Opinion
B184947
12-7-2006
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COLIN GRANT, Defendant and Appellant.
Sally P. Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Ryan B. McCarroll, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Colin Grant (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated plea of no contest to possessing cocaine for sale and after he admitted he possessed more than one kilogram of a controlled substance by weight. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11370.4, subd. (a)(1).) Before he entered his negotiated plea, the trial court denied his motion to suppress illegally seized evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years in state prison.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his search and seizure motion. He makes two arguments: (1) The seizure of the brick of cocaine and of the United States currency was the fruit of an illegal traffic stop, and (2) there was no probable cause justifying the automobile search.
We conclude that the contention is meritless because the prosecution produced evidence supporting a conclusion that the officers engaged in a valid warrantless automobile search justified by probable cause. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.
THE FACTS
I. The Evidence Established at the Motion to Suppress
The motion was submitted after several exhibits were entered into evidence and several police officers testified in support of a valid search and seizure. We state the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courts ruling. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679.)
In June 2001, a multijurisdictional narcotics task force, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDA), was engaged in judicially authorized wiretaps on two cellular telephones belonging to a large scale narcotics trafficker, Clemente Gonzalez. On June 10, 2001, Los Angeles Police Officer Sal Duarte, who speaks Spanish, listened to the recordings of that days wire intercepts for the cellular telephones. That day, Gonzalez had spoken to his own minion, Manuel Hernandez, and a number of times to a man who called himself "Security."
Based upon the information disclosed during these telephone conversations and the officers expertise concerning narcotics investigations, Los Angeles Police Detective Brain Agnew and Officer Duarte formed the opinions that Gonzalez was planning to sell one or two kilograms of cocaine that afternoon. Officer Duarte concluded that Security was serving as the middleman facilitating the sale, and the buyer was the person Gonzalez and Security referred to as the "Jamaican." At the suppression hearing, transcripts of the recorded wire intercepts were entered into evidence.
Officer Duarte and Detective Agnew testified to the important details of the planned transaction. Officer Duarte said that the "coded" cellular telephone conversations indicated that Gonzalez planned to sell illicit cocaine to an African-American buyer. The officers explained that Security had referred to the purchaser as a "male Black Jamaican" and told Gonzalez that the Jamaican was from Washington. During the conversations, Gonzalez and Security had negotiated a purchase price for the cocaine of $15,400 per kilogram.
Gonzalez initially directed Security to meet his people at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant near El Segundo Boulevard and Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles. Based on information the task force had developed during their prior investigation of Gonzalezs drug operation, the officers concluded that Gonzalez was planning to complete the sale at an apartment complex located at 730 and 740 El Segundo Boulevard, an apartment he had previously used for this purpose and in which a girlfriend lived.
When Security indicated over the telephone that the purchaser was an African-American man, Gonzalez told Security that he would sell the purchaser only one kilogram of cocaine that afternoon. Gonzalez said that if all went well, he would sell the other kilogram to the purchaser at a later time. The officers believed that Gonzalez did not want the purchaser, a stranger, to go to a location in Gardena where Gonzalez maintained a "stash."
On the telephone, Security identified the vehicle in which they would arrive as a burgundy Ford Expedition. In anticipation of the sale, Gonzalez telephoned Hernandez and directed Hernandez to move contraband to the El Segundo Boulevard apartment complex.
Detective Agnew informed the task force supervisor, Detective Gerard Kennelly, about their information. Detective Kennelly made arrangements with the local watch commander to have two uniformed Los Angeles police officers in a marked police car stop Securitys sports utility vehicle (SUV) after it left the apartment. By cellular telephone, Detective Kennelly directed uniformed Los Angeles Police Officers Robert Worrall and his partner Sobieski to follow the SUV when it left the location. Detective Kennelly told the uniformed officers to follow the SUV and stop it whenever the uniformed officers developed probable cause for a traffic stop.
Officer Worrall testified that before the stop, he was informed that the HIDA officers believed that "a possible narcotics deal" was "going down." He was also told that the SUV would be occupied by an African-American man and possibly two Hispanic males.
