Opinion
C077617
03-13-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARTIN EMMETT FITZPATRICK, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 13F05416)
A jury convicted defendant Martin Emmett Fitzpatrick of numerous sexual offenses against his 10-year-old daughter. At trial, defendant argued his Miranda waiver and confession were involuntary, an argument the trial court rejected. Defendant renews his challenge to his confession on appeal. We shall affirm the judgment.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 .
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2012 defendant moved to Sacramento with his 10-year-old daughter K.F. and her two younger siblings. While in Sacramento, defendant molested K.F. "If not every day, [then] every other day" he had vaginal intercourse with his daughter. He once sodomized K.F. and at least 10 times put his finger in her vagina.
K.F. moved back to Idaho in 2013 and told her mother about the molestations. K.F.'s mother contacted the police, who interviewed K.F. about the molestations.
Officers also recorded a phone call between K.F. and defendant. During the call, K.F. told defendant she wanted him to promise not to "touch [her] anymore." Defendant replied, "Of course." K.F. asked if he was sorry and defendant said: "Yes, very. Are you setting me up?" K.F. denied it and defendant replied: "Well, I don't remember touching you sweetie, like that." When K.F. reminded him of how he used to touch her, defendant said: "No, honey. All I remember is - is loving you sweetheart."
Following the interviews with K.F. and the phone call, the Sacramento police arrested defendant. During his interrogation at the police station, defendant admitted molesting K.F.
A jury convicted defendant of the following offenses against K.F.:
Count one: Sexual intercourse with a child 10 years or younger on May 16, 2013. (Penal Code § 288.7, subd. (a).)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise designated. --------
Count two: Sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger for the first intercourse between March 1, 2012, and May 16, 2013. (§ 288.7, subd. (a).)
Count three: Sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger for the last intercourse between March 1, 2012, and May 16, 2013. (§ 288.7, subd. (a).)
Count four: Sodomy of a child 10 years old or younger between March 1, 2012, and May 16, 2013. (§ 288.7, subd. (a).)
Count six: Digital penetration of a child 10 years or younger for the first penetration between March 1, 2012 and May 16, 2013. (§ 288.7, subd. (b).)
Count seven: Digital penetration of a child 10 years or younger for the last act of penetration between March 1, 2012, and May 16, 2013. (§ 288.7, subd. (b).)
The jury acquitted defendant of sexual penetration of his daughter with a showerhead (Count five), oral copulation with his daughter (Counts eight & nine), and abuse of his daughter likely to cause great bodily harm or death (Count ten).
The court imposed consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the four counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy. For the two counts of sexual penetration, the court imposed consecutive terms of 15 years to life, for an aggregate sentence of 130 years to life. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the officers' conduct during his interrogation vitiated his Miranda waiver and rendered his confession involuntary. He argues officers ignored his physical discomfort and request for medication and manipulated his fragile emotional state. According to defendant, the court committed prejudicial error in admitting the confession.
Background
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude his confession. The trial court reviewed defendant's medical records, videos of the interrogation, and video of defendant's transportation to the police station. We consider the evidence utilized by the trial court in denying defendant's motion.
The Interview Begins
Officers arrested defendant and transported him to the station. During the ride in the police car, defendant complained about back pain, asked to be helped out of the car, and stated he had nerve damage.
At the station, Detectives Amy Crosby and Andrew Newby began the interview. Defendant was not handcuffed and sat behind a table with water and a box of tissues. Crosby introduced herself and Detective Newby and defendant said he was in pain and asked for his medication. Defendant told detectives he took medicine for a ruptured disc, pain medicine, and medicine to go to sleep.
Crosby told defendant she needed to read him his Miranda rights. The following exchange took place:
Det. Crosby: "[S]ome of those procedures are that I need to read you your Miranda Rights. Okay?
"[Defendant]: Well, then I want a lawyer in her[e].
"Det. Crosby: Okay, you - you don't - you want a lawyer?
"[Defendant]: Yeah, I - I don't know what you guys are trying to do and I - I don't want to answer any questions without a lawyer.
