Opinion
C081207
04-07-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLAUDIENS SANTRAIL GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15F04437)
Defendant Claudiens Santrail Griffin was found guilty by a jury of first degree residential burglary and inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a person whom defendant has, or previously had, a dating relationship with. The jury also found true the enhancement that another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary. It also found true the allegation defendant had one strike prior and had served one prior prison term. The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison and ordered him to pay various fines and fees. Defendant timely appealed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2013, defendant began dating T'Keyah Greer. In April 2015, defendant and Greer moved into an apartment together on Boxwood Street in North Sacramento. According to Greer, both of their names were on the lease, and the SMUD bill was in defendant's name.
In June 2015, Greer ended her relationship with defendant and "kicked him out" of their apartment when she discovered he had cheated on her. Although their relationship had ended, Greer continued to see defendant.
Several days after Greer told defendant to leave the apartment, she called 911 claiming defendant had been threatening her and was trying to kick her door down. Greer explained she had invited defendant into her apartment but told him to leave after she got mad at him. When the police arrived several hours later, defendant was gone. After this incident, Greer continued to hang out with defendant but did not intend on getting back together with him. Greer also allowed defendant to come over to her apartment on several occasions to collect his belongings and shower.
On July 19, 2015, Greer called 911 because defendant had been texting her some "crazy stuff after she placed his belongings outside the apartment and began dating someone else. During the 911 call, Greer said defendant had previously kicked her door down, was harassing her, and was threatening to "put his hands on [her]" and knock her out. She also said there was a history of domestic violence between them. Greer explained she called 911 because she knew defendant was upset and on his way over to the apartment to collect his belongings. She also said she was afraid of what he might do. According to Greer, her relationship with defendant was "totally over" at that point.
On July 21, 2015, Greer invited defendant into her apartment to talk. During the conversation, Greer became upset and told defendant to leave. Shortly after defendant left, Greer called 911. During the call, Greer claimed defendant had broken into her apartment by busting through the front door, threatened to kill her, and hit her.
When the police arrived at Greer's apartment, an officer noticed the front door had been "busted open." Greer was visibly upset, crying, and grabbing her face, which was swollen and red. Greer said defendant had broken into her apartment and punched her in the head at least three times. Greer also said she was afraid she would be hurt or killed if defendant or any member of his family found out she told the police he had punched her. Greer's 15-year-old sister, M. L., told the police a black male had forced his way into the apartment and hit her sister in the face two times with an open hand.
At trial, Greer testified defendant did not threaten to kill her, break her apartment door, or hit her on July 21, 2015. Greer explained she was taking a lot of medicine at the time and was not in her right mind. She further explained she told the police defendant had broken into her apartment and punched her because the officers who responded to the 911 call were pressuring her, and because she believed she would go to jail for calling the police and lying.
At trial, M. L. denied she made this statement to the police. M. L. claimed she told the police she did not know what happened because she was sleeping. M. L. also claimed she did not see any injuries sustained by her sister. However, she admitted her sister was crying and the front door was broken.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts and procedural history of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date the opening brief was filed. Defendant filed a timely supplemental brief arguing reversal is warranted for various reasons. In addition to undertaking a review of the record as required by Wende, we will address the issues raised in defendant's supplemental brief.
I
Instructional Error
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury he could not be convicted of burglarizing Greer's apartment because his name was on the lease to that apartment. We disagree.
"[S]ince burglary is a breach of the occupant's possessory rights, a person who enters a structure enumerated in section 459 with the intent to commit a felony is guilty of burglary except when he or she (1) has an unconditional possessory right to enter as the occupant of that structure or (2) is invited in by the occupant who knows of and endorses the felonious intent." (People v. Salemme (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 775, 781.) An unconditional possessory right to enter a building is a defense to burglary, not an element of the crime. (See People v. Felix (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1397 [holding that consent to enter a building (which would include an unconditional possessory right to enter) is not an element of burglary, but a defense].) "In the absence of a request for a particular instruction, a trial court's obligation to instruct on a particular defense arises ' "only if [1] it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or [2] if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case." ' " (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1148.)
Here, defendant did not rely on the defense he had an unconditional possessory right to enter the apartment. Therefore, the trial court did not have an obligation to instruct on this defense unless substantial evidence showed defendant had an unconditional possessory right to enter the apartment.
