Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Los Angeles County, No. VA113437, Patrick T. Myers, Judge.
Pamela J. Voich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David C. Cook, Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COFFEE, J.
Rolando Anthony Garcia was convicted by jury of carjacking, with a finding that he personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 215, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 13 years in state prison, consisting of the low term of 3 years for the carjacking, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. He contends he was intoxicated, thus lacked the requisite intent to commit a carjacking. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
FACTS
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 19, 2009, victim Ricardo Monroy was walking towards his parked car, a black Chevy Equinox. He heard footsteps behind him and the cocking of a gun. Someone called to him to stop and he turned around. The victim saw appellant and a juvenile accomplice. Appellant, who was wearing a hooded sweatshirt, pulled a gun out of his pocket, and told the victim to give him all his money. He pointed the gun at the victim's head and said, "Empty out your pockets." The victim gave appellant his wallet, car keys and cell phone.
Appellant responded, "I don't want your keys. [¶]... [¶] Give me your money." Both men directed the victim into the driver's side of his car. Appellant got into the passenger side and continued to demand money. He placed the gun on his lap and began rifling through the center console. The victim repeated that he had no money. Appellant then began demanding drugs. The victim denied having drugs and said he was unemployed. Appellant then "just blew" and told him to get out of the car and ordered him to lie face down on the ground, about five feet from the car.
While keeping the gun trained on the victim, appellant got into the driver's side of the car and the accomplice got into the passenger side. Appellant began to back up the car, very close to the victim's fingers, then closed the car door and "sped off." The victim contacted the police and told them he had been carjacked and his car was taken at gunpoint.
Appellant and his juvenile accomplice, Martin R., drove to the home of appellant's cousin in Watts. Upon leaving, they noticed that a police officer was following them. Officer Jason Estrada saw a car with the same license plate as the vehicle involved in the carjacking. He followed the car for about 200 yards, when it stopped abruptly and two men jumped out and fled. Martin R. ran northbound on Barlin Avenue, and Estrada was able to follow and detain him. Additional police vehicles responded, as well as a K-9 unit and a sheriff's helicopter.
After turning west, appellant scaled a chain-link fence. Officer Jason Klevos first saw appellant on the 105 Freeway. He was crouched down next to the carpool lane. Appellant ran southbound across all the eastbound lanes of traffic, causing cars to slam on their brakes to avoid hitting him. He ran up the south embankment, into very dense brush. Officers set up a perimeter and a K-9 unit found him. As appellant was escorted to the patrol car, a stack of cards fell from his pants pocket onto the ground. They belonged to the victim. His cell phone was also recovered. The gun was never found.
Approximately 30 minutes later, police took the victim to an area near Barlin Avenue and the 105 Freeway. A black Chevy Equinox was parked nearby and the victim positively identified Martin R. Approximately 90 minutes later, officers took the victim to an area near the Lakewood on-ramp of the 105 Freeway, where he identified appellant. The officers later returned the victim's cell phone and the contents of his wallet, which consisted primarily of his identification, business cards and store membership cards.
At the police station, Martin R. waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. He told the officers that he and appellant had run towards a man near his car. Appellant pulled a gun out of his sweatshirt, "racked" it, and pointed it at the victim's head. He instructed the victim to give him everything he had, and the victim handed over his keys, wallet and cell phone to Martin R. Appellant told the victim to lie on the ground. Martin R. described the gun as a "black semiautomatic handgun with a long, skinny barrel." Appellant had told Martin R. that "it was a real gun with real bullets." Martin R. stated that appellant put the gun in the center console while he was driving. He testified that, when the car stopped, appellant grabbed the gun and ran.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. On the afternoon of the offense, he was very drunk. Between 2:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., he drank almost a whole bottle of tequila, "two 40's" (approximately seven 12-ounce bottles of beer), and smoked four "blunts" (fat marijuana cigarettes). He was stumbling, but could walk. He did not remember where he was going, or recall what happened. All he knew is that he never owned a gun at any time in his life. He did not remember jumping out of the car, but recalled jumping a fence. He saw the police and helicopter, ran across six lanes of traffic and then up an embankment. He denied disposing of or hiding a gun.
When appellant was apprehended, he was talking to his stepsister on his cell phone, saying "I am about to go to jail." He did not tell the police he was drunk. Instead, he said that he was tagging. On rebuttal, Detective Klevos testified that he escorted appellant to the police car, but did not notice any signs of intoxication or smell alcohol on his breath.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to show that he had the requisite intent to support his conviction for carjacking. He claims that he was too intoxicated to have formed the intent to deprive the victim of his vehicle.
"'Carjacking' is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, ... against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear." (§ 215, subd. (a); People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 858-859.)
In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, we review the entire record "in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we do not substitute our evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
Appellant and Martin R. threatened the victim at gunpoint. They ordered him into the car, keeping the gun in plain view. After rummaging through the car, appellant ordered the victim onto the ground, face down, several feet from the car. He backed up very close to appellant's body. Appellant and the minor drove quickly away. This evidence supports the jury's finding that appellant took the victim's car from his immediate presence, against his will, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive him of his car. This was accomplished by means of force or fear.
The jury rejected appellant's voluntary intoxication defense. He testified that he was drunk and unable to remember if he was in a car or even whether Martin R. was with him. Nevertheless, he was able to drive away from his cousin's house, form the intent to grab the gun, jump the fence and run across six lanes of the 105 Freeway, without getting hit. Appellant ran up an embankment and hid in dense brush. When he was apprehended, he was talking to his stepsister on his cell phone, and told the police he had been tagging. He did not say he was drunk or exhibit any signs of intoxication. There was no evidence, other than appellant's testimony, that he was intoxicated at the time he committed the crime. The jury's findings were supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, Acting P.J., PERREN, J.