"Det. Crosby: Okay, that's
"[Defendant]: What - what is the offense you're - what am I being charged with?
"Det. Crosby: Uhm - if you want an attorney, then I can't sit here and talk to you without an attorney present. Okay, so, we're gonna work on getting - uhm - your booking paperwork ready . . . and then we'll let you know . . . what you're being arrested for, okay?
"[Defendant]: I just talk
"Det. Crosby: Okay?
"Det. Newby: Sir, what - you're saying that you want to talk now without an attorney?
"[Defendant]: Let's talk and see what it's about. At least.
"Det. Newby: Okay. I mean we - you still have to understand we're gonna have to read you your rights.
"[Defendant]: Okay."
Crosby read defendant his Miranda rights. After each advisement, defendant signified he understood. The detectives showed defendant the warrant for his arrest
Defendant Denies the Charges
Defendant, after reading the arrest warrant, said the allegations must have come from his niece and his sister. However, the detectives told him K.F. was the source of the accusations.
Defendant denied molesting K.F. and said his ex-wife had brainwashed her. He said he would not go to prison and threatened suicide. The detectives took a break.
Crosby alone continued the questioning. Defendant talked about giving his daughter back massages and Crosby asked if he had ever beaten K.F. Crosby asked if defendant had given K.F. a pregnancy test or showed her pornography. Defendant denied both.
Newby returned to the interrogation. Crosby told defendant K.F. was "very descriptive during her interview." Crosby said she thought "something happened" and asked defendant to tell her the truth. Defendant again denied molesting K.F.
Cole and Newby told defendant he should apologize to K.F. Newby asked defendant about the recorded phone call. He also asked defendant if his back hurt. Defendant said yes and Newby asked, "What do you think [K.F.] felt like?" Newby accused defendant of acting, saying, "you seem to be crying, but I don't see any tears." Defendant denied he was acting.
Defendant Admits the Molestations
The detectives asked if K.F. had lied about the molestation. After defendant began to cry, Crosby told him to take a deep breath and drink water. They continued questioning him, but defendant did not respond. Newby told defendant they would not judge him and wanted to hear his side of the story. He asked defendant when the molestations began, but defendant did not answer.
This exchange followed:
"[Defendant]: My foot is really burning.
"(Short Pause)
"[Defendant]: Sorry. I - I go through these pains.
"Det. Newby: Martin, would you like to be done? Do you want to end this now?
"[Defendant]: Yeah.
"Det. Newby: Is this what you want to do? You don't want to tell your side of the story?
"[Defendant]: No.
"Det. Newby: I told you, this is - this is your opportunity. This is what we write down on paper.
"[Defendant]: Right. I know. [¶] . . . [¶]
"Det. Newby: Make us understand.
(Long Pause)
"Det. Crosby: What is stopping you from talking at this point?
"[Defendant]: Because I don't want to say nothing negative."
Newby reminded defendant they would not judge him, but wanted to hear his side of the story. Asked when the molestation started, defendant said "It wasn't till recent." The detectives asked what happened and defendant said: "Please. I begged [K.F.]," and "I can't do this. I can't do this. I can't do - I can't." Newby told defendant he could tell Crosby what happened and then left the room for about three minutes.
Defendant told Crosby he had begged K.F. to stop, that the molestation did not begin "till recent," and K.F. had been "very aggressive with it." Defendant continued to cry and gave short answers.
Defendant asked to stand up because of his leg. The interrogation continued as he stood up for approximately 10 minutes. Defendant said K.F. would "take off her clothes and get - dance around naked in front of me." He begged her many times to stop, and restrained himself from molesting her "quite a few times." When the detectives asked what sex acts occurred, defendant said that he was going to kill himself and that he would not go to prison. Newby offered to take a break, but defendant wanted to continue.
