Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR908767
Sepulveda, J.
Defendant Ja Bee Gee III reportedly threatened his mother with a knife when she confronted him about his excessive drinking. Defendant pleaded guilty to making a criminal threat and the court granted defendant probation upon specified conditions. (Pen. Code, § 422.) These conditions include standard provisions that defendant maintain employment and submit to searches by probation officers and law enforcement officers. On appeal, defendant contends that the probation conditions are unconstitutionally overbroad. The contention is founded on a misinterpretation of the conditions. The probation conditions, properly read, are reasonable and narrowly tailored to promote defendant’s rehabilitation.
I. Discussion
Defendant concedes that a search condition, subjecting a probationer to search and seizure without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, is proper. (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 607-611.) This standard search condition is precisely what was imposed in this case. The written minutes from the sentencing hearing state: “The defendant shall submit his person, vehicle, place of residence or any other property under his control to search and seizure at any time during the term of his probation by any probation officer or law enforcement officer, acting with or without a search warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”
Defendant does not object to the probation condition as written, but claims that the condition was orally expanded when the trial court said, during sentencing: “You should also understand that the state and federal Constitution[s] guarantee you the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As part of your probation, you’re being asked to give up that right. Do you give up your right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures?” (Italics added.) Defendant interprets the court’s oral advisement as an expansion of the search condition to permit searches undertaken for harassment and searches for arbitrary or capricious reasons, when such searches have been held outside the scope of a probationer’s consent to search and his waiver of constitutional rights. (People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 610.)
Defendant’s strained interpretation of the court’s oral remarks conjures a controversy where none exists. The People agree with defendant that a probationer’s waiver of his constitutional rights “does not permit arbitrary, capricious, and harassment searches.” The People make no effort to impose a probation condition broader than the standard search condition reflected in the written minutes of the sentencing hearing. The People maintain that the court’s extemporizing remarks did not expand the probation condition and are wholly consistent with the written minutes, which allow searches without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. We agree.
The court explained that defendant was giving up his “right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,” meaning that he was waiving his right “to expect that a search will be undertaken only on reasonable cause.” (People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 604.) Nothing in the court’s remarks indicates any intention to alter the written terms of the probation condition and to impose a broader search condition that would subject defendant to arbitrary, capricious, and harassment searches. The probation condition, properly read, is unobjectionable.
Defendant also misconstrues the employment condition in arguing that the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. The probation condition provides: “The defendant will maintain full time, gainful employment except when prevented from doing so by the incarceration imposed as a term of probation in this case.” Employment conditions are commonly imposed on probationers, and constitutional where the probationer is employable. (People v. Hodgkin (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 795, 807-811.) The Legislature has expressly authorized a probation condition that requires a probationer “go to work and earn money for the support of his or her dependents or to pay any fine imposed or reparation condition, to keep an account of his or her earnings, to report them to the probation officer and apply those earnings as directed by the court.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (d).)
Defendant does not deny that he is employable. At the time of sentencing, defendant was employed and requested probation so that he could “get back to [his] job on the outside.” Defendant’s complaint on appeal lies in the fact that the employment condition does not explicitly provide an exception for “factors outside of the probationer’s control, such as illness or inability to find work.” The People concede that defendant would not violate his probation if he lost employment due to circumstances beyond his control, like illness, disability, or inability to find full time work. But this concession is not enough for defendant. He wants the probation condition modified to provide an explicit exception.
Modification is unnecessary. A probation condition “ ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him’ ” but “only reasonable specificity is required.” (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630.) A probation condition must be given a “ ‘reasonable and practical construction.’ ” (Ibid.) The reasonable and practical construction of the probation condition here is that defendant must use his best efforts to maintain gainful employment. It is both unreasonable and impracticable to expect a court granting probation to catalog all the possible exceptions to an employment condition, from natural disasters to physical disability. An exception for involuntary unemployment is implied and need not be stated explicitly in the terms of probation.
II. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P. J., Rivera, J.