Opinion
4-21-0664 4-21-0665
03-18-2022
In re W.H. and Z.H., Minors v. Gretchen G., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike County Nos. 21JA5, 21JA6 Honorable Ramon Manuel Escapa, Judge Presiding.
HARRIS, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's neglect finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Respondent, Gretchen G., appeals from the trial court's judgment finding her minor children, W.H. (born March 29, 2016) and Z.H. (born March 7, 2017), to be neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and making them wards of the court. On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in adjudicating the minors neglected. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On March 19, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship with respect to W.H. and Z.H., alleging the minors were neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act because their environment was injurious to their welfare when residing with respondent and their father, David H., in that it exposed them to domestic violence. Specifically, the State alleged that on March 17, 2019, both children told their bus driver they had witnessed David H. punch respondent in the face, causing her to bleed. The State further alleged respondent "has previously made numerous calls to 911 for domestic violence and then refuses to cooperate."
¶ 5 On August 4 and 25, 2021, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Jennifer Ruzich, the minors' school bus driver, testified that on March 17, 2021, as she was securing the minors' seat belts, Z.H. said," 'My dad punched my mommy and her head is bleeding,' and then [W.H.] said, 'Yes, daddy punched mommy and her face was bleeding.' Ruzich reported the minors' statements to a classroom aide when she dropped the children off at school.
¶ 6 Jennifer Herren, the minors' preschool teacher, testified that the classroom aide informed her about what the minors had said on the school bus. Herren then "sat down with [Z.H.] and asked her about her day and then she shared some of the same information with me." Herren testified that Z.H. said "her daddy had hit her mommy in the face and that her mommy had blood on her face." Herren took Z.H. to the principal's office, and Z.H. told the principal the same thing.
¶ 7 Sandra Groom testified that she lived across the street from respondent and David H. On April 20, 2019, she called the police after witnessing a domestic dispute involving respondent and David H. Groom explained that on this date, she was sitting on her deck when she heard David H. loudly yelling the "F" word at respondent while respondent was crying. Groom got up to see what was transpiring and observed David H. push respondent into their house with one hand. Groom testified that W.H. and Z.H. were on the porch watching the incident. Groom further testified that she called the police because she was concerned about the minors being present during the alleged altercation.
¶ 8 Brad Wassell, an officer with the Pittsfield Police Department, testified that on April 20, 2018, he was dispatched to the hospital to meet with respondent. Wassell testified respondent's eye was injured and had "some sort of bleeding and/or severe redness." At first, respondent declined to tell Wassell what had happened, citing "the financial stake and for also having another parent assist with childcare." Ultimately, respondent told Wassell that she had gotten into an argument with David H. and David H. "struck her with an open hand to her right eye one time." David H. was arrested for domestic battery, but respondent did not want to press charges, so he was never prosecuted in relation to this incident.
¶ 9 Jordan Gerard, an officer with the Pittsfield Police Department, testified that on March 18, 2021, he was dispatched to the residence of respondent and David H. According to Gerard, when he met with respondent on March 18, he observed a laceration above her right eye with "dried blood on it." Gerard further testified he had been dispatched to their residence "numerous times" in the past "based upon 911 calls that were made where screaming and yelling was going on in the background." Gerard was also present when the minors were interviewed at the Children's Advocacy Center (CAC). The CAC interviews were recorded and played at the hearing over respondent's objection. Respondent objected to the introduction of the recordings on the basis it was a due process violation because the "whole process amounts to *** an evidence deposition without notice, without opportunity for input or contact."
¶ 10 Jennifer Lovelace, an investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), testified that on March 17, 2021, she was assigned to investigate a hotline report involving W.H. and Z.H. The following day, Lovelace went to respondent and David H.'s residence along with several police officers. David H. informed Lovelace he did not know what had happened to respondent's face. When Lovelace asked respondent about her face, respondent said "she had hit it on the car door." Respondent also said that David H. had helped her clean up the blood. Lovelace then asked respondent why David H. said he did not know what happened, and respondent answered, "he probably didn't want to incriminate himself." Lovelace testified she observed "visible bruising" to respondent's right eye and a scab above the eye. Lovelace further testified she had received a separate hotline report on March 6, 2021, involving a "bad physical, violent fight between the two of them."
¶ 11 Respondent testified that the relevant injury to her eye was caused by inadvertently hitting herself in the face with her car door and David H. was inside at the time. Respondent then went inside, and David H. helped her tend to the injury and clean up the blood. Respondent further testified that she and David H. had previously "argued in front of the kids but nothing physical."
¶ 12 At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found the State had proven the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In its written order finding the minors were neglected, the court noted it based its finding on the following facts: "minors reported to bus driver and school teacher that they witnessed father strike mother and subsequently gave consistent CAC interviews." The court later clarified its ruling was that the "minor children were neglected because of being exposed to environment injurious due to observing domestic violence between mother and father."
¶ 13 On October 14, 2021, the trial court conducted the dispositional hearing. The court noted it had considered the dispositional report and an addendum to the report. According to the report, David H. was incarcerated in Ohio after being charged with attempted murder and felonious assault; sentencing was scheduled for September 22, 2021. The court noted at the hearing that David H. had been convicted of felonious assault and was sentenced to "seven to ten years in corrections." The addendum to the dispositional report indicated that during a family trip to Florida in September 2021, respondent became upset when "her needs were not being considered" at Disney World. A "verbal argument" ensued between respondent and her aunt while W.H. and Z.H. were present. At some point during the argument, respondent threw a water bottle at her aunt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding respondent unfit and making the minors wards of the court.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Respondent argues the trial court erred in finding the minors were neglected. Specifically, respondent contends (1) the minors' statements were insufficient under section 2-18(4) (c) of the Act (705 ILCS 4-5/2-18(4)(c) (West 2018)) to support the neglect finding because the minors were not subject to cross-examination, (2) proof of her mental impairment was insufficient to support the court's finding, and (3) the original situation giving rise to the allegations of neglect no longer exist, making the issue of an injurious environment "now moot."
