Opinion
E072727
06-24-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP RYAN FRANKE, Defendant and Appellant.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and James R. Secord, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1002158) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Eric M. Nakata, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and James R. Secord, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437), legislation that prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons who were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the courts that sentenced them to vacate their murder convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining counts. (Ibid.; see Pen. Code, § 1170.95)
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Defendant and appellant Phillip Ryan Franke appeals from an order denying his petition to vacate a first degree murder conviction in which he aided and abetted one or more codefendants and obtain resentencing under the procedures established by Senate Bill 1437. The trial court granted the People's motion to strike defendant's petition after concluding the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) and Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)), voter initiatives that increased the punishments for persons convicted of murder and augmented the list of predicate offenses for first degree felony-murder liability, respectively.
Defendant argues Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional and therefore the order striking his petition for resentencing must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The People urge us to affirm the order striking defendant's petition and find Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional on grounds that: (1) Senate Bill 1437 unlawfully amended Proposition 7; (2) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 115; (3) the resentencing provision of section 1170.95 violates the separation of powers doctrine; and/or (4) the resentencing provision deprives crime victims the rights afforded them by the Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008, commonly known as Marsy's Law (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008)).
All published opinions addressing this issue have concluded that Senate Bill 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend either initiative. Most recently, in People v. Johns (June 8, 2020, E072412) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ , People v. Prado (May 26, 2020, G058172) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ , People v. Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 300, 306 (Bucio), People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762, 774-780 (Solis), and People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, 753-759 (Cruz), our sister courts concluded that Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional. Previously, Division One of this court in People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 (Lamoureux), review denied February 19, 2020, S259835, and People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270 (Gooden), review denied February 19, 2020, S259700, concluded Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidly amend Proposition 7 and/or Proposition 115. The Lamoureux court also determined that the resentencing provisions of Senate Bill 1437 do not contravene separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime victims.
Agreeing with the analyses and the conclusions set forth in those opinions, we reverse the trial court's order granting the People's motion to strike defendant's resentencing petition and remand with directions to consider defendant's petition on its merits.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from this court's nonpublished opinion in defendant's prior appeal, case No. E053756, which is part of the record on appeal in this case. (People v. Franke (July 25, 2012, E053756) [nonpub. opn.].)
A. Factual Background
Victim Sandi Duncan (nicknamed "Sweet P") was a student at Barstow Community College. On September 20, 2009, around 10:30 a.m., she cashed a financial aid check for $458.37. She went home, showered, changed, then went out again. When she did not come home that night, one of her roommates was worried; he phoned her and texted her, but she did not respond.
The next day, September 21, 2009, between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m., a man looking for firewood found Duncan's body. It was out in the desert, in a dry creek bed about 100 yards from his house in Apple Valley.
The body was lying face up. There were two ligature marks on Duncan's neck, mostly on the left and front. In addition, Duncan had been shot once in the chest and once in the abdomen. Both bullets had exited through her back. The bullets were found under her body, indicating that she had been shot where she lay.
Two empty bullet casings were found within two feet of the body. A third, unfired bullet was also found. All three casings were marked ".380 auto."
In the opinion of an expert forensic pathologist, the strangulation occurred first, followed by the shooting. Duncan was still alive when she was shot; the gunshot wounds were the cause of death. The two gunshot wounds were inflicted one right after the other—"bang, bang." The time of death was at least eight hours and perhaps as much as 24 hours before body was found.
There was a fresh set of tire tracks in the area. These indicated that a vehicle had made a three-point U-turn. There were also six shoe prints. One shoe print was right next to the body; five were farther away, next to some tire tracks. The shoe prints displayed two distinct sole patterns.
There were no drag marks. Moreover, none of the shoe prints matched Duncan's shoes. Investigators concluded that Duncan had been "picked up and placed" where she was found.
About a week later, on September 28, 2009, a police officer assigned to observe one Melvin Satcher spotted Satcher riding as passenger in a car that defendant was driving. The car had a cracked taillight. The officer performed a traffic stop.
Defendant consented to a search of the car. Under the front passenger seat, the officer found a distinctive beaded purse later identified as Duncan's. It was turned inside out. Defendant said it belonged to his mother.
In the trunk, the officer found fireworks that appeared to have been altered. He arrested defendant for possession of illegal fireworks.