By cellular telephone, the uniformed officers were informed that the SUV was leaving the apartment complex. Officers Worrall and Sobieski observed the burgundy Ford Expedition SUV leaving the complex and followed it. At a distance from the complex, Officer Worrall observed that the SUV had an item hanging from its rearview mirror. He concluded that the presence of that item in the SUV constituted a Vehicle Code violation.
It was not apparent from the hearing testimony whether the task force was conducting a surveillance of the location or whether the task force was depending entirely on the cellular telephone communications for the information that the SUV had left the apartment.
During cross-examination, Officer Worrall explained that the driver was violating Vehicle Code section 26708 as there was "an object hanging from the rearview mirror, obstructing [the drivers] forward view." As nearly as Officer Worrall could recall, the hanging item was an air freshener.
In pertinent part, Vehicle Code section 26708 provides as follows: "(a)(1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied upon the windshield or side or rear windows. [¶] (2) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle which obstructs or reduces the drivers clear view through the windshield or side windows."
After observing the traffic violation, Officer Worrall and his partner effected a traffic stop. Two Hispanic men occupied the SUVs front seat, and an African-American man, defendant, occupied the SUVs rear seat. Officer Worrall asked the occupants to step out of the SUV, and the three men complied. Officer Worrall asked the driver for his drivers license. The driver gave Officer Worrall a California identification card. By radio, Officer Worrall discovered that the driver had no drivers license. Officer Worrall exercised his discretion to impound the SUV.
Preparatory to impound, Officer Worrall conducted an inventory search of the SUV. In the rear seat, where defendant had been sitting, respectively inside a bag and a cardboard box, Officer Worrall discovered $10,700 in United States currency and a brick of cocaine. When Officer Worrall discovered the brick of cocaine, Officer Worrall arrested defendant and the two Hispanics, Higinio Paez "Security" Rodriguez and Aniceto Gomez.
At the police station, Detective Kennelly asked defendant whether he would fill out a disclaimer of ownership of property form with respect to the items found in the SUVs rear seat. Defendant responded that "[h]e did not know anything about it and it wasnt his." The disclaimer form, exhibit 4, was entered into evidence.
II. The Trial Courts Ruling
At the hearing, the prosecutor raised the issue of whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy permitting him to challenge the search and seizure. The prosecutor proffered two theories of justification for the officers conduct: (1) There was a valid traffic stop, and the drivers failure to have a valid drivers license warranted the impound and the inventory search, and (2) the search of the closed containers within the SUV was justified because the officers had probable cause entitling them to conduct a valid warrantless automobile search.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court found that the officers had stopped the SUV in part because they believed that defendant was a drug trafficker. The trial court ruled that such evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was seized during the course of the SUVs stop, and thus, defendant was permitted to challenge the validity of the stop. However, with respect to the automobile search, defendant had failed to carry his burden of showing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the SUV or in its closed containers.
Defense counsel did not comment on whether defendant was seized or whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and cardboard box in the SUV. Defense counsel addressed only the merits of whether the officers had reasonable and probable cause. Counsel argued that the traffic stop was an impermissible seizure, i.e., that the "stopping" violated the Fourth Amendment because the SUV "was going to be stopped no matter what." As to probable cause, defense counsel urged that "[T]here are a lot of [burgundy] Ford Excursions in this city," some of which also happen to have one African-American passenger and possibly two Hispanic men. Defense counsel argued that the stop was illegal, and consequently, the seized contraband and currency constituted "the fruits of the poisonous tree."
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It found that the search of the SUV was a valid warrantless automobile search. It said that there was probable cause for the search because the description of the SUV and its occupants matched the information developed during the officers investigation. The trial court commented that the uniformed officers had stopped "not just any burgundy Excursion, it [was] a burgundy Excursion at that place, at that location, [and] at that time." It said that probable cause required only "a fair probability [that the] contraband" be present inside the automobile searched and that the officers "clearly" had developed probable cause. It observed that it was irrelevant to the reasonableness of the search that Detective Kennelly had directed Officer Worrall to develop independent probable cause for a traffic stop. The trial court concluded that the officers subjective beliefs about the existence of reasonable or probable cause were irrelevant. It said that the question of whether the officers knew facts sufficient to constitute reasonable or probable cause was an objective inquiry for the trial court.
