Opinion
No. 1-12-2583
06-27-2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAY FLOWERS, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.
No. 12 DV 73091
Honorable
Yolande M. Bourgeois,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hall concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating an order of protection when two witnesses testified that defendant contacted the victim after receiving a copy of the order which forbade all contact between defendant and the victim. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Ray Flowers was found guilty of violating an order of protection and sentenced to 30 days in jail, and one year of supervision. On appeal, he contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim's testimony was inconsistent and the State failed to substantiate the victim's testimony with documentation establishing that he actually contacted her. We affirm. ¶ 3 An order of protection was entered on April 3, 2012 requiring defendant to refrain from any contact with the victim, Chiquita Battle, by any means including through third parties. On May 2, 2012, defendant sent a text to the victim in violation of the order of protection. ¶ 4 The next day, the State appeared before the trial court seeking leave to file a criminal complaint and the issuance of an arrest warrant. At that hearing, the victim testified that defendant was her "ex," and that he called her 30 minutes after a police officer gave him a copy of the order of protection and told her that she was still not safe. The court granted the State leave to file a criminal complaint, an arrest warrant was issued and defendant was subsequently arrested. The complaint alleged that defendant violated the order of protection in that he called the victim. ¶ 5 On June 7, 2012, the matter proceeded to bench trial. Before trial began, the State sought leave to amend the complaint to indicate that defendant "contacted" the victim in violation of the order of protection, rather than that he called the victim. The defense did not object. ¶ 6 The victim testified that the dating relationship between herself and defendant ended in September 2011. She subsequently obtained a default order of protection against defendant which forbade him from having any contact with the victim or her grandchild. ¶ 7 On May 2, 2012, the victim went to the Evans Club to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. When she saw defendant, she walked away. Defendant followed her and told her that they could be civil and speak to one another. The victim did not respond; rather, she called the police. When officers arrived, defendant was standing in front of the building. The victim gave the officers a copy of the order of protection. The victim then watched as the officers gave a copy to defendant and told him that he was not to have any contact with her. The victim's friend Valeria Durhan was also present. ¶ 8 Less than an hour later, the victim received a text message from defendant stating that she was "still not safe." She knew the message was from defendant because it was from the number she had used to contact defendant in the past. The victim showed her phone to Durhan and then went to a police station to file a police report. She later went to court in order that an arrest warrant might be secured. ¶ 9 During cross-examination, the victim admitted that she did not have any records from her cellular phone carrier with her. However, May 3, 2012, she told an attorney that she had received the text and showed "them" the text. She explained that it was because she showed the text that she was able to appear before a judge. The victim was surprised that the "document" indicated that defendant called her. ¶ 10 Valeria Durhan then testified that when she and the victim arrived for their meeting, defendant was present. The victim got out of Durhan's car first and began walking toward the building. As Durhan exited her car, she heard defendant call the victim's name and saw him approach the victim. The victim told him to leave her alone and walked away. Durhan also told defendant to leave the victim alone. She then went inside. When the police later arrived, she saw them speak to the victim and hand defendant a copy of the order of protection. Within an hour, the victim received a text from defendant stating that the victim was not safe. Durhan knew that the text was from defendant because she recognized his number, which began with "643." ¶ 11 Defendant testified that, on May 2, 2012, he stayed outside the building while the victim and Durhan went inside. He denied approaching the victim or speaking to her. When the police arrived, he was given a copy of the order of protection and driven to a bus station. The officers did not take his phone. Defendant had previously received a copy of the temporary order of protection, and from that point forward, he did not communicate with the victim. In fact, he learned that she changed her phone number from other people when they asked him why she could not be reached. He denied texting the victim. ¶ 12 In finding defendant guilty, the trial court found that the victim and Durhan were credible when they testified that they both saw the text message from defendant. The trial court found that while their story made sense, defendant's did not. Rather, defendant "slipped up" when he admitted, and then tried to explain, how he knew that the victim's phone number had changed. The trial court believed that defendant texted the victim. Therefore, the court found defendant guilty of violating the order of protection. The court sentenced defendant to 30 days in jail, with 30 days credit, followed by one year of reporting supervision, domestic violence counseling, and GPS monitoring. ¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the victim testified inconsistently regarding the nature of the contact and the State failed to substantiate her testimony with documentation establishing that the text actually existed. ¶ 14 In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must determine whether any rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder on issues involving the weight of evidence or witness credibility because the fact finder resolves conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. The fact finder need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances; instead, all the evidence taken together must satisfy the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. In weighing the evidence, the fact finder need not disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence or seek all possible explanations consistent with a defendant's innocence and elevate them to reasonable doubt. Id. A defendant's conviction will be reversed only where the evidence is so unreasonable or improbable that a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt remains. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. ¶ 15 Here, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, the evidence at trial established that defendant contacted the victim after receiving a copy of the order of protection which banned all contact between defendant and the victim. Both the victim and Durhan testified that less than an hour after police officers gave defendant a copy of the order of protection, the victim received a text message from defendant. Although defendant denied sending a text to the victim, the trial court did not believe him; rather, the court found the testimony of the victim and Durhan credible, as evidenced by its finding. It was for the trial court, as the trier of fact to determine witness credibility; we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this issue. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. ¶ 16 Defendant, however, contends that the victim was not a credible witness because her testimony was inconsistent. Specifically, defendant argues that the victim testified at a May 2012 hearing that defendant violated the order of protection by calling her. He relies on that inconsistency to argue the State's failure to "substantiate" the victim's testimony with phone records establishing that a text was actually sent was fatal to the State's case. ¶ 17 Here, the trial court was faced with two competing versions of events. The victim and Durhan testified that the victim received a text message from defendant and defendant denied sending a text. During cross-examination, the victim testified that she was surprised that it was alleged that defendant called her, as on the day that she came to court to swear out the complaint, she showed the text message to an attorney in order to appear before a judge. To the extent that the victim's testimony regarding the method of contact differed, it was for the trial court, as the tier of fact to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. See People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009) (in a bench trial, the trial court, as the trier of fact, determines witness credibility and resolves conflicts in the evidence). We similarly reject defendant's argument regarding the victim's phone records. At trial, the victim admitted that she did not bring phone records with her that day, but that she had previously shown the text message to attorneys when she went to court in May 2012. Although the fact that the victim testified inconsistently regarding the form of contact between herself and defendant may have affected her credibility, a trier of fact is not required to disregard the inferences that flow from the evidence or search out all possible explanations consistent with a defendant's innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. Ultimately, this court cannot say that the victim's testimony was "so wholly incredible" that it was incapable of being used as evidence against defendant. People v. Sanders, 2012 IL App (1st) 102040, ¶15. ¶ 18 This court reverses a defendant's conviction only when the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to his guilt (Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48); this is not one of those cases. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction. ¶ 19 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 20 Affirmed.