Opinion
53737-04.
Decided January 26, 2005.
Defendant is charged in an information with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, a class A misdemeanor, and related offenses. The case is pending in the Supreme Court and he has moved for an order dismissing the information on the grounds that CPL §§ 210.05 and 10.20 (2) prevent the Supreme Court from prosecuting the case and also that the administrative transfer of all unindicted misdemeanor charges in Bronx County to the Criminal Division of the Bronx County Supreme Court violates defendant's equal protection rights. Defendant's challenge stems from the recent transfer of his case and all pending and future misdemeanor cases from the Criminal Court, Bronx County, to the newly-created Criminal Division of Supreme Court, Bronx County, pursuant to a series of administrative orders.
On September 8, 2004, in an effort to promote the administration of justice in the criminal courts in Bronx County, the Honorable Judith Kaye, Chief Judge, in consultation with the Administrative Board of the Courts, and with the approval of the New York State Court of Appeals, promulgated a new Part 42 of the Rules of the Chief Judge. That rule authorized the Chief Administrator of the New York Courts, in consultation and agreement with the Presiding Justice of the First Judicial Department, to establish a Criminal Division of Supreme Court Bronx County.
On September 21, 2004, the Administrative Judge promulgated new Part 142 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator which established the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court in Bronx County to which all pending and future Bronx County criminal cases charging class A misdemeanors or felonies would be transferred. On September 27, 2004, the Administrative Judge of the Criminal Division of Bronx Supreme Court issued an order putting that transfer order into effect as of November 5, 2004. This initiative has become know as the Bronx County "merger" because it effectively merges the Criminal Court in the Bronx with the Supreme Court in the Bronx.
The issue raised by defendant's motion is whether various legislative provisions, mainly CPL § 210.05, preclude this court from exercising trial jurisdiction over an offense which has not been presented to it in either an indictment or superior court information, and, if so, whether said provisions violate Article VI § 7 (a) of the New York State Constitution or, in the alternative, whether other laws authorize the transfer of this case to Supreme Court. [*2]
Article VI, § 7 (a) of the New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part that the Supreme Court "shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity. . . ."
The legislature has provided that, with respect to cases charging misdemeanors, the superior courts of the State (which include the Supreme Court [CPL § 10.10]) have trial jurisdiction concurrent with that of the local criminal courts. CPL § 10.20 (1)(b). However, the legislature, in CPL § 210.05, further provided that "the only methods of prosecuting an offense in a superior court are by an indictment filed therewith by a grand jury or by a superior court information filed therewith by a district attorney." Additionally, CPL § 170.15 (2) provides that where a Supreme Court judge sits as a local criminal court for the purpose of exercising preliminary jurisdiction and arraigning a defendant [permitted by CPL §§ 10.10 (3)(f); 10.20 (3)] such case must thereafter be remitted to a local criminal court having trial jurisdiction over the matter for further proceedings such as trial or plea. The legislature further established procedural mechanisms for prosecuting misdemeanors in local criminal courts. [CPL Art. 100 and Art. 170.]
Pursuant to these various statutory provisions, misdemeanors can be prosecuted either by local criminal court accusatory instrument, by indictment or by superior court information. However, the legislature has specifically provided that the Supreme Court may only prosecute misdemeanors charged in an indictment or a superior court information. CPL § 210.05. The instant case, as are most misdemeanor cases prosecuted in this state, is being prosecuted by local criminal court accusatory instrument, not by indictment or by superior court information. The difference is not insignificant. A prosecution by indictment requires the presentation of witnesses to the grand jury. A prosecution by superior court information requires consent of the defendant. Additionally, the trial of an indictment or superior court information is by a jury of twelve, while a trial of a local criminal court accusatory instrument charging a class A misdemeanor is by a jury of six. Accordingly, if CPL § 210.05 substantively limits, restricts, or abridges the constitutional grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, such legislative restriction is unconstitutional and the Supreme Court can exercise its constitutionally mandated jurisdiction so long as it is not done in a manner prohibited by any other lawful enactment, rule or regulation.
Courts should proceed cautiously before holding legislation to be violative of the State Constitution. There is a presumption of constitutionality concerning legislative statutory enactments. However, where the question has been considered by an appellate court and that court has found the statute unconstitutional, the trial courts are duty bound to follow such precedent. Furthermore, in the absence of appellate law in this Department, this court must turn to the decisions of the other Departments' appellate courts for controlling precedent. See Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 103 AD2d 663 (2nd Dept. 1984).