Defendant's tires matched tire tracks found at the scene. For example, one of his tires was the same size and the same width and had the same tread design as one of the tracks. However, the tracks did not have enough detail to support a determination that they had been made by defendant's tires (rather than by tires of the same make and model).
Shoes that Satcher was wearing matched the shoe print found near Duncan's body. The shoes that defendant was wearing, however, did not match any of the shoe prints found at the scene; neither did a second pair in defendant's car. The police searched defendant's home but did not find any additional shoes.
The police interviewed defendant on the day of his arrest and again the next day. The interviews were audiotaped, and the tapes were played for the jury.
Defendant said he lived in Las Vegas. He also said he and Satcher were friends. They had met while incarcerated together in the military.
At first, defendant denied even being in California on the date of the shooting. When the police told him they could prove that he was in Barstow, however, he changed his story; he admitted being in Barstow but claimed he left town in the morning. He specifically said he did not lend his car to anybody. He then changed his story again; he claimed a friend of Satcher paid him $100 to borrow his car.
Defendant then changed his story again. He said that, at Satcher's request, he agreed to drive four people to Los Angeles: Satcher, the victim, and two men he did not know. The victim said she wanted to go to Los Angeles to go shopping.
It was afternoon. One of the other two men said he needed to use the bathroom, so defendant got off the freeway. The man told him to pull into a "little cut." Defendant pulled in, made a three-point turn, and stopped. The other four got out, but only three got back in. They told him, "[D]on't worry about it, just go," so he did.
The police told defendant they knew he was lying, because the victim had not left any footprints. Defendant then changed his story yet again. He said that the victim was sitting in the front passenger seat; Satcher and the other two men were sitting in the rear. After they pulled off and stopped, one of the other two men started to strangle the victim, using a white cloth. The victim "tried to fight." Defendant got out of the car and walked around it.
After a while, all three other men got out. Satcher just "st[ood] around looking" while one of the other two men opened the front passenger door and pulled the victim out. Simultaneously, defendant got back in the car. He moved the car forward, about to leave, but he decided he "wasn't gonna leave [Satcher] . . . ." He then heard two shots. The other three men got back in the car, and defendant drove away.
When the interview resumed the next day, at first, defendant stuck to this story. However, he did say it was Satcher who told him where to drive and where to stop. The police repeatedly said they knew he was lying because there were only two sets of shoe prints. Defendant then changed his story one final time. He said the other two men never got out of the car. Each of the two strangled the victim; whenever one of them got tired, they "switched off." Satcher warned them not to let go. It was Satcher who opened the car door and pulled the victim out.
Defendant admitted seeing Satcher shoot the victim. Satcher stood over her and fired two shots downward—"like pow, pow." A third round jammed, so Satcher removed the magazine, took out the bullet, wiped it, and put it back in the chamber. Satcher later told defendant that he shot the victim in the chest and in the stomach.
When asked why they did it, defendant said, "[S]he was supposed to have some check . . . that she cashed and . . . they were trying to get her money . . . ." Sometime before the shooting, Satcher had told defendant that "she gets checks every other week." However, the victim had less money than they expected—only about $200. They gave defendant $40 for gas, then split the rest between them.
When asked if his DNA would be on the murder weapon, defendant said it might be, because a few days earlier, Satcher had been looking at a .38-caliber semiautomatic, and defendant had touched it.
Although defendant's and Satcher's homes were searched, the murder weapon was never found.
Defendant's statement included many details that the police had not told him and had not made public, including the fact that the victim had been strangled and shot twice, in the chest and abdomen; the fact that the bullets were .38-caliber; and the fact that the vehicle had made a three-point turn. According to the pathologist, the fact that there were two separate ligature marks was consistent "with someone struggling and the ligature slipping[.]" The fact that there was no mark on the back of Duncan's neck was consistent with her being in the front seat of a car and being strangled by someone in the back seat.
B. Procedural Background
On February 25, 2011, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211). As to the murder count, the jury found true the allegations that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to 26 years to life.
On July 25, 2012, we affirmed the convictions and instructed the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.
In 2018, after defendant's judgment of conviction became final, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which allows those "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . ." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
On January 7, 2019, defendant in pro. per. filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95.