¶ 17 The Act provides a two-step process to employ when determining whether minor children should be removed from their parents' custody and made wards of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. Step one requires the trial court to conduct an adjudicatory hearing on the petition for adjudication of wardship to consider only whether the minor children are abused, neglected, or dependent. See 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2018). If the court finds the minor children are abused, neglected, or dependent, the proceedings advance to the second step-the dispositional hearing. See id. § 2-21(2). At the dispositional hearing, the court must determine whether the health, safety, and best interests of the minors and the public require that they be made wards of the court. See id.
¶ 18 Section 2-3(1) (b) of the Act provides that a "neglected minor" includes any minor "whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare." Id. § 2-3(1)(b). "Generally, 'neglect' is defined as the failure to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Arthur H., 212 Ill.2d 441, 463 (2004). "[T]he term 'injurious environment' has been interpreted to include the breach of a parent's duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "It is the burden of the State to prove allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] In other words, the State must establish that the allegations of neglect are more probably true than not." Id. at 463-64. We will not disturb a trial court's finding of neglect on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident." Id.
¶ 19 Respondent's first argument is that the trial court erred in basing its neglect finding "solely, or almost solely, *** on the children's statements." Respondent contends doing so violated section 2-18(4) (c) of the Act because the minors did not testify and therefore were not subject to cross-examination.
¶ 20 Section 2-18(4) (c) of the Act provides the following: "Previous statements made by the minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4) (c) (West 2018). Our supreme court has noted that" [u]nder the plain language of the second sentence, a minor's hearsay statement is sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect where the statement either is subject to cross-examination or is corroborated by other evidence." In re A.P., 179 Ill.2d 184, 196 (1997). The A.P. court went on to define corroborating evidence in this context as follows:
" [Corroborating evidence of the abuse or neglect requires there to be independent evidence which would support a logical and reasonable inference that the act of abuse or neglect described in the hearsay statement occurred. In essence, corroborating evidence is evidence that makes it more probable that a minor was abused or neglected. The form of corroboration will vary depending on the facts of each case and can include physical or circumstantial evidence." Id. at 199.
¶ 21 Here, we reject respondent's argument for several reasons. Initially, we note respondent forfeited the issue by failing to raise an appropriate objection at the adjudicatory hearing. See, e.g., In re April C, 326 Ill.App.3d 225, 242 (2001) ("Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is [forfeited]."). Although respondent objected to the introduction of the minors' CAC interviews, she did so on the basis it was a due process violation, not on the basis the minors' hearsay statements were insufficiently corroborated for purposes of section 2-18(4) (c) of the Act.
¶ 22 Additionally, respondent's argument is meritless on its face because she asserts only that the minors were not subject to cross-examination but makes no allegation the hearsay statements were not corroborated by other evidence. See A.P., 179 Ill.2d at 196 (noting the statement is insufficient only if not subject to cross-examination and'not corroborated by other evidence). In fact, respondent concedes in her brief that the hearsay statements were "corroborated by tangential and generic police testimony of prior calls to the residence." Therefore, respondent's argument is facially without merit.
¶ 23 Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, respondent had argued the minors' hearsay statements lacked sufficient corroboration, we would likewise reject such a contention. W.H. and Z.H. reported witnessing David H. punch respondent in the face on March 17, 2021, causing respondent's face to bleed. These statements were corroborated by the testimony of Officer Gerard and DCFS investigator Jessica Lovelace. Both witnesses testified that they observed bruising and a laceration to respondent's right eye when they met with her on March 18. The minors' statements were further corroborated by the conflicting versions of events given by respondent and David H. Respondent testified she injured her eye by inadvertently hitting herself in the face with her car door. Respondent further testified that David H. helped her tend to the injury and clean up the blood immediately after it happened. However, Lovelace testified that David H. told her he had no idea what had happened to respondent's face. These conflicting versions make it more probable that respondent and David H. were lying about what had transpired. Accordingly, because the minors' hearsay statements were corroborated by other evidence, the trial court did not err in relying on those statements in finding the State had proved the minors were neglected due to exposure to domestic violence.
¶ 24 In closing, we note it is not necessary to discuss respondent's remaining two arguments at length. As noted above, respondent's second argument is that "proof of [her] mental impairment was not sufficient" to support the neglect finding. However, no evidence of mental impairment was presented at the adjudicatory hearing, and respondent's mental condition was completely irrelevant to the question of whether the minors were neglected as a result of being exposed to domestic violence. Instead, the evidence respondent complains of-i.e., the Disney World incident-was not presented until the dispositional stage, and it therefore had no bearing on the court's neglect finding.
¶ 25 Respondent's final argument is that "the manifest weight of the evidence showed that the injurious environment is now moot" because David H. is apparently serving "at least a seven[-]year prison term for felonious assault" in Ohio. Respondent does not elaborate further with respect to this argument. It is not clear if she is challenging the court's neglect finding or the dispositional order. Respondent also does not cite to any authority in support of her argument. Accordingly, because we are unable to discern exactly what respondent is attempting to argue, and because she has failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) by failing to cite to any authority for support, we decline to address her contention.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 28 Affirmed.