Defendant said K.F. had been "aggressive" and would "grab me in my privates." When asked if they had vaginal sex, defendant said, "I don't believe it ever . . . She's too small." He stated, "It was more just rubbing, you know, dry." K.F. performed oral sex on him twice, but they did not have anal sex. When asked how frequently the molestations occurred, defendant responded: "I don't know how many times, it was a -maybe a few times that we messed around . . . I just didn't keep count." Defendant later estimated the molestations happened maybe 20 times.
Before leaving the room, the detectives handcuffed defendant so he could not hurt himself. They left him alone for about seven minutes; at this point the interrogation had lasted a little over two hours. Defendant called Newby back in and they spoke for about 10 minutes. Defendant told Newby he wanted his personal property given to his children. Newby left. The interrogation lasted about two and a half hours in total.
Medical Records
The trial court reviewed defendant's medical records, specifically those related to a back injury in April 2013. The accident either caused or worsened three bulging discs and one herniated disc. Defendant was prescribed various medications and limited to desk work. In May 2013 doctors changed his medication after defendant complained of pain. There was no medical information between May 2013 and defendant's arrest.
Trial Court's Ruling
Defense counsel argued defendant's Miranda waiver was involuntary because he was in a great deal of pain and emotionally unstable. Detectives repeatedly ignored his request for medication. The prosecution contended the detectives were respectful and accommodating regarding defendant's pain. They ceased questioning him when he requested counsel and defendant reinitiated the interrogation by asking what he was charged with.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to exclude his confession. The court found defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, specifically the right to counsel. According to the court, defendant confessed voluntarily.
The court noted defendant suffered an injury in April 2013 with an original diagnosis of a hamstring pull, a relatively minor injury. A subsequent MRI revealed three bulging discs and nerve compression for which defendant was prescribed a muscle relaxer. Defendant saw doctors in May 2013, complained of continued pain, and was prescribed different medications. The medical records stop in May and defendant was arrested in August.
After reviewing the videos, the court noted defendant did struggle and seemed to experience some pain getting into the police car. The court viewed videos of the interrogation and observed: "It was apparent to me that the Defendant is a fairly emotional person. He was demonstrating -- on a spectrum from low emotion to high emotion, he appeared to be demonstrating high emotion essentially throughout the entire process. That included when he was talking about his pain, which causes me to conclude that a portion of his expressions about is pain is influenced not necessarily by the pain but by his emotional response by where he was. I don't believe that he was physically in as much pain as he was verbalizing during the course of the tapes, and that's based upon the fact, as I just mentioned, plus the fact he that he went for lengthy periods of time where he didn't seem to be experiencing any pain. He wasn't making any complaints. He was not verbalizing any pain. He appeared to be deep in thought. He was concentrating. He wasn't moving around, getting up and shifting his weight in the chair."
The court concluded any pain defendant suffered did not overcome his ability to make a knowing, willing, and intelligent waiver of his rights. The court termed the interrogation "stark" and "pointed", but noted the officers offered defendant a break which he declined. Defendant was given water, but did not ask for any other accommodations. After defendant invoked his right to counsel, the officers took steps to terminate the interrogation. Defendant then reinitiated the conversation and verified he wanted to continue without counsel.
The court concluded: "I find that there were no circumstances, such as being under the influence of medication, being in undue pain, having no apparent language issue, no unusual fatigue factor, none of the objective factors that might arise to a question as to whether or not the Defendant adequately understood and waived his Miranda rights. I find those to be absent."
Standard of Review
A valid Miranda waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. A waiver is voluntary when the defendant gives it by choice and not through intimidation. (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 (Williams).) The voluntariness of a statement is determined by assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 286 .) In the context of the case before us, a waiver need not be wise, nor does the suspect need to be in perfect health in giving the waiver. (People v. Simpson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 854, 859, fn. 1; People v. Breux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 299-301 (Breaux).)
The People bear the burden of proving the validity of the waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. On appeal, we review the trial court's legal determination de novo and adopt the court's findings of disputed facts if substantial evidence supports them. (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 425.)
