Opinion
10-07-2016
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Caitlin M. Connelly of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Michael J. Flaherty, Jr., Acting District Attorney, Buffalo, for Respondent.
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Caitlin M. Connelly of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Michael J. Flaherty, Jr., Acting District Attorney, Buffalo, for Respondent.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of two counts each of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16[1], [12] ) and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (§ 220.50[2], [3] ). Defendant's conviction stems from the seizure of cocaine and drug paraphernalia during a search of his residence conducted by parole officers and police officers. Defendant's parole officer testified at the suppression hearing that he made the determination to search defendant's residence based on defendant's recent parole violations and the fact that, despite being unemployed, on one occasion he possessed a large sum of cash (see People v. Maynard, 67 A.D.3d 1391, 1391, 887 N.Y.S.2d 882, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 890, 903 N.Y.S.2d 778, 929 N.E.2d 1013 ). We agree with Supreme Court that the search was “rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty” (People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 ; see People v. Escalera, 121 A.D.3d 1519, 1520, 993 N.Y.S.2d 605, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1083, 1 N.Y.S.3d 10, 25 N.E.3d 347 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that another parole officer and police officers assisted defendant's parole officer during the search did not render it a police operation (see People v. Adams, 126 A.D.3d 1405, 1405–1406, 5 N.Y.S.3d 779, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1158, 15 N.Y.S.3d 291, 36 N.E.3d 94 ). Defendant's remaining contentions regarding the search of his residence were not raised in his motion papers or before the suppression court and are therefore not preserved for our review (see generally People v. Schluter, 136 A.D.3d 1363, 1363, 24 N.Y.S.3d 478, lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 1138, 39 N.Y.S.3d 121, 61 N.E.3d 520 ; People v. Fuentes, 52 A.D.3d 1297, 1298, 859 N.Y.S.2d 841, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 736, 864 N.Y.S.2d 395, 894 N.E.2d 659 ). We decline to exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[3][c] ). Finally, the period of postrelease supervision is not unduly harsh or severe (see People v. Singer, 104 A.D.3d 1311, 1312, 960 N.Y.S.2d 924 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.