Opinion
B305333
05-19-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GABRIEL GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.YA089864) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed. Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Gabriel Gonzalez pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 2015. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition, finding that appellant was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder. On appeal, appellant argues that section 1170.95 applies to petitioners who could have been convicted of murder at trial but instead pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and therefore the trial court erred in denying his petition. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are irrelevant to the issue on appeal. Moreover, because appellant pled guilty, there is no factual record from trial.
On January 6, 2015, the Los Angeles County District Attorney (the People) filed an information charging appellant and David Calderon Juarez with the March 22, 2014 murder of Marie Smith (§ 187, subd. (a)). The information also included firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) allegations, and prior conviction allegations against Juarez (§§ 667, 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12).
On August 20, 2015, appellant pled guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the gang enhancement allegation. Pursuant to the plea, the court sentenced appellant to the low term of three years, plus ten years for the gang enhancement, for a total of 13 years in prison.
On October 24, 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. He argued that the information filed against him allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. He further stated that he entered a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter "because I believed I would have been convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder at trial pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine," and that he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder. Appellant requested the appointment of counsel and a hearing on his petition.
The People filed a response, limited to the issue of appellant's eligibility for resentencing. They stated that appellant had been the driver in a gang-related shooting case and pled to "a reduced charge of manslaughter in exchange for his testimony at the trial of the shooter," Juarez. The People argued that appellant was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of murder. The People further argued that appellant was ineligible because he could have been convicted of murder under an aiding and abetting theory of liability.
The court summarily denied the petition, finding that appellant was "not eligible for relief under PC 1170.95(a)(2) because he was convicted of [manslaughter under] PC 192."
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437), the primary purpose of which is to align a person's culpability for murder with his or her own actions and subjective mens rea. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) To effectuate that purpose, SB 1437 amended sections 188 and 189. As amended, section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now provides that "in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 189 now provides that a participant in qualifying felonies during which a death occurs generally will not be liable for murder unless (1) he or she was "the actual killer," (2) he or she, "with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree," or (3) he or she "was a major participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless indifference to human life." (§ 189, subds. (e)(1)-(3).) The effect of these changes was to restrict the application of the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as applied to murder. (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 248.) "Felony murder and aiding and abetting a murder remain crimes, but to be convicted of murder it isn't enough to participate in a felony that results in a death. Now, a person so accused must have killed the victim, aided the person who did kill the victim with the intent to kill them, or acted as a major participant in the felony with reckless indifference to human life." (People v. Johns (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 46, 54.)
SB 1437 also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code. The relevant part of section 1170.95 provides:
"(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:
"(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
"(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder.
"(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
Because appellant's argument that he met section 1170.95's requirements presents a pure question of law, we independently review the trial court's ruling. (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435 (Turner).) "As with any question of statutory interpretation, 'our primary task is to give effect to the Legislature's intended purpose in enacting the law.' [Citations.] 'We begin with the statute's text, assigning the relevant terms their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme.'" (Ibid.) "'"'[I]f the statutory language is not ambiguous, then . . . the plain meaning of the language governs.'"' [Citation.] 'We . . . must, if possible without doing violence to the language and spirit of the law, interpret it so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.'" (People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 200 (Paige).) "Where the statutory text admits of more than one reasonable interpretation, we may consider various extrinsic aids—including the legislative history—to the extent they are helpful in illuminating that purpose." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.)
II. Analysis
Appellant contends that the wording of section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) means that the statute applies to defendants who accept a plea offer of voluntary manslaughter in lieu of going to trial where the defendant could have been convicted of murder. We conclude that this contention is contrary to the plain language of the statute.
The trial court's conclusion that section 1170.95 does not apply to convictions for manslaughter has been endorsed by numerous courts of appeal. (See People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557, 565-569; Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 200-204; People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 917-920 (Sanchez); Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 434-438; People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992-997; People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 (Cervantes).)
Section 1170.95, subdivision (a) expressly provides a remedy only for "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder." Thus, we agree that the plain language of the statute indicates "that the Legislature intended to limit relief to those convicted of murder under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 435; accord, Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887; Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992-993.) Before specifying the other conditions a defendant must meet, section 1170.95, subdivision (a) states that "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition . . . to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated." (Italics added.) Subdivision (d)(1) states that if the court finds a defendant's petition sets out a prima facie case for relief, it must hold a hearing "to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner." (Italics added.) Subdivision (d)(2) allows the parties to stipulate that a defendant is eligible "to have his or her murder conviction vacated and for resentencing." (Italics added.)
As the Cervantes court observed, "the language of the statute unequivocally applies to murder convictions. There is no reference to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. To be eligible to file a petition under section 1170.95, a defendant must have a first or second degree murder conviction. The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions." (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887; see also Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 ["[W]e agree with our colleagues in the Second, Fourth and Fifth Districts holding that defendants charged with felony murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement are not eligible for relief under section 1170.95."]; Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 918; Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 435-436 ["Relying on the clear language of the statute, courts including ours have concluded that section 1170.95 is unambiguous and does not provide relief to persons convicted of manslaughter."]; Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
Appellant relies on the language in section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) referring to the defendant's acceptance of "a plea offer in lieu of trial at which the petitioner could be convicted of first degree or second degree murder." He contends this language means a defendant is eligible for relief under section 1170.95 if he or she accepted a plea offer for voluntary manslaughter in lieu of murder. We disagree. As the court in Paige explained, "[R]ead in the context of the statute as a whole, considering both its structure and its language, subdivision (a)(2) cannot reasonably be understood to encompass persons who accept a plea offer in lieu of trial for a crime other than murder. The first paragraph of section 1170.95, subdivision (a) sets forth the basic 'who' and 'what' of the statute—who may seek relief and what they may seek. The 'who' is '[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' and the 'what' is the opportunity to 'file a petition with the court . . . to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated.' The provision on which [defendant] relies, section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2), is one of three conditions—all of which must also apply before the person convicted of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder may seek relief under section 1170.95. Given the structure of the statute and the language in the first paragraph of section 1170.95, subdivision (a), the reference to a person who 'accepted a plea offer' in subdivision (a)(2) must necessarily mean a person who accepted a plea to, and was convicted of, first or second degree murder in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of either of those charges." (Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 202; accord, Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 918-919; Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.)