An unconditional possessory right to enter is the "right to exert control over property to the exclusion of others" or the "right to enter as the occupant of that structure." (People v. Salemme, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779, 781.) Even assuming defendant had a possessory interest in the apartment under the lease at the time of the charged crimes, this was not a complete defense to the burglary charge because evidence showed that he had moved out of the apartment before the crimes, and therefore no longer had an unconditional possessory interest in the apartment unit. (People v. Ulloa (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 601, 606-607.) The evidence showed that defendant moved out of the apartment in June 2015, when his relationship with Greer ended. By moving out, defendant abandoned his unconditional possessory right to enter or inhabit the apartment, despite his name being on the lease. (Id. at p. 609.) The record discloses that defendant was not allowed to enter the apartment without Greer's permission. Thus, Greer was the only person with a possessory interest in the apartment at the time of the burglary. (See People v. Gill (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 149, 161 [no unconditional possessory right to enter where husband voluntarily left the family home]; People v. Ulloa, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 606-610 [no unconditional possessory right to enter where husband voluntarily moved out of apartment].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on the right to enter as a defense to burglary.
II
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law. According to defendant, the prosecutor misstated the law when he referred to the Boxwood apartment as Greer's residence instead of referring to the apartment as defendant's and Greer's residence. We disagree.
We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct pursuant to a settled standard. "Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes use of 'deceptive or reprehensible methods' when attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the defendant's specific constitutional rights--such as a comment upon the defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent--but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional violation unless the challenged action ' "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." ' " (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 298.) In addition, " 'a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion--and on the same ground--the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.' " (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 952.) Objection may be excused if it would have been futile or an admonition would not have cured the harm. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)
Preliminarily, defendant has forfeited his claim of misconduct because he did not object at trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct and did not request an admonition. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 763, 766.) Further, defendant failed to show that an objection would have been futile or admonition would not have cured the purported harm. In any event, defendant's claim lacks merit. Defendant failed to show the prosecutor made any improper statements. As discussed above, Greer was the only person with a possessory interest in the apartment after defendant voluntarily left the apartment in June 2015. Therefore, it was not improper for the prosecutor to refer to the residence as Greer's apartment. Moreover, we perceive no prejudice from the alleged misconduct.
III
Ineffective Assistance
Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call his landlord as a witness to establish he was a legal resident of the apartment. We disagree.
Defendant also suggests trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the right to enter defense. However, because substantial evidence did not support such an instruction, counsel's performance was not deficient. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246.)
There are two elements to an ineffective assistance claim: (1) deficient performance, and (2) prejudice resulting from such deficient performance. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 961.) The deficient performance element consists of "a showing that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' " (In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602-603, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693].) To satisfy the second element of "prejudice," the defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been more favorable to defendant, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 201.)
Here, it was undisputed that defendant was on the lease of the apartment. Therefore, counsel's decision not to call the landlord of the apartment to establish this fact does not constitute deficient performance. Moreover, defendant failed to show he suffered any prejudice from counsel's alleged deficient performance.
IV
Sufficiency Of The Evidence
Defendant suggests there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for infliction of corporal injury because there were no pictures or medical records showing Greer suffered any injuries, Greer testified she did not suffer any injuries, and her sister did not observe any injuries. We disagree.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--to support the decision. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638.) "We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses." (Ibid.)
Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) prohibits inflicting "corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition" upon someone with whom the offender has, or previously had, a dating relationship. Subdivision (d) of Penal Code section 273.5 defines " 'traumatic condition' " as "a condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury . . . whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force." Here, there is ample evidence in the record to support defendant's conviction for infliction of corporal injury. The record reflects defendant broke down Greer's door and hit her in the face several times, causing swelling and redness.
We note that the same evidence is sufficient to support defendant's burglary conviction and the occupied burglary enhancement. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record pursuant to Wende, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. Consequently, we will affirm the judgment. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.) We have, however, noticed an error in the abstract of judgment that requires correction. The trial court orally imposed a $10 crime prevention program fine. (Pen. Code, § 1202.5, subd. (a).) This fine was omitted from the abstract of judgment. "Rendition of the judgment is normally an oral pronouncement, and the abstract of judgment cannot add to, or modify, the judgment, but only purports to digest and summarize it." (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 389.) We will order the clerk to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.
The trial court imposed the crime prevention program fine without determining defendant's ability to pay the fine. When a trial court imposes a fine under section 1202.5, it must also impose additional penalties, assessments, and surcharges. (See People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 935; People v. Castellanos (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1528-1530.) We shall decline to modify the sentence since we are conducting a Wende review and increasing the imposed fine would not benefit defendant. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk is ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the imposition of a $10 crime prevention program fine. The clerk shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/_________
Robie, J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Duarte, J.