Only one appellate court has considered the questions presented here. In People v. Darling, 50 AD2d 1038 (3rd Dept. 1975), the Court reviewed the actions of a Supreme Court justice in arraigning a defendant and co-defendant on misdemeanor charges not charged in an indictment or superior court information and accepting a plea of guilty to reckless driving by defendant. The Court framed the question before it as follows:
The first question is whether [the judge] had preliminary jurisdiction to arraign and trial jurisdiction to dispose of the matters while sitting as a Justice of the Supreme Court. This in turn depends on whether the Legislature constitutionally could grant such [*3]jurisdiction to local criminal courts and withhold the same from the Supreme Court. (Italics added)
People v. Darling, supra, at 1038.
The Court answered that question as follows;
Article VI (§ 7, subd a) of the New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part that the Supreme Court "shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity" and the immense jurisdictional power of the Supreme Court has been characterized as "original, unlimited and unqualified" (Kagen v. Kagen, 21 NY2d 532, 537). As such, it is competent to entertain all causes of action unless its jurisdiction has been specifically proscribed (Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 NY2d 159, 166; Condon v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of NY, 287 NY 411, 414-415) and any attempt by the Legislature to abridge, limit or qualify this broad jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is unconstitutional and void (Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 NY 150, 156; Matter of Malloy, 278 NY 429, 432; People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 NY 478, 487-488; Matter of Stilwell, 139 NY 337, 341; People ex rel. Mayor of City of NY v. Nichols, 79 NY 582, 589-590; Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Halpin, 267 App Div 236, 241, affd 292 NY 705; Decker v. Canzoneri, 256 App Div 68, 71-72). Not even the circumstance that another court has been given jurisdiction can deprive the Supreme Court of its general jurisdiction in law and equity (Barone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 NY 410, 414).
People v. Darling, supra, at 1038.
The Court then held:
Accordingly, since from its inception the Supreme Court has had the constitutional authority to try misdemeanors, (People ex rel. Constantinople v. Warden of Rikers Is., 72 Misc 2d 906; People v. Ruttles, 172 Misc 306), it must be concluded that [the Supreme Court justice], sitting as a Supreme Court Justice, had the requisite authority to conduct the preliminary proceeding and to conduct the actions.
People v. Darling, supra, at 1038.
The actions conducted were the acceptance of pleas and imposition of sentence, clearly the exercise of trial jurisdiction.
While the Appellate Division in People v. Darling, supra, did not state, by section number, which legislative enactment(s) it found to be an unconstitutional abridgement and/or limitation on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is clear that CPL § 210.05 and other CPL sections that flow from that section are those unconstitutional legislative enactments. Indeed, in the Supreme Court justice's own decision explaining its actions, that court stated that CPL § 170.15(2), which requires a case wherein a defendant is arraigned on a local criminal court accusatory instrument charging a misdemeanor before a Supreme Court justice sitting as a local criminal court thereafter to be remitted to the local criminal court having jurisdiction thereof, was "in defiance and derogation of the Constitution of the State of New York." People v. Darling, 81 Misc 2d 487 (Sup.Ct. Rensselaer Co. 1975); aff'd and modified on other grnds, 50 AD2d 1038 (3rd Dept. 1975). CPL § 170.15(2) requires transfer of criminal court accusatory instruments not [*4]charging felonies to the local criminal court because CPL § 210.05 limits the Supreme Court's trial jurisdiction over misdemeanors to those charged by indictment or superior court information.
While the appellate court in People v. Darling, supra, disapproved of the Supreme Court's actions, it did so not because that court lacked jurisdiction, but because its exercise of jurisdiction was undertaken without the presence of an Assistant District Attorney and done outside the courthouse in the judge's home. See, People v. Darling, 50 AD2d 1048, at 1039.
Accordingly, CPL § 210.05 can not be viewed as being simply a valid exercise of legislative authority in enacting a procedure by which the Supreme Court exercises its constitutional jurisdiction. The appellate court, in People v. Darling, supra, held that the legislature may not enact such procedural mechanisms which have the effect of limiting the Supreme Court exercise of jurisdiction.
Prior to the Bronx merger initiative other courts had considered whether the restrictions of CPL § 210.05 prevented the transfer of misdemeanors charged in criminal court accusatory instruments to the Supreme Court. In People v. Trabazo, 180 Misc 2d 961 (Crim.Ct. Queens Co. 1999), the court found a Supreme Court order transferring a case from the Criminal Court to the matrimonial part to be prohibited by CPL § 210.05. Without mentioning People v. Darling, supra, the court held that CPL § 210.05 did not violate the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, but rather, set forth a "procedural mechanism by which the Supreme Court obtains jurisdiction over misdemeanors, namely, by action of the grand jury." People v. Trabazo, supra, 963. The Appellate Division in People v. Darling, supra, rejected that argument.
