Opinion
G057108
01-30-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AURELIA AMAYA GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc E. Kohm and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17CF1518) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed. Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc E. Kohm and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Aurelia Amaya Gonzalez of human trafficking, pimping, and pandering related to a prostitution ring she ran out of a motel involving multiple women. On appeal, Gonzalez claims there was insufficient evidence as to human trafficking for two of the victims. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
I. Arrest and Investigation
In June 2017, Santa Ana Police Officer Aaron Pratt went to the Royal Grand Inn (Grand Inn) because dispatch reported a white Nissan Maxima (Nissan) parked in front of room 112 was associated with prostitution. The report named Gonzalez as the suspect. Pratt did not immediately see the Nissan and began to knock on motel doors.
Pratt observed a man, later identified as Israel Vasquez, exit from room 109 and walk through the parking lot. Vasquez said he was residing in room 108 with his girlfriend. Later, however, Vasquez walked to room 109 and opened it with a key. Pratt then went to room 109 where he interviewed a woman later identified as Teresa. Inside the room, he found lubricant, cash hidden in a bible, cell phones, a knife in a drawer, condoms, and sex toys.
The original complaint jointly charged Vasquez with Gonzalez but the charges were dismissed.
After exiting room 109, Pratt observed the Nissan, driven by Gonzalez, enter the motel parking lot. Police searched the Nissan, finding a purse with $1,044 in cash, six cell phones, 36 condoms, 40 pre-paid gift cards, and a pay/owe ledger in the trunk with an additional cell phone. Police arrested Gonzalez.
During questioning, Gonzalez stated she knew Vasquez and his wife and admitted she and Vasquez had been previously arrested together for pimping. Gonzalez said she parked at the motel to pick up food at a nearby restaurant for dinner with her boyfriend. She explained the pre-paid gift cards were used to pay bills and she bought condoms in bulk for personal use.
In July 2017, detective James Marquez interviewed Teresa, who showed him a Facebook account belonging to Gonzalez. The account had a photograph of Gonzalez but listed her name as "Yaqui Gonzalez." Marquez also downloaded information from the cell phone confiscated from Gonzalez's car. Information extracted from the cell phones included text messages asking for prices and availability, as well as photos of provocatively dressed women. Using the information gathered from Gonzalez's cell phones, Marquez contacted and interviewed four women E., D., M., and N. When Marquez interviewed N., he noticed she appeared to be "clearly mentally disabled." For example, she would find things funny that were not, and got confused.
We refer to the women by their first initials to protect their anonymity.
II. Testimony at Trial
A. Witness E.
E. testified she is from Mexico and speaks no English. E. stated she worked for Gonzalez for two to three years, but she knew Gonzalez as Karina. E. met Gonzalez in a restaurant in Santa Ana. Gonzalez approached her asking if she would like a job. The pair eventually met at the Grand Inn motel where Gonzalez told her the work involved being sexual with men and that she would make "plenty of money." E. agreed to work for Gonzalez as a prostitute.
E. worked six days a week and had over 15 clients a day. E. did not want that many clients per day, but did not say anything because she was afraid of Gonzalez. Gonzalez would get upset and insult E. in front of clients. E. wanted to quit working for Gonzalez, but Gonzalez threatened she would tell E.'s family she was a prostitute. E. worried Gonzalez would tell her children. E. continued working as a prostitute for Gonzalez for about two years after she wanted to quit. Gonzalez also warned E. she was going to have people come after her if she tried to quit.
E. was afraid of Gonzalez because she heard Gonzalez beat up a prostitute for refusing to see a client. E. also saw men outside the Grand Inn who she believed were with Gonzalez, and were present to ensure she continued to work. One time, a man and woman followed E. to her home.
While working for Gonzalez, E. became aware of another prostitute named N. Whenever E. saw N., she was with Gonzalez. One time, Gonzalez asked E. to babysit N. E. noticed N. did not act her age, but behaved child-like. Gonzalez gave N. alcohol "basically, every day." About four times a week, Gonzalez took N. into rooms used for prostitution with men; often the men appeared to be drunk. B. Witness D.
D. was born in El Salvador and does not speak English. In April 2017, D. met Gonzalez, whom she knew as Karina, at a store in Santa Ana. Gonzalez asked D. to work for her. A few days later, D. met Gonzalez at the Grand Inn. Gonzalez informed D. the work involved providing sexual services for money. D. told Gonzalez she did not want to do that type of work, but Gonzalez threatened her. Gonzalez said she was not alone, and would "get even" with D. and knew where D. lived. Two men would stay near the Grand Inn while D. was working. One of the men followed D. home after she finished working. Gonzalez also said she knew where D.'s family lived in El Salvador.
D. worked for Gonzalez for about four months. Gonzalez rented the rooms at the Grand Inn, brought clients to D., and collected the money. Gonzalez hit D. to force her to have sex without a condom. D. also witnessed Gonzalez physically abuse other women who worked for her at the Grand Inn. One of the other prostitutes was N. D. saw Gonzalez bathe N. and hit her while doing so. Gonzalez gave N. alcohol every day. Gonzalez also forced N. to have sex with clients without a condom.
D. stated the district attorney's office was "talking to the immigration people" about obtaining a special "U" visa for her to stay in the United States if she cooperated and testified against Gonzalez. D. denied she testified at the preliminary hearing that Gonzalez had not forced her to work as a prostitute and that she had not seen Gonzalez hit N. C. Witness M.
