Opinion
E039909
5-10-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GABRIEL FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.
Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorney General, and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
I. INTRODUCTION
In an information filed October 7, 2005, Gabriel Flores ("defendant") was charged in Riverside County with one felony count of willfully and unlawfully possessing methamphetamine for sale, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378, and one felony count of willfully and unlawfully threatening to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury to a person in violation of Penal Code section 422.
All further statutory references will be to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise noted.
On January 10, 2006, the jury found defendant guilty of violating section 11378, but deadlocked on the Penal Code section 422 charge. As a result of the guilty verdict, defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The court sentenced defendant to a total of five years in state prison, two years for violating section 11378, and three years for a prior conviction pursuant to section 11370.2, subdivision (c). For violating probation, the court sentenced defendant to three more years in state prison, to run concurrently to the five-year term.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution by not excluding at trial statements made to the police, because defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 18, 2005, Officer Lance Bourgault of the Corona Police Department responded to a dispatcher reporting a domestic disturbance. While en route, the dispatcher advised Officer Bourgault that defendant had threatened his wife, Laura Alcala, with a knife.
Upon arrival, Officer Bourgault found the front door of the apartment already open. He peered inside and saw defendant standing alone in the kitchen while Ms. Alcala stood in the bedroom area. Despite not speaking English, defendant complied with the officers instruction to "step outside" the apartment. Officer Bourgault then went to check on Ms. Alcala while Corporal Madory, having just arrived, watched over defendant. Since Ms. Alcala did not speak English, Officer Bourgault waited for Officer Castaneda, a Spanish translating officer, to arrive and assist in the investigation.
With Officer Castaneda translating, Officer Bourgault began inquiring into what had transpired earlier that day. Ms. Alcala showed the officers the knife she said defendant used to threaten her and then led the officers to a computer desk near the front door of the apartment. The desk contained baggies of crystal methamphetamine, extra empty baggies, an electronic scale, a straw, a hollow pen, and pay-owe sheets. Ms. Alcala told the officers that defendant had been selling drugs out of the house for about a week, and when she confronted defendant, he threatened to kill her with the knife.
Officer Castaneda went to talk to defendant, who had remained outside with Corporal Madory throughout the investigation. Shortly thereafter, Officer Bourgault joined them with the knife and drugs in hand. Defendant denied threatening his wife, but admitted that the knife found inside the house belonged to him. Officer Castaneda next asked defendant about the drugs found in the desk. Defendant stood quiet for a few seconds but then admitted that the drugs in Officer Bourgaults possession belonged to him. The officers then handcuffed and arrested defendant.
On January 6, 2006, the trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine the admissibility of defendants statements to the police. Officer Bourgault offered the only testimony at this hearing. He testified that upon arriving at the scene, he instructed defendant to step outside of the apartment, but did not handcuff defendant. The officer left defendant outside with Corporal Madory, while he went inside to investigate. Officer Bourgault eventually came back outside with the knife and drugs found inside the apartment. Upon seeing the items, defendant made some admissions to Officer Castaneda, the only officer who understood Spanish. The officers handcuffed and arrested defendant immediately after he made the admissions. The entire sequence of events constituted 50 minutes.
The trial court interrupted the cross-examination of Officer Bourgault and ruled that the statements could be used at trial. The judge determined that defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda; rather, the officers were in an investigative mode at the time defendant made the incriminating statements.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that his pre-arrest statements to the officers were inadmissible at trial, because they violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination under Miranda. Specifically, defendant claims the totality of circumstances establish that he was in custody at the time of the police interrogation, thus triggering his Miranda rights. Defendant further claims that the officers did not read defendant his Miranda rights and obtain a waiver of those rights before interrogation began, so any statements made would be inadmissible at trial. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445.) We disagree.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that suspects in custody cannot be interrogated by law enforcement officers until first warned that they have the right to the presence of an attorney, the right to remain silent, and that anything they say can be used against them at trial. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) Any statements obtained from the suspect in violation of Miranda cannot be used at trial to establish guilt. (Id. at pp. 444-445; Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224.)