On February 28, 2019, the People filed a motion to strike defendant's petition for resentencing on grounds that the amendments effectuated by Senate Bill 1437 were unconstitutional and violated the separation of powers between the judiciary and the Legislature. On this same day, the People also filed an informal response arguing defendant failed to set forth a prima facie case for relief as required by section 1170.95.
On March 28, 2019, defendant's appointed counsel filed an opposition to the People's motion to strike the petition for resentencing.
A hearing on defendant's petition for resentencing was held on May 3, 2019. Ultimately, the trial court struck defendant's petition for resentencing, finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional, without reaching the merits of defendant's petition, and denied defendant's petition.
On May 3, 2019, defendant timely appealed the order striking and denying his section 1170.95 petition. The Attorney General permitted the Office of the District Attorney of San Bernardino County to represent the People's interests in this appeal and, for its part, filed an amicus curiae brief defending the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1437.
III
DISCUSSION
A. General Background of Senate Bill 1437
On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437. "The legislation, which became effective on January 1, 2019, addresses certain aspects of California law regarding felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine by amending Penal Code sections 188 and 189, as well as by adding Penal Code section 1170.95, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can seek retroactive relief if the changes in law would affect their previously sustained convictions." (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 722 (Martinez).)
An uncodified section of the law expressing the Legislature's findings and declarations states the law was "necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It further provides that the legislation was needed "to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of the individual." (Id., § 1, subd. (e).)
Prior to Senate Bill 1437's enactment, a person who knowingly aided and abetted a crime, the natural and probable consequence of which was murder or attempted murder, could be convicted of not only the target crime but also of the resulting murder or attempted murder. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161; In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144 (R.G.).) "This was true irrespective of whether the defendant harbored malice aforethought. Liability was imposed '"for the criminal harms [the defendant] . . . naturally, probably, and foreseeably put in motion." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (R.G., at p. 144.) "The purpose of the felony-murder rule [was] to deter those who commit[ted] the enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly responsible for any killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony." (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197.) Aider and abettor liability under the doctrine was thus "vicarious in nature." (People v. Chiu, at p. 164.)
Senate Bill 1437 "redefined 'malice' in section 188. Now, to be convicted of murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought; malice can no longer 'be imputed to a person based solely on [his or her] participation in a crime.' (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)" (R.G., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) "Senate Bill 1437 also amended section 189, which defines first and second degree murder, by, among other things, adding subdivision (e). Under that subdivision, a participant in enumerated crimes is liable under the felony-murder doctrine only if he or she was the actual killer; or, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer in commission of first degree murder; or was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life." (People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, 749; § 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099-1100, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175; Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) "Senate Bill 1437 thus ensures that murder liability is not imposed on a person who did not act with implied or express malice," or—when the felony-murder doctrine is at issue—"was not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (People v. Munoz, at pp. 749-750; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subds. (f), (g); People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1147; Martinez, at p. 723.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which permits persons convicted of murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory to petition in the sentencing court for an order vacating their convictions and allowing defendant to be resentenced. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) An offender may file a section 1170.95 petition if he or she was prosecuted under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory, but under amended sections 188 or 189, could not have been convicted of first or second degree murder. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1); Martinez, at pp. 723-724.) At such a hearing, both the prosecution and the defense may rely on the record of conviction or may offer new or additional evidence. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) "[T]he burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3); Martinez, at pp. 723-724.)
If the petitioner is found eligible for relief, the murder conviction must be vacated and the petitioner resentenced "on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been [sic] previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) If the petitioner is found eligible for relief, but "murder was charged generically[ ] and the target offense was not charged," the petitioner's murder conviction must be "redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes." (§ 1170.95, subd. (e).)
B. Constitutionality of Senate Bill 1437
Proposition 7 had increased the penalties for first and second degree murder and expanded the list of special circumstances that, if found true, would require a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Proposition 115 expanded the number of crimes to which the felony-murder rule would apply and made numerous changes to various statutes to protect the rights of crime victims and witnesses in criminal cases.
Defendant and the Attorney General both contend Senate Bill 1437 and section 1170.95, as enacted by Senate Bill 1437, did not unconstitutionally amend Propositions 7 and 115. The People reassert the same arguments that they had made to the trial court. They argue Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutionally amends Propositions 7 and 115 by decreasing the number of people who are subject to conviction, and thus punishment, for murder. The People also contend that the resentencing petition process established under Senate Bill 1437, specifically section 1170.95, violates the separation of powers doctrine and that the resentencing provision is in direct conflict with Proposition 9 or Marsy's Law.