M. is N.'s sister. She testified N. said incoherent things and had to be taken care of. Sometime in November or December 2016, N. called M. Gonzalez took the phone away. M. asked Gonzalez if she was feeding and taking care of N. M. asked Gonzalez to return N. to her, which she did. D. Expert Testimony
Corporal Luis Barragan worked the vice unit for approximately six years. In his experience, prostitution, pimping, pandering, and human trafficking in the Hispanic community in Santa Ana often occurred at a hotel room or an apartment building. The Grand Inn was located in an area of prostitution activity, which had a high concentration of motels.
III. Verdict and Sentencing
The amended information charged Gonzalez with human trafficking (Pen. Code § 236.1, subd. (b); counts 1 (E.), 4 (N.) & 10 (D.)), pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a); counts 2 (E.), 5 (N.) & 8 (D.)), pandering (§ 266i, subds. (a); counts 3 (E.), 6 (N.) & 9 (D.)), and elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1); count 7 (N.)). Gonzalez pleaded not guilty. Count 7 was dismissed pursuant to section 1118.1. A jury found Gonzalez guilty on the remaining charges.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court sentenced Gonzalez to a total prison term of 29 years and four months, calculated as follows: on count 1, the upper term of 20 years; on counts 4 and 10, as to both counts, a term of four years, eight months. The court imposed but stayed punishment on the remaining counts.
DISCUSSION
Gonzalez concedes there was sufficient evidence to convict her of the pimping and pandering counts, but argues insufficient evidence supported her conviction she violated either E. (count 1) or N.'s (count 4) personal liberty and committed the crime of human trafficking. We disagree.
In determining whether a conviction is supported by substantial evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which "a reasonable trier of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Ibid.) Where the trier of fact's findings are reasonably justified by circumstantial evidence, an appellate court may not reverse a judgment even though it believes the circumstantial evidence might reasonably be reconciled with the defendant's innocence. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1329.)
Human trafficking "is comprised of three distinct offenses" set forth in section 236, subdivisions (a) through (c). (People v. Shields (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1248-1249.) Gonzalez was charged with and convicted of the definition of human trafficking set forth in section 236.1, subdivision (b), which applies where a "person . . . deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to effect or maintain a violation" of one of several specific crimes including pimping (§ 266h) and pandering (§ 266i).
Section 236.1, subdivision (h)(3), provides: "'Deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another' includes substantial and sustained restriction of another's liberty accomplished through force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to the victim or to another person, under circumstances where the person receiving or apprehending the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the threat would carry it out."
As to count 1, Gonzalez claims the evidence at trial showed only that E., by her own testimony, voluntarily agreed to work for Gonzalez as a prostitute. She also contends E. was merely afraid her family would find out she was working as a prostitute. The evidence, however, also demonstrated E. worked for Gonzalez six days a week servicing more than 15 clients a day. E. stated she was afraid of Gonzalez because she would get mad at E., insult her, and E. witnessed Gonzalez beat another prostitute for refusing to see a client. E. saw men outside watching the Grand Inn, and she believed they worked for Gonzalez and were there to make sure she continued working. To corroborate E.'s testimony, D. stated two men stayed near the Grand Inn while she worked for Gonzalez and the men followed her home or to nearby stores. When E. told Gonzalez she wanted to quit working for her, Gonzalez told her she was going to have people come after her. At most, Gonzalez presented an alternate conclusion that could be drawn from E.'s testimony, namely that E. worked for her of her own free will. The jury, however, credited E.'s version of events. The evidence demonstrated Gonzalez restricted E.'s liberty through fear and threats of violence. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict Gonzalez committed human trafficking of E.
As to count 4, Gonzalez also argues there was no evidence she used physical violence or coercion to keep N. working for her as a prostitute. D.'s testimony detailed how Gonzalez hit N. while she was working as a prostitute. D. and E. also stated Gonzalez gave N. alcohol and multiple witnesses testified to N.'s child-like behavior. E. stated Gonzalez maintained custody and control over N., including caring, feeding, and bathing her. As the Guyton court described it, "[s]omething far more serious and sinister than a pimp deriving support or maintenance from the prostitute's earnings was occurring here." (People v. Guyton (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 499, 507 (Guyton).) Sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict Gonzalez committed human trafficking of N.
Gonzalez further argues she did not force E. to stay at the Grand Inn, but that she was allowed home each night. Gonzalez also asserts there was no evidence N. was prevented from leaving at any time. This does not preclude a human trafficking conviction. In Guyton, defendant made a similar argument, claiming the victim "could have walked away at any time," had her own hotel room, and was not physically restrained. (Guyton, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 507.) A different panel of this court rejected the argument. (Ibid.) The Guyton defendant placed various restrictions on the victim, including isolating her, monitoring her, and requiring her to stay in contact with him. (Ibid.) The court determined the human trafficking conviction was supported by substantial evidence because defendant kept his victim dependent on him. (Ibid.) Evidence a victim returned home at night does not preclude a human trafficking conviction.
Here, the evidence demonstrated E. continued to work for Gonzalez because she was afraid of Gonzalez based on her threats of violence. Similarly, and even more troubling, ample evidence showed N. was dependent on Gonzalez as her caregiver. Indeed, the facts showed N. required constant care, Gonzalez bathed and fed her, Gonzalez used physical violence against her, and that Gonzalez plied her with alcohol. Gonzalez's assertion on appeal that "there was no evidence offered that [N.] was forced into acts of prostitution or was prevented from leaving at any time" is disingenuous and belied by the record. Simply because the women were allowed to go other places does not preclude a determination Gonzalez's custody and control over E. and N. amounted to human trafficking. We find no error with the judgment.
Because sufficient evidence supports the convictions, Gonzalez's due process claim has no merit. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'LEARY, P. J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, J. THOMPSON, J.