In the alternative, the trial court found a valid traffic stop. It observed that Officer Worrall had testified that the drivers view was obstructed by the item hanging from the SUVs rearview mirror. Accordingly, the traffic stop was justified. It also observed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the SUV contained contraband and the occupants were involved in drug trafficking. The officers also had probable cause to arrest the driver for failing to have a valid California drivers license. As the search was contemporaneous with the occupants arrests, the search was additionally justified as incident to arrest.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that evidence of the brick of cocaine and the currency should have been suppressed as they were the fruit of a traffic stop that was unlawful at its inception. To support his challenge on appeal, he cites this court to the decision in People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 642 (White). He claims that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy entitling him to challenge the traffic stop as he was a passenger in the SUV during the stop. On appeal, his theory for claiming a lack of a justification for the traffic stop is that Officer Worrall made a mistake of law by concluding that the driver of the SUV had violated Vehicle Code section 26708, driving a motor vehicle with the vehicles windshield improperly obstructed. He argues that the evidentiary posture in White is identical to that here, that the decision in White requires that we find no traffic violation and an illegal traffic stop, and that the contraband and currency obtained as a result of that illegal stop must be suppressed. (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484-485; People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1107, 1113-1114 (Brendlin).)
Defendant also asserts that there was no valid alternative justification for the search. He argues that at the hearing, the prosecutor asserted that the HIDA officers had independently developed probable cause to search the SUV because its occupants were apparently involved then and there in drug trafficking and that the officers had probable cause to believe that the SUV contained cocaine and other evidence of drug trafficking. On appeal, he claims that there was no probable cause to justify the search because the evidence at the hearing established that Detective Kennelly gave directions to Officer Worrall that he should stop the SUV only after he observed a traffic violation. As nearly as we can discern, by this claim, defendant is asserting that Detective Kennellys insistence that the uniformed officers stop the SUV only after they had observed a traffic violation had the effect of negating the existence of probable cause. Without citing any authorities relevant to our determination of probable cause, defendant also argues that the information known to the officers about this particular SUV and its occupants was insufficiently specific to demonstrate probable cause and to justify the warrantless automobile search.
Defendant concludes his argument by asserting that because neither of the prosecutions proffered justifications prove to demonstrate a reasonable search and seizure, he is entitled to have the trial courts ruling reversed and to have his plea set aside. We disagree.
I. The Relevant Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. We review the trial courts resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. (Brendlin, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1113-1114; accord, People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134 (Saunders).)
II. The Relevant Legal Principles
The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained. (California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 580.) During such a search, the police "may inspect passengers belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search." (Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 U.S. 295, 307.)
Taking into account an officers common sense and experience, probable cause exists where, given all the facts at the time of the search, "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.)
III. The Analysis
The trial courts ruling that the collective information known to the officers justified an automobile search is supported by the evidence and by the law. "`If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search." (Wyoming v. Houghton, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 301, quoting United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 825, italics omitted.) On appeal, defendant argues that the wiretap information known to the officers was insufficiently specific to constitute probable cause. Neither party has cited any pertinent authorities to guide us in this determination. However, during our brief research on the point, we discovered a factually apposite federal case that supports the trial courts ruling.
In U.S. v. Ford (4th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 1350 (Ford), through a judicially authorized wire intercept, the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents (FBI) discovered that a Maryland drug dealer named Winestock had contacted a Pennsylvania man, Ford. Ford made arrangements to supply Winestock with cocaine. (Id. at p. 1357.) The agents monitored the mens telephone conversations. In November 1990, the FBI overheard a call from "Eric" to Winestock, telling him that the "`main man" had "`something" for him that would be available the next day. There was a further conversation between Eric and Winestock in which they set the price per kilogram during the sale and the commission the courier was to be paid. There was another telephone call the next day from Eric to Winestock confirming that his driver was at the International House of Pancakes in a rented red Corsica. Later that morning, by telephone, the courier and Winestock spoke to Eric. They confirmed that the transaction was completed and that the courier was at a certain hotel. (Ibid.)
