Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC-067888
Dondero, J.
Defendant Jose Galan-Najarro appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of attempted murder. He contends there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill to support the conviction. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of November 21, 2008, Karla Garcia went with some friends to a club in San Francisco named Caliente. Isai Jonathan Monterozza was there with his friend Daniel. Monterozza noticed defendant inside the club. He had seen defendant at this club about seven times before and had gone to defendant’s house on a prior occasion. Garcia had also seen defendant before at the club and was familiar with him because he was an acquaintance of Daniel, who was also her friend. The friends stayed at the club until it closed at about two o’clock the next morning. After the club closed, a friend offered to drive Garcia, Monterozza, and some other friends to her apartment in Daly City. Daniel invited defendant to come with them. Along the way, they stopped at a liquor store to get beer.
About seven people came to Garcia’s apartment. They stayed in the living room listening to music and drinking. Everyone appeared to be having a good time. After awhile, Garcia felt tired so she went to another room to lie down and watch television with some of her friends. When she left the living room, the only people remaining there were Daniel, Monterozza, and defendant.
Monterozza sat down in a chair near the kitchen area. Defendant began pacing around the middle of the room and appeared to be uneasy. As the three men were talking, their voices rose and defendant told Monterozza to calm down. Monterozza said that he was calm and told defendant to calm down. Defendant said, “What? Are you not afraid of me?” He repeated this and started coming closer to where Monterozza was sitting. Monterozza said, “Why? Why should I be afraid?” As defendant moved closer, Monterozza turned his gaze away and looked down. At that point, defendant had turned away.
As Monterozza raised his head, he suddenly felt a blow to his neck. He thought defendant had hit him with his hand, but then he noticed he was bleeding. He raised his arms to protect himself and defendant stabbed him three times in his chest and torso area. Daniel grabbed defendant and pulled him away from Monterozza, saying, “Leave him, leave him. Look at the way you left him.” In the bedroom, Garcia heard Daniel saying, “Don’t do that.” Then, she heard Daniel yell something. She and her friends came out of the bedroom and saw Monterozza on the floor covered in blood. Defendant was no longer there. The front door of the apartment was open. Defendant had run out of the apartment.
At approximately 3:30 in the morning on November 22, 2008, Officer Blake Lycett received a call concerning a disturbance at a residence in Daly City. When he arrived at the residence, he was told that someone had been stabbed and was directed to an in-law unit in the back of the house. He saw the male victim, who was bleeding from his chest and neck. The wound to the neck appeared to be serious. Lycett noticed a lot of blood on the victim’s clothing, as well as on towels that were being used to stop the blood flow. The victim appeared to be distraught and in pain. Paramedics arrived and the victim was taken to the hospital. The particular wounds inflicted here were not slash wounds but direct and penetrating ones. Monterozza had surgery on his neck and stayed in the hospital for four days. He missed 10 days of work and, at the time of trial, still felt some pain from his injuries.
Officer Bruce Perdomo arrived to assist Lycett at the crime scene. Perdomo interviewed witnesses and collected evidence. One of the items he collected was a T-shirt worn by Monterozza. The shirt had two linear holes in it, one in the upper left chest area and one in the lower right side.
Perdomo interviewed Monterozza at the hospital later that night. He showed Monterozza a photo lineup with six pictures. Monterozza identified defendant as the perpetrator. Defendant was apprehended on November 23, 2008.
On February 10, 2009, an information was filed charging defendant with one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 664/187, subd. (a)) committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 189) and with use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The information also charged defendant with one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). As to both counts, the information alleged that defendant had inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On September 30, 2009, a jury found appellant guilty of the attempted murder and assault charges. The jury found untrue the allegation that the attempted murder was committed with premeditation. The jury found the allegation that defendant used a deadly weapon to be true, and also found that defendant inflicted great bodily injury.
On December 1, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison: the midterm of seven years for the attempted murder count, plus an additional three years for causing great bodily injury. The court struck the weapon use enhancement and imposed, but stayed, punishment on the assault charge. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted murder. He claims the assault on Monterozza was a spontaneous act and that there is no substantial evidence he had the intent to kill. Specifically, he asserts he had no motive to kill Monterozza, and claims there was no medical evidence as to the seriousness of the injuries. He concedes he is guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, but contends that no rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill his victim. We disagree.
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.)
“[T]o prove an attempted murder charge, there must be sufficient evidence of the intent to commit the murder plus a direct but ineffectual act toward its commission.... [T]he evidence must demonstrate a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill a fellow human being.” (People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690.) Often there is no direct evidence to prove intent so it “must be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the putative killer’s actions and words.” (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 946.)
Here, defendant repeatedly stabbed Monterozza in the neck, chest, and torso. Monterozza was unarmed and had not threatened defendant. He also posed no danger to him, being in a seated, vulnerable position when the attack occurred. This evidence alone is substantial evidence of defendant’s intent to kill. (See People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [intent to kill demonstrated in part by evidence of unprovoked attack that rendered unarmed victim prone and defenseless as the defendant repeatedly stabbed him].) Further, defendant only stopped stabbing Monterozza after he was pulled away by Daniel.
The evidence also showed that Monterozza sustained injuries serious enough to require surgery to his neck and a four-day hospital stay. While defendant questions the medical evidence of Monterozza’s injuries, “the degree of the resulting injury is not dispositive of defendant’s intent. Indeed, a defendant may properly be convicted of attempted murder when no injury results.” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 702.) Further, defendant intentionally targeted the chest and neck, areas he would have known could have easily resulted in death. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [that the defendant missed the victim’s “heart and lungs was fortuitous rather than indicative of the absence of an intent to kill”]; People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114 [defendant’s testimony that he did not intend to kill victim was contradicted by the fact that he “stabbed the victim not in the arm or leg, but in the abdomen, an extremely vulnerable area of the body”].)
Defendant also suggests that he had no motive to kill Monterozza, claiming the assault merely occurred “in the middle of a drunken argument.” He does not explain how this context would be inconsistent with an intent to kill. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162 [if “jury found defendant’s use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance”].) Even assuming the circumstances are inconsistent with such intent, “ ‘if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th 680, 703.) We note the jury was properly instructed on voluntary intoxication pursuant to CALCRIM No. 625. Additionally, review of appellant’s brief in this case presents no legal challenge to the jury instructions given at the trial. Also, our independent review discloses no legal impropriety with the instructions. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that there was a lack of substantial evidence to show that he possessed the requisite intent to kill.
CALCRIM No. 625, as given in this case, provides: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill, or the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation. [¶] A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect. [¶] You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J.Banke, J.