The Attorney General notes that it "is providing a uniform defense of the law."
After conducting a de novo review (People v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 663, 680), we agree with defendant and the Attorney General that Senate Bill 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend Propositions 7 and 115, and/or violate the separations of powers doctrine, Proposition 9, or Marsy's Law. Since the trial court's ruling in this case, constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 1437 have been rejected. (See generally Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 241; Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270; Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th. 762; Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 740; Bucio, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 300.)
A statute enacted by voter initiative may be amended or repealed by the Legislature only with the approval of the electorate, unless the initiative statute provides otherwise. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) "[D]espite the strict bar on the Legislature's authority to amend initiative statutes, judicial decisions have observed that this body is not thereby precluded from enacting laws addressing the general subject matter of an initiative. The Legislature remains free to address a '"related but distinct area"' [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure 'does not specifically authorize or prohibit.' [Citations.]" (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1025-1026 (Kelly), italics omitted.)
Because Proposition 7 did not authorize the Legislature to amend it (People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 41, 44), and because Senate Bill 1437 passed the Assembly without the necessary votes for legislative amendment of Proposition 115 (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 567 (Pearson); Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 277), Senate Bill 1437 would be unconstitutional, if it constitutes an "amendment" to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. (See Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1483-1484 (Quackenbush) [the Legislature may amend a statute enacted by the initiative process "only if the voters specifically gave the Legislature that power, and then only upon whatever conditions the voters attached to the Legislature's amendatory powers"].) "An amendment is a legislative act designed to change an existing initiative statute by adding or taking away from it some particular provision." (People v. Cooper, at p. 44.)
The People cite Quackenbush, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1473 for the standard that an amendment is "'"'any change of the scope or effect of an existing statute, whether by addition, omission, or substitution of provisions, which does not wholly terminate its existence, whether by an act purporting to amend, repeal, revise, or supplement, or by an act independent and original in form.'"'" (Id. at pp. 1484-1485.) This language was taken from Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776-777. In Kelly, supra, 47 Cal.4th at page 1026, the California Supreme Court declined to "endorse any such expansive definition" of the term "amendment." Therefore, the cases in which the appellate court concluded a statute constituted an amendment based on an "expansive definition" of amendment are of less precedential value to our analysis.
To determine if Senate Bill 1437 constitutes an amendment to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115, "we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits." (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) Division One of this court recently answered this question in the negative in Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270, and reaffirmed its conclusion in Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 241. This Division and this District have found the analysis in Gooden and Lamoureux persuasive. We continue to follow that analysis here.
In Solis and Cruz, Division Three of this court also rejected the People's arguments. The Solis court explained: "A statute enacted by voter initiative may be amended or repealed by the Legislature only with the approval of the electorate, unless the initiative statute otherwise provides. [Citation.] '"[T]he purpose of California's constitutional limitation on the Legislature's power to amend initiative statutes is to 'protect the people's initiative powers by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people have done, without the electorate's consent.'"'" (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 771.)
"For purposes of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution, legislation amends an initiative if it '"'change[s] an existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular provision.'"' [Citations.] '[T]his does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative's provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes. "The Legislature remains free to address a '"related but distinct area"' [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure 'does not specifically authorize or prohibit.'" [Citations.] In deciding whether this particular provision amends Proposition 115, we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits.'" (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 771-772.)
With respect to Proposition 7, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three held: "Proposition 7 provided greater penalties for those convicted of murder and increased the number of special circumstances that could form the basis of a sentence of death or life in prison without parole. In contrast, Senate Bill No. 1437 changed the elements of murder by limiting the circumstances in which malice can be implied, thereby restricting the application of the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Senate Bill No. 1437 is neither inconsistent with Proposition 7, nor does it circumvent the electorate's intent." (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 779; see Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 755-756.)
With respect to Proposition 115, the appellate court concluded: "Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . limits liability for felony murder and murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to an individual who is the actual killer, or who had the intent to kill and undertook specific actions to assist in commission of the murder, or who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. These limitations do not directly modify or amend the language of Proposition 115." (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; see Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759-761.)
In Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270, Division One of this court concluded "Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 because it neither added to, nor took away from, the initiatives." (Id. at p. 275.) Gooden noted Senate Bill 1437 does not speak to the penalties for murder; rather, it amends the mental state required for murder. (Gooden, at p. 287.)
With respect to Proposition 7, the Gooden court explained: Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 7 because it did not "address the same subject matter [as Proposition 7]. It did not prohibit what Proposition 7 authorizes by, for example, prohibiting a punishment of 25 years to life for first degree murder or 15 years to life for second degree murder. Nor did it authorize what Proposition 7 prohibits by, for instance, permitting a punishment of less than 25 years for first degree murder or less than 15 years for second degree murder. In short, it did not address punishment at all. Instead, it amended the mental state requirements for murder, which 'is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense 'element.'" (Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 282, quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 493.)
Because Senate Bill 1437 and Proposition 7 concerned different subjects, the Gooden court concluded Proposition 7 did not foreclose the Legislature from enacting Senate Bill 1437 to amend the mental state requirements for murder under the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 282-286.) Gooden's analysis applied to all the legislative amendments effectuated by Senate Bill 1437, including section 1170.95. (Gooden, at p. 286.)
Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 287 and 288, similarly found Senate Bill 1437 does not amend Proposition 115, which made more offenses eligible for felony murder. The Gooden court explained, again, Senate Bill 1437 "did not augment or restrict the list of predicate felonies on which felony murder may be based" but instead "amended the mental state necessary for a person to be liable for murder." (Gooden, at p. 287.) The court thus concluded that because Senate Bill 1437 does not amend Propositions 7 and 115, it does not violate article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution, which provides that the Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute only with voter approval, unless the original initiative permits amendment or repeal without voter approval. (Gooden, at pp. 279, 289.)
In Lamoureux, the same appellate court used the same analysis as it had in Gooden to again conclude Senate Bill 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend the earlier enacted initiatives. (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) The Lamoureux court further concluded that "the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 does not contravene separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime victims." (Ibid.)
The Lamoureux court explained, first, the bill was part of a broad penal reform to ensure our state's murder laws fairly address individual culpability and to reduce prison overcrowding. (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 247, 256.) Having such a purpose, any interference with the executive's power of clemency is merely incidental and not an impermissible encroachment on the core functions of the executive. (Id. at p. 256.) Second, the bill does not intrude on a core function of the judiciary by allowing prisoners serving final sentences to seek relief. To the extent retroactive reopening of final judgments implicates individual liberty interests, Senate Bill 1437 does not present any risk to those interests. (Lamoureux, at p. 261.) "On the contrary, it provides potentially ameliorative benefits to the only individuals whose individual liberty interests are at stake in a criminal prosecution," the criminal defendant. (Ibid.) Also, the legal landscape is rife with legislation allowing petitioners to reopen final judgments of conviction without regard to their finality as of the effective date of the legislation, for example, Propositions 36 and 47. (Lamoureux, at pp. 262-263.)
Regarding crime victims' rights as enshrined in Marsy's Law, the court in Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 264 to 266 explained, although Marsy's Law established a victim's right to prompt and final conclusion to postjudgment proceedings, Marsy's Law did not foreclose postjudgment proceedings altogether. (Lamoureux, at p. 265.) The court also noted section 1170.95 does not deprive victims of safety-related rights because trial courts may consider that factor when resentencing the defendant on any remaining counts. (Lamoureux, at pp. 265-266.)
The analyses and holdings in Solis and Cruz apply equally here, as do the holdings of Gooden and Lamoureux. We agree with the reasoning in those cases, and likewise conclude Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional and does not violate Propositions 7 and 115, the separation of powers doctrine, and/or Marsy's Law. We reject the People's reasons to depart from the conclusions reached in Gooden and Lamoureux. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional and striking defendant's resentencing petition under section 1170.95 without reaching its merit. We offer no opinion as to whether the trial court should issue an order to show cause or grant the relief requested in the petition.
The People requested judicial notice of ballot and legislative materials pertaining to Senate Bill 1437, Proposition 7, Proposition 115, and other proposed legislation. We deny the request as to items 1 through 6 as unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal. --------
IV
DISPOSITION
The trial court's postjudgment order striking defendant's section 1170.95 resentencing petition is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to consider the merits of defendant's petition under section 1170.95.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J. We concur:
SLOUGH
J. RAPHAEL
J.