Opinion
April 5, 1985
Appeal from the Niagara County Court, DiFlorio, J.
Present — Hancock, Jr., J.P., Callahan, Boomer, Green and Schnepp, JJ.
Judgment unanimously reversed, on the law, and new trial granted. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment of conviction for rape in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.25), defendant's primary claim is that the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to establish that the complainant had falsely accused defendant of a similar crime two years earlier. The complainant was asked "Had you in fact prior to October 25, 1982 ever told your father that you had sexual relations with [the defendant] before?" She replied that she had made such an accusation and that it was true. Defense counsel was barred from cross-examining the victim regarding the prior allegation that the defendant had raped her. This was error.
Cross-examination of complainant was proper for the purpose of impeachment ( People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 245, cert denied 396 U.S. 846; Richardson, Evidence § 491 [Prince 10th ed]; Fisch, Evidence § 486 [2d ed]). Bias, interest, or hostility of a witness is not collateral ( see, People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73), nor is a matter collateral when it is relevant to impeach a witness by showing a motive to lie ( see, People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 94; People v. Crandall, 48 A.D.2d 946, 947). Here, the issue of an allegedly false prior accusation was relevant ( see, People v. Hill, 52 A.D.2d 609, 611; People v. Moore, 23 A.D.2d 854).
The theory of the defense was that on the night of the alleged crime, the complainant was with men of whom her father did not approve and that the complainant, who admittedly was intoxicated, had lied to her father to avoid punishment as she had done in the past. The truth or falsity of the prior accusation was relevant on the question of the complainant's motive falsely to accuse defendant, i.e., whether her fear of her father was so great that she would falsely make a serious accusation in order to conceal her misconduct ( see generally, People v. Murtha, 63 A.D.2d 579). Since the defendant was denied a fair trial we are compelled to reverse the judgment and grant a new trial ( see, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 238; People v. McDowell, 9 N.Y.2d 12, 15).