Opinion
02-07-2024
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Michael GOODMAN, appellant.
Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Nicholas Raskin of counsel), for appellant. Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott, Tess Mariel O’Leary, and Joseph DiPietro of counsel), for respondent.
Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Nicholas Raskin of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott, Tess Mariel O’Leary, and Joseph DiPietro of counsel), for respondent.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, PAUL WOOTEN, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kenneth C. Holder, J.), rendered July 15, 2020, as amended August 5, 2020, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment, as amended, is affirmed.
Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s argument that the evidence supporting his conviction of assault in the second degree was legally insufficient based on the degree of the complainant’s injuries is preserved for appellate review. The defendant was not required to renew his motion to dismiss at the close of his case, since "his case did not supply any additional evidence of guilt" (People v. Murray, 163 A.D.3d 1000, 1001, 82 N.Y.S.3d 455 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Soto, 8 A.D.3d 683, 779 N.Y.S.2d 251).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of assault in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant intended to cause physical injury (see People v. Liyao Chen, 200 A.D.3d 1066, 1067, 159 N.Y.S.3d 137). The evidence was also legally sufficient to establish that the defendant caused the complainant substantial pain (see Penal Law §§ 120.05[2]; 10.00[9]; People v. Jones, 206 A.D.3d 1292, 1294, 170 N.Y.S.3d 326; People v. Huddleston, 196 A.D.3d 1098, 1099, 150 N.Y.S.3d 480; People v. Brown, 95 A.D.3d 1229, 945 N.Y.S.2d 334).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and WAN, JJ., concur.