Here, the sole issue is whether the officers had defendant in custody at the time Officer Castaneda questioned him about the drugs found inside the desk. This is a mixed determination of law and fact. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 402; Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 112-113.) We defer to the trial courts factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently determine whether defendant was in custody during the interrogation. (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 402; Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. at pp. 112-113.)
Our highest Court has instructed that "custody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspects situation would perceive his circumstances." (Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 662.) After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation (id. at pp. 662-663; Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322), courts must determine if there was `"a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citation.]" (Yarborough v. Alvarado, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 663; Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 112; California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402.)
Although no single factor is determinative, some factors to consider include "(1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning." (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753; People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403.)
The totality of the circumstances shows that a reasonable person would not have perceived that he or she was in a situation similar to a formal arrest at the time of questioning. First, defendant was neither under arrest nor handcuffed during questioning. Second, the officers had been at defendants apartment for approximately 50 minutes before he made the incriminating statements. Third, both the detaining and questioning of defendant occurred outside the front door of his apartment, as opposed to a more intimidating locale such as a police station. (See Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 437-438 [suspect not in custody during traffic stop for Miranda purposes].) Fourth, there were three officers at the apartment; however, Corporal Madorys sole role in the investigation consisted of keeping an eye on defendant, and Officer Castaneda only came to the apartment because Officer Bourgault needed a translator. Further, the presence of more than one officer was necessary because one officer had to watch defendant while another officer tended to the purported victim, Ms. Alcala. Fifth, because of the language barrier, only Officer Castaneda questioned defendant. The record did not indicate that the officer used threats or confronted defendant with anything more than investigative inquiries. Further, the questioning of defendant only took a few minutes at most.
While three officers did not arrive at the same time, all three were present for the duration of the investigation.
Officer Castaneda testified, "I asked him who the drugs belonged to, and he said that they belonged to him."
Defendant argues that a 50-minute detention would lead a reasonable person to believe he or she was in custody. However, in People v. Forster, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, the suspect had been detained for a little over an hour at a border crossing, on suspicion of drunk driving, but was nonetheless found to have not been in custody. (Id. at 1753.) The court stated that, normally, detaining the suspect for over an hour supported the contention that the suspect was in custody, but the circumstances of the situation warranted an hour-long detention. (Ibid.) Since border patrol officers did not investigate drunk driving cases, they had to wait for the California Highway Patrol officers to arrive and investigate. (Id. at 1753-1754.)
Similar to the officers in People v. Forster, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, the officers here had good reason to keep defendant outside of the apartment for 50 minutes. First, since the officers responded to a domestic disturbance, they had to separate defendant from Ms. Alcala while they sorted out the situation. The officers would have acted irresponsibly in letting defendant stay in the apartment. Second, defendants detention was necessarily prolonged because both Ms. Alcala and defendant spoke only Spanish. Officer Bourgault had to wait for a Spanish-speaking officer to arrive at the scene and assist in the investigation. A reasonable person would not have equated standing outside his apartment for 50 minutes with being formally arrested considering the extraordinary circumstances.
Defendant also contends that Officer Castaneda only asked him about the drugs in order to gather incriminating information. Defendant claims this is evidenced by Officer Castaneda questioning him while Officer Bourgault stood with the drugs in his hand. However, even if both officers suspected that the drugs belonged to defendant, their beliefs had no bearing on the issue of custody. For determining custody, the correct inquiry focuses on a reasonable persons belief at the time of the questioning. (Yarborough v. Alvarado, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 662.) Further, Officer Castaneda did not ask defendant if the drugs belonged to him. Rather, the officer asked whom the drugs belonged to. While the first question accuses defendant, the second question asks defendant to provide information. When the police simply seek to gather information at the scene of a crime, Miranda does not apply. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 477; People v. Forster, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1754, fn. 2.)
Because defendant was not in custody at the time of questioning, Miranda did not apply. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting defendants statements at trial.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
RAMIREZ, P.J.
KING, J.