FBI agents at the scene went to the hotel. (Ford, supra, 88 F.3d at p. 1357.) They saw a rented red Corsica with Pennsylvania license plates in the hotel parking lot. The FBI agents confirmed the personal descriptions of the occupants of the hotel rooms that were registered to Winestock and that these physical descriptions fit two women driving off in the direction of Philadelphia on I-95 in the rented red Corsica. (Ibid.) One of the FBI agents concluded that the women in the red Corsica were the drug couriers working for the drug organization selling Winestock the cocaine. That agent had the FBI agents at the scene stop and search the Corsica. From one of the women, the agents on the scene obtained permission to search the trunk of the Corsica. Inside a shoebox in the truck, the FBI agents found several kilograms of cocaine. (Id. at p. 1358.)
The Ford court held that the FBI agents had probable cause to search the Corsica, including its trunk and the closed containers inside the truck. (Ford, supra, 88 F.3d at p. 1358.) It concluded from the intercepted telephone calls that the FBI agents knew that the women in the Corsica had delivered five kilograms of cocaine to Winestock. The federal court said that that fact alone likely established probable cause to believe that the Corsica contained either more cocaine or the payment resulting from the sale. At the very least, the Corsica would have contained the courier fee. The couriers southerly direction on Highway I-95 also indicated that the couriers probably were on their way to make another delivery. As there was probable cause that the Corsica contained illicit drugs and money, the FBI was justified in initiating a search of the Corsica. (Ibid.)
The facts in the Ford case are analogous to what occurred here. Consequently, we conclude that the prosecution adequately justified the warrantless automobile search. The officers collectively had probable cause to search the SUV for illicit drugs and other evidence of drug trafficking.
With respect to the automobile search, defendant seems to be arguing that search was invalid as it was a pretext search, i.e., regardless of the existence of probable cause, the officers intended to stop that SUV and seize its occupants. The point is not well taken. It is well settled that the officers subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. (Arkansas v. Sullivan (2001) 532 U.S. 769, 772; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 812-813.) The reasonableness of a search is determined by the circumstances known to the officers when the search was conducted. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334.) In its ruling, the trial court commented on defendants claim that the officers state of mind impacted the evaluation of probable cause. The trial court properly concluded that probable cause did not depend upon the subjective beliefs of the officers, but upon the trial courts conclusion about whether the facts known to the officers objectively constituted probable cause. We conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that probable cause justified the detention and the search of the SUV because the officers believed that the occupants of the SUV were engaged in drug trafficking.
Also, in making the above point, we should observe that the uniformed police officers did not have to know the precise basis for their fellow officers conclusions about probable cause. When police officers work together to build "`collective knowledge" so as to establish probable cause, the important question is not what each officer knew, but how valid and reasonable the probable cause was that was developed by the officers collective knowledge. (People v. Ramirez (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1555; People v. Ngaue (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 896, 906.) The instant search was justified by the observations of the detaining officers, the objective facts developed by the task force officers during their wire intercepts, by the task force officers narcotics expertise, and by the previous information that the task force officers had developed about Gonzalezs drug operations. The evidence at the hearing supported a ruling that the warrantless automobile search was reasonable.
Furthermore, in Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 148, the United States Supreme Court held that a mere passenger in an automobile ordinarily does not have the legitimate expectation of privacy necessary to launch a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of the automobile. At the hearing, defendant did not introduce evidence supporting a conclusion that he had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the SUV or in the bag and the box inside the SUV that would have entitled him to challenge the search. Accordingly, at the outset, the decision in Rakas prevents him from launching a Fourth Amendment challenge to the instant automobile search. (Rakas, supra, at p. 148; People v. Jackson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1370.)
The trial court ruled on the instant motion to suppress before the California Supreme Court filed the Brendlin and Saunders decisions. In those decisions, the California Supreme Court settled the circumstances in which a passenger in a vehicle is "seized" during a traffic stop so that the passenger is entitled to challenge the legality of the stop. (Brendlin, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1123; accord, Saunders, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)
As defendant did not show an invasion of his Fourth Amendment interests, and the prosecution produced evidence of probable cause permitting the officers to conduct a warrantless automobile search, it is inconsequential whether the uniformed officers also conducted a valid traffic stop. (Saunders, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1134, 1137.) As the outcome of defendants further claim of an illegal traffic stop will not affect the judgment, we decline to reach that issue.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
BOREN, P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.