In People v. Turza, 193 Misc 2d 432 (Sup.Ct. Suffolk Co. 2002), the court, without referring to People v. Darling, supra, questioned the constitutionality of CPL § 210.05 but found it unnecessary to decide the question in the context of an Integrated Domestic Violence Part transferring cases to itself from the District Court. That court found that CPL § 210.05 was not applicable to the Integrated Domestic Violence Part based on Article VI, § 19 (a) of the State Constitution which provides authority for the Supreme Court to transfer cases from other courts to itself [discussed further below].
In People v. Levandowski, 190 Misc 2d 738 (Sup.Ct. Rensselaer Co. 2002), the court considered the same transfer issue as the court in People v. Turza, supra, again in the context of an established Integrated Domestic Violence Part. That court noted the holding of People v. Darling, supra, and further detailed the specific constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the Supreme Court to transfer unindicted misdemeanor cases to itself [discussed below], making it unnecessary to decide the constitutionality of CPL § 210.05.
Art. VI § 19 (a) of the State Constitution provides: "[a]s may be provided by law, the supreme court may transfer to itself any action or proceeding originated or pending in another court within the judicial department other than the court of claims upon a finding that such a transfer will promote the administration of justice." To the extent that such power is not self-executing [See, People v. Levandowski, supra, for an analysis of whether the phrase "as may be provided by law" requires further specific legislative action, concluding that it does not], Art. VI, § 30 of the Constitution provides that:
the legislature may, on such terms as it shall provide and subject to subsequent modification, delegate, in whole or in part, to a court, including the appellate [*5]division of the supreme court, or to the chief administrator of the courts, any power possessed by the legislature to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. The chief administrator of the courts shall exercise any such power delegated to him or her with the advice and consent of the administrative board of the courts.
Pursuant to this constitutional authority for the legislature to delegate certain of its powers over the courts to others, Judiciary Law § 211 provides:
The chief judge, after consultation with the administrative board, shall establish standards and administrative policies for general application to the unified court system throughout the state, including but not limited to standards and administrative policies relating to: (a) The dispatch of judicial business, the designation of administrative judges, hours of court, assignment of terms and judges, transfer of judges and causes among the courts of the unified court system, the assignment and reassignment of administrative functions performed by judicial and nonjudicial personnel, the need for additional judicial or nonjudicial personnel, and the publication of judicial opinions" (emphasis supplied).
The administrative orders by which the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Bronx County was established and the transfer of cases thereto was ordered were issued pursuant to and in conformity with Judiciary Law § 211.
The Constitutional provisions authorizing the transfer of cases from other courts to the Supreme Court and the provisions of the Judiciary Law authorizing the Chief Judge and Chief Administrator (currently the Chief Administrative Judge) to provide for the transfer of cases among courts provide clear authority for establishing the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Bronx County and transferring all pending and future misdemeanor cases to it notwithstanding the apparently restrictive provisions of CPL § 210.05. Whether one finds that authority preemptive of CPL § 210.05 or finds CPL § 210.05 unconstitutional, the result is the same; the Bronx merger is lawful and the Supreme Court Bronx County can exercise full jurisdiction over misdemeanors not presented to it by indictment or superior court information.
The Bronx merger has been the subject of two opinions prior to this writing. One Justice has upheld the authority of the Supreme Court to exercise full jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases not charged in indictments or superior court informations. People v. Robinson, NYLJ, 12/29/04, p. 20, col. 1 (Sup.Ct. Bx. Co., Davidowitz, J.), and one Justice has held that the Supreme Court does not have such jurisdiction because CPL § 210.05 prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction and that such provision is presumptively constitutional. People v. Barrow, NYLJ, 1/13/05, p. 19, col. 1 (Sup.Ct. Bx. Co., Barone, J.).
This court finds that CPL § 210.05 can not constitutionally limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over misdemeanors to those charged in indictments or superior court informations. Furthermore, the Constitution and Judiciary Law § 211(1)(a) enacted pursuant to constitutional authority provide for the administrative orders which have created the Criminal Division of the Bronx Supreme Court and transferred to that [*6]Division all criminal cases charging class A misdemeanors or felonies regardless of the type of accusatory instrument in which such crimes are charged for the exercise of the Supreme Court's full jurisdiction over those cases.
For the reasons sets forth in People v. Robinson, supra, the Supreme Court's exercise of jurisdiction over this case which, in the other counties of New York City, would be prosecuted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Wherefore, defendant's motion to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, to transfer it to a local criminal court is denied.
This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court.