Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. PA053173 Robert J. Schuit, Judge.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, J.
Timothy B. Gordon appeals from the judgment following his multiple convictions of first degree burglary and other offenses for breaking into cars in enclosed parking areas of several apartment buildings. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In late September and early October 2005, a number of cars in enclosed garages (or in one case, a covered carport) of apartment buildings in the Sunland-Tujunga area of Los Angeles were broken into and the car owners’ personal items stolen. On October 10, a Los Angeles police detective investigating the break-ins saw appellant driving a white SUV with gray rocker panels. Appellant’s car resembled one seen on two surveillance videotapes from one of the burglaries and from a business where someone tried to use a bank card stolen from one of the burglarized autos. Based on the similarity between appellant’s car and those seen on the tapes, and appellant’s race and gender matching the description of the suspected burglar, the detective asked officers in a marked patrol car to pull appellant over. The officers did so, and learned that appellant was on parole. They searched appellant and his car, from which they recovered a credit card stolen during one of the burglaries and the identification, checkbook, and W-2 tax form of another burglary victim. The police also found a bottle of hydrocodone pills prescribed to a third burglary victim and methamphetamine.
After searching appellant and his car, police went to the home of appellant’s mother, where he lived in a converted garage. Searching his room, they found other victims’ stolen personal effects, such as a sword engraved with a victim’s driver’s license number and a notebook, as well as stolen card credit cards and other identification documents. Appellant claimed he received the stolen material from an acquaintance named John or Johnny who lived in San Fernando.
Appellant moved to suppress all the items the police seized from him, his car, and his room because the police did not have a search warrant. He argued that the store security videotape showing a man who appeared to match his description trying to use a bank card stolen during one of the auto burglaries and then driving away from the store in a white Chevy Blazer or GMC Jimmy with gray rocker panels did not give probable cause for the police to detain him while driving a car matching that description. The court denied the motion to suppress because the officers knew appellant was on parole when they conducted their searches.
Appellant was tried by jury. The jury convicted him of first degree burglary, during which another person besides an accomplice was present, for breaking into automobiles in the enclosed parking areas of the residents living at five different locations (counts 1, 5, 10, 12, and 17). The jury also convicted him of second degree burglary for breaking into five vehicles. The jury additionally convicted him of grand theft of a firearm in connection with one of the auto break-ins and for receiving stolen property. Finally, the jury convicted him of possession of methamphetamine and hyrdocodone. Appellant admitted a prior conviction for first degree burglary, constituting a first strike under the Three Strikes law, and of having served four prior prison terms.
Appellant moved for a new trial. He argued the evidence was insufficient that he had broken into enclosed parking garages. He noted there was no evidence he possessed any mechanism, such as a remote control device, to let himself into any of the parking areas, yet there was no evidence of forced entry into the garages. Moreover, he argued no physical evidence, such as fingerprints, hair, or blood samples, tied him to the crimes, and no eyewitnesses saw him near the crime scenes. The court denied the motion.
Appellant also moved to dismiss his first strike. Enforcing the strike, he argued, effectively amounted to imposing a life sentence for a series of property crimes in which he had no direct contact with his victims and had not threatened or injured anyone. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
The court thereafter sentenced appellant to state prison for 31 years and 8 months. It imposed a base term of 17 years on one count of first degree burglary, calculated as a 6 year upper term doubled to 12 years under the Three Strikes law, plus 5 years for a single prior prison term. The court also imposed, but stayed under Penal Code section 654, upper term sentences for grand theft of a firearm, receiving stolen property, and five counts of second degree burglary for the actual break-ins of the cars. Finally, the court imposed four consecutive one-third of the mid-term sentences of 2 years and 8 months on four counts of first degree burglary, and three one-third of the mid-term sentences of 1 year and 4 months for second degree burglary and drug possession convictions. This appeal followed.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant. In February 2008, counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 containing a detailed recitation of the facts of appellant’s offenses, but concluding counsel could not find any colorable issues to argue on appeal. The clerk of this court sent a letter to appellant telling him counsel had found no arguable issues on appeal. We informed appellant he had 30 days to file a brief or letter if there were any issues he wished us to consider.
In March 2008, appellant filed a supplemental brief raising three questions barren of any argument or citation to authority. First, is an apartment building’s underground parking garage an inhabited structure making a burglary of the garage burglary of the first degree? Second, was someone other than an accomplice present during the garage burglaries, thereby making the burglaries serious offenses under the sentencing statute Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)? And finally, should his conviction for possession of methamphetamine have stayed his sentence for conviction of hydrocodone under Penal Code section 654?
We have reviewed the record. During our review, we have been particularly mindful of the three contentions appellant raised in his supplemental brief. In our review, we have been cognizant of well-established law holding that structures and spaces, such as attached garages and underground parking areas, are deemed to be inhabited when they are attached and integrally related to the living quarters of a residence. (See, e.g., People v. Fox (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1043; People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402-1404, disapproved on another point in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 560 fn. 8.) We have also familiarized ourselves with the evidence from appellant’s trial that the apartment buildings were occupied, and not abandoned, residences, when the crimes occurred. And finally, we have taken into account that methamphetamine and prescription hydrocodone are different substances. Our review found no colorable issues for appeal.
Although we found no appealable issues, our review discovered a clerical error in the abstract of judgment that misidentified appellant’s conviction for count 17. The abstract described the conviction as being for burglary in the second degree, when in fact it was for burglary in the first degree. We sent a letter to the Attorney General and to appellate counsel calling their attention to our discovery, and they confirmed the clerical error. Moreover, they agreed that this court possesses the authority to remedy the clerical error by directing the clerk of the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment.
DISPOSITION
The clerk of the superior court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that appellant’s conviction for count 17 was for burglary in the first degree, and is further directed to forward the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As amended, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.