Opinion
December 14, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find no merit to the defendant's contention that her guilty plea was coerced because the plea agreement offered to her father, a codefendant, was conditioned upon her acceptance of the plea offer. It is well settled that prosecutors are free to dictate the terms of a plea bargain (see, People v Antonio, 176 A.D.2d 528, 529) and that a guilty plea will not be held per se coercive, just because the defendant's plea was conditioned upon a codefendant's plea (see, People v Cornielle, 176 A.D.2d 190, 191). A review of the defendant's plea allocution reveals that she intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered her plea of guilty. Moreover, we find that the performance of the defendant's first counsel met the standard of meaningful representation as evidenced by counsel's omnibus motion and pretrial disclosure motions. Under the circumstances of this case, counsel's failure to request a Wade hearing did not render his assistance ineffective (cf., People v Hale, 142 A.D.2d 172). The defendant's second counsel, who represented the defendant at the plea and sentencing proceedings, also provided the defendant with meaningful representation as evidenced by the favorable plea bargain which included a sentence considerably lower than the permissible, maximum sentence. Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, O'Brien, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.