Opinion
2008-1347 RO CR.
Decided June 29, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Suffern, Rockland County (Richard H. Ackerson, J.), rendered June 9, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of displaying the word "Police" on a private motor vehicle.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
PRESENT: RUDOLPH, P.J., TANENBAUM and NICOLAI, JJ.
Defendant was found guilty after a nonjury trial of the traffic infraction of displaying the word "Police" in capital letters on a private motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 396 (2). Said provision prohibits a person from using or displaying such word, "or any other matter," indicating ownership, possession or use of a vehicle by a police department, upon a motor vehicle on a public highway when the vehicle is not used by a member or employee of a duly organized police department. The evidence at trial showed, inter alia, that the commercial vehicle being operated by defendant was a white Ford covered pickup truck, the doors of which bore a company's name, "GEESE POLICE," with a six-pointed badge or star between such words, and a "bubble" type of amber light on its roof. Notwithstanding that the vehicle bore statements and other indications suggesting that it was not a police vehicle, we are of the view that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), was sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The issues raised by defendant on this appeal are without merit. The prior acquittal of a different defendant charged with operating a different truck bearing the words "GEESE POLICE" on its doors did not render the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable to the subject case, in the absence of the prerequisites of identity of parties and of issues ( see People v Aguilera, 82 NY2d 23, 29-30; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 346).
Furthermore, the defense of justification is inapplicable to the facts herein ( see Penal Law § 35.05). Defendant's conduct was not committed in a place where the placement of the name of his employer was "required or authorized by law" (Penal Law § 35.05). Moreover, the situation was not one "occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor" (Penal Law § 35.05). Defendant chose to drive a truck bearing the word "POLICE," along with other matter, making the truck resemble a police vehicle, which word and markings defendant's employer appears to have elected to adopt and display without sufficient consideration of any adverse legal consequences.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and Nicolai, JJ., concur.