We must also consider whether the confession itself was voluntary. Both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution forbid the use of a defendant's involuntary confession against him at trial. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Again, the People bear the burden of proving the voluntariness of a defendant's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. On appeal, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. We uphold a trial court's findings as to the circumstances of the confession if they are supported by substantial evidence. However, we independently review the trial court's finding as to the confession's voluntariness. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347 (McWhorter); People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 65, 71.)
A confession is involuntary if it is the product of threat or violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence. The confession and the inducement must be causally linked. (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 347.) In considering whether a confession was voluntary, the question is whether the defendant's decision to confess was not freely made because his will was overborne at the time he confessed. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404.) In evaluating coercion, we look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. In the absence of coercion, the characteristics of the accused cannot render a statement involuntary. (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 814.)
Miranda Waiver
Defendant argues his Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. According to defendant: "He was in significant pain, but the detectives refused to disclose the charges and ignored his request for medication. By its very nature, this situation was intimidating and coercive; he was trying to absorb what was going on while experiencing great pain."
We disagree. After the detectives introduced themselves they informed defendant that they needed to read him his Miranda rights. Defendant said he wanted counsel and the detectives agreed to end the interrogation. Defendant asked what he was charged with and Detective Newby asked if defendant wished to proceed without an attorney. Defendant said yes and he was read his Miranda rights.
Detectives did not delay ending the interrogation after he requested a lawyer. Instead, they briefly clarified that he did indeed want counsel. Nor did detectives delay informing him of the charges, as he asserts. Defendant was shown a copy of the arrest warrant right after he was read his Miranda rights.
Defendant claims the pain he suffered rendered his waiver unknowing. However, the trial court concluded defendant did not suffer undue pain during the questioning, but exaggerated the pain he was feeling. We find the trial court's factual finding supported by substantial evidence. (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 425.) Although defendant spoke of pain at times, long stretches of the questioning continued without any complaint. Twice defendant mentioned pain immediately following detectives questioning him about the molestation accusations.
The court also reviewed defendant's medical records. The records ended in May 2013; at that point defendant could continue working if allowed to sit at a desk. Defendant was arrested in August 2013. During the interrogation defendant remained seated and only stood when the detectives accommodated his request to stand.
Defendant's physical state differs greatly from that of the defendant in Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 301, cited by defendant. In Breaux the defendant had not slept for days and was using drugs. He was in the hospital suffering from wounds and injected with morphine. Although he was in pain, the defendant was alert when he waived his Miranda rights. (Id. at pp. 299-301.) The Supreme Court found the waiver to be voluntary and knowing. (Id. at p. 301.) Here, defendant's condition was far more benign and the court's finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Voluntariness of Confession
Defendant contends the tactics employed by the detectives exploited his fragile physical and mental state, overbore his will, and produced an unreliable confession which may be false. According to defendant, his confession "has all of the hallmarks of an involuntary confession induced by coercive interrogation." Again, the record supports the trial court's finding that, to the contrary, defendant voluntarily confessed to molesting his daughter.
Detectives Crosby and Newby did not threaten or intimidate defendant. They confronted him with the evidence against him. Defendant knew that under Miranda he did not have to respond. The interrogation lasted only two and a half hours. Defendant was given breaks and provided water and tissues.
Defendant asserts the detectives' belief in his guilt made him decide asserting his innocence would be futile. Our review of the interrogation reveals no such coercion. The detectives' questions summarized the evidence against him and challenged his denials.
He also contends the detectives pressured him into believing the interrogation would not end until he confessed. However, both detectives merely urged defendant to tell the truth or confirm or deny his daughter's accusations. Moreover, defendant knew, under Miranda, he could end the session.
Finally, defendant argues his physical condition made him vulnerable to coercion. A suspect's mental condition does not render a confession involuntary unless the detectives' coercion brought about the confession. (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 814.) Here, the detectives responded to defendant's physical complaints by giving him water, telling him to take a deep breath, and offering to take a break.
Nothing in the interrogation supports defendant's claim of coercive conduct by the detectives. The questioning, as the court concluded, was tough, but it was not the product of threat of violence or secured by the exertion of improper influence. (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 347.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RAYE, P. J. We concur: HULL, J. DUARTE, J.