Further, contrary to appellant's argument, our construction of section 1170.95 does not render this portion of section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) superfluous. "Specifying that section 1170.95 applies to murder convictions both by trial and by guilty plea clarifies that it does not matter how the murder conviction was obtained for section 1170.95 to apply. Regardless of whether that clarification was necessary, 'the Legislature may choose to state all applicable legal principles in a statute rather than leave some to even a predictable judicial decision.' [Citation.] Express statutory language defining the class of defendants to whom section 1170.95 applies is not surplusage." (Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) Had the legislature intended to include voluntary manslaughter within the scope of section 1170.95, it could have done so. "'Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.'" (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 692.) We do not find it reasonable to construe the second clause of subdivision (a)(2) as extending eligibility to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the face of the language in subdivision (a) restricting eligibility to those convicted of murder and the language in subdivision (d) specifying relief for a murder conviction.
We similarly reject appellant's invocation of the rule of lenity, which states that "ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation." (People v. Soria (2010) 48 Cal.4th 58, 65.) This rule applies "only if two reasonable interpretations of the statute stand in relative equipoise." (Ibid.) Here, as we have rejected appellant's interpretation of section 1170.95, the rule of lenity does not apply. --------
The legislative history of section 1170.95 supports this construction of the statute. "First, the Legislature understood the distinction between murder and manslaughter and focused its efforts on revising accomplice liability under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory. Second, nearly every committee report and analyses made note of the life sentences imposed for defendants convicted of first- or second- degree murder. One report based cost estimates on the number of inmates serving terms for first- or second-degree murder. Finally, the petitioning procedure was restricted by amendment to apply to persons convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. Viewed together, the legislative history confirms that a defendant who faces murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but pleads guilty to manslaughter in lieu of trial, is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438; see also Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 203.)
We further agree with Turner that this construction does not "undermine[e] the Legislature's goal to calibrate punishment to culpability. The punishment for manslaughter is already less than that imposed for first- or second-degree murder, and the determinate sentencing ranges of 3, 6, or 11 years for voluntary manslaughter and 2, 3 or 4 years for involuntary manslaughter permit a sentencing judge to make punishment commensurate with a defendant's culpability based on aggravating and mitigating factors. [Citations.] Providing relief solely to defendants convicted of murder under a felony-murder or natural and probable consequences theory does not conflict with the Legislature's stated objective to make 'statutory changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.'" (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 439, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (b); see also Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993; Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 [quoting Turner].)
Appellant's reliance on In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141 and People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page) is misplaced. In In re R.G., the same court that decided Cervantes concluded section 1170.95's petitioning procedures applied to juvenile offenders, even though the statute does not expressly reference juvenile offenders and uses terminology not generally applicable in juvenile proceedings. (In re R.G., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 144, 146-147.) However, the court's holding was based on considerations specific to juvenile law, and is therefore inapplicable here. (See id. at pp. 148-151.)
Similarly, Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th 1175, involved an analysis of a different statute, section 1170.18. The Supreme Court considered whether the unlawful taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 was an offense eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. (Id. at pp. 1179-1180.) Based on both the statutory language and legislative history, the Page court concluded that those convicted of taking a vehicle were eligible for resentencing (even though Proposition 47 does not explicitly mention Vehicle Code section 10851) because taking a vehicle fell within the statutory definition of theft. (Id. at pp. 1180, 1183, 1187.) This analysis does not apply here, where appellant seeks eligibility based on a conviction for manslaughter, rather than murder.
Appellant also argues that denying him section 1170.95 relief violates his constitutional right to equal protection, because it treats defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea differently from those convicted of murder. We agree with the cases that have rejected an equal protection challenge on this basis. (See Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 920; Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 206; Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) As the Cervantes court noted, "[t]he decision not to include manslaughter in section 1170.95 falls within the Legislature's 'line-drawing' authority as a rational choice that is not constitutionally prohibited." (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.)
We likewise reject appellant's argument that he was denied substantive due process. "'[S]ubstantive due process requires a rational relationship between the objectives of a legislative enactment and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives.' [Citation.] Here there was such a relationship. The legislative goal was to eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the felony murder rule [and natural and probable consequences doctrine]. That goal was properly achieved by the section 1170.95 petition procedure to vacate those murder convictions." (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 889.)
Appellant urges us to find that Cervantes, Flores, and Turner were "wrongly decided and should not be followed." He has offered nothing that persuades us to depart from these and the other well-reasoned opinions finding that the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief to those convicted of murder, thereby excluding convictions for voluntary manslaughter. The trial court accordingly did not err in denying appellant's petition.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J. We concur: MANELLA, P. J. WILLHITE, J.