Opinion
A157867
06-10-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 155799) MEMORANDUM OPINION
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
Defendant Juan Anthony Gonzalez was charged in a second amended information with seven felonies, including murder with a robbery special circumstance in which a principal was armed, and attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder in which defendant personally used or discharged a firearm.
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of attempted second degree robbery and admitted the personal discharge enhancement. The remaining charges were dismissed, and in August 2008 he was sentenced to a total prison term of 22 years (2 years on the felony and 20 years on the firearm enhancement).
In April 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant and ordered briefing. Following briefing by both defendant and the People, and a hearing at which defendant and his counsel were present, the trial court denied defendant's petition.
The Attorney General correctly asserts defendant's appeal presents a threshold issue—whether, having pled no contest to and being convicted of second degree robbery, defendant is nevertheless eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 because he was charged with robbery special circumstance murder.
We agree with the uniform line of decisions by other courts of appeal that Penal Code section 1170.95 applies to defendants convicted of murder, not to defendants who plead to and are convicted of a lesser offense. (People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 916 (Sanchez) [charged with first degree murder with a gang enhancement, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted enhancement]; People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 431-432 (Turner) [charged with first degree murder and firearm and gang enhancements, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted firearm enhancement]; People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 989-990 (Flores) [charged with murder with robbery and gang enhancements, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted enhancements]; People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 (Cervantes) [charged with murder, pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter].)
In Sanchez, for example, the court thoroughly addressed the threshold issue before us as follows:
"Acknowledging that [Penal Code] ection 1170.95 does not reference manslaughter convictions, Sanchez nevertheless contends that [Penal Code] section 1170.95 applies to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea because of an alleged ambiguity in one of the three qualifying conditions that must be met under subdivision (a) of [Penal Code] section 1170.95. One of those conditions requires the petitioner to have been 'convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder.' ([Pen. Code,] § 1170.95, subd. (a)(2). . . .) Sanchez claims that because the plea portion of this provision does not expressly mention that the guilty plea had to be to murder, [Penal Code] section 1170.95 must apply to defendants like him who pled guilty to manslaughter to avoid being convicted of murder at trial. The argument is unpersuasive because it 'ignores the introductory language in [Penal Code] section 1170.95, subdivision (a) that limits petitions to persons "convicted of . . . murder." ' (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) Subdivision (a) of [Penal Code] section 1170.95 provides that '[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' may petition to have that 'murder conviction vacated' 'when all of the following conditions apply.' ([Pen. Code,] § 1170.95, subd. (a).) Consequently, only a person who has been 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' may petition for relief under [Penal Code] section 1170.95 in the first place. ([Pen. Code;] § 1170.95, subd. (a).) If that prerequisite is not met, then fulfillment of the subparts in subdivision (a) is not relevant." (Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 918-919, first italics added.)
"Relying on this same qualifying language in subdivision (a)(2) of [Penal Code] section 1170.95, Sanchez maintains that if the Legislature intended to limit [Penal Code] section 1170.95 to those convicted of murder 'it would have been unnecessary for the Legislature to distinguish between those convicted by trial and those convicted by guilty plea.' He contends that interpreting [Penal Code] section 1170.95 as being limited to those convicted of murder therefore would render most of the language in that qualifying provision surplusage. We do not agree. Specifying that [Penal Code] section 1170.95 applies to murder convictions both by trial and by guilty plea clarifies that it does not matter how the murder conviction was obtained for [Penal Code] section 1170.95 to apply. Regardless of whether that clarification was necessary, ' "the Legislature may choose to state all applicable legal principles in a statute rather than leave some to even a predictable judicial decision." ' (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 929. . . .) Express statutory language defining the class of defendants to whom [Penal Code] section 1170.95 applies is not surplusage. [Citation.] Such clarification 'may eliminate potential confusion and avoid the need to research extraneous legal sources to understand the statute's full meaning.' " (Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p 919.)
"It is axiomatic that the ' " 'language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.' " ' (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887.) Sanchez claims that our interpretation produces an absurd result by allowing more culpable individuals to seek relief under [Penal Code] section 1170.95. We agree with the other courts that have rejected the same argument. (Cervantes, at p. 887; Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-997; Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 438-439.) As the court noted in Turner, '[t]he punishment for manslaughter is already less than that imposed for first or second degree murder, and the determinate sentencing ranges of 3, 6, or 11 years for voluntary manslaughter . . . permit a sentencing judge to make punishment commensurate with a defendant's culpability based on aggravating and mitigating factors.' (Turner, at p. 439; see [Pen. Code,] § 193, subd. (a).) Construing [Penal Code] section 1170.95 to exclude those convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea agreement therefore does not 'produce absurdity by undermining the Legislature's goal to calibrate punishment to culpability.' (Turner, at p. 439.)" (Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 919-920.)
"Because [Penal Code] section 1170.95 is clear and unambiguous, we need not consult its legislative history to determine the statute's meaning. (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 997, fn. 5.) In any event, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1437 confirms that the Legislature was concerned only with providing relief to those who were convicted of felony murder or of murder on a natural and probable consequences theory. (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887; Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436-438.) Sanchez's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He does not point to any express language about manslaughter in the legislative history. Instead, he points out that expanding [Penal Code] section 1170.95 to include those convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea supports the general legislative intent of ensuring that punishment is better aligned with a defendant's level of culpability and saving incarceration costs by decreasing the number of inmates serving long sentences. That does not show that the Legislature contemplated granting the relief afforded by [Penal Code] section 1170.95 to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea. At most, it shows that including those individuals would also serve those purposes. But that it is not the approach that the Legislature chose." --------
We adopt the reasoning in Sanchez and the other court of appeal opinions we have cited. Accordingly, we need not, and do not, reach any of the other issues defendant has advanced on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant's petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
Banke, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Margulies, J.