Opinion
SC: 163641 COA: 356714
06-30-2023
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adam FERGUSON, a/k/a Adam Fergerson, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 26, 2021 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
Clement, C.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to remand this case to the Court of Appeals without further guidance.
The defendant, who was 17 at the time, was charged as an adult with several felonies related to drug-dealing, multiple violent assaults, and a kidnapping scheme. After a jury found him guilty as charged, the court sentenced him to a term of years for each conviction. In this successive motion for relief from judgment, he raises several arguments, including an argument that the decision to try him as an adult amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under Miller v Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
Unlike Justice VIVIANO , I conclude that because the defendant has raised a claim under Miller v Alabama , his claim is "based on" a retroactive change in the law as required under MCR 6.502(G)(2). See Montgomery v Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (holding that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review); People v Manning , 506 Mich. 1033, 1036, 951 N.W.2d 905 (2020) ( CLEMENT , J., concurring). However, I agree with Justice ZAHRA that because the defendant filed a previous motion for relief from judgment that postdated the retroactive change in the law, he has failed to demonstrate that his claim is "based on a retroactive change in the law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment was filed." MCR 6.502(G)(2). Therefore, I conclude he has not steered around the procedural bar for successive motions for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G)(2).
I dissent from the Court's decision to nevertheless remand this case to the Court of Appeals without any direction after holding it in administrative abeyance for People v Poole , 510 Mich 851 (2022), People v Parks , 510 Mich. 225, 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022), People v Stovall , 510 Mich. 301, 987 N.W.2d 85 (2022), People v Tate , 510 Mich. 171, 987 N.W.2d 58 (2022), and People v Boykin , 510 Mich. 171, 987 N.W.2d 58 (2022). Like Justice VIVIANO and Justice ZAHRA , I conclude that the decisions issued in Parks , Stovall , and Boykin are not applicable in this case. The purpose of abeyance is to promote consistency. When a case comes before us that presents the same or a similar issue as another case we plan to hear, holding that case in abeyance allows us to consider it anew in light of whatever decision we ultimately issue.
Here, the decisions we ultimately issued in Parks , Stovall , and Boykin do not provide guidance on the issue presented—namely, whether trying this particular defendant as an adult amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under Miller . Therefore, I question the decision to remand this case with no direction. The precise rationale for a further extension of Miller is not clear, nor are the guardrails that might be put up around such an extension. Moreover, the defendant was convicted of a whole host of different charges with varying sentence lengths, so there is no clarity about what aspects of the sentencing decision appear possibly unconstitutional to a majority of this Court. Because holding cases in abeyance is supposed to generate clarity and uniformity, not confusion, I respectfully dissent from the Court's choice to remand this case to the Court of Appeals without any indication of its reasoning.
Zahra, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from this Court's order remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. MCR 6.502(G)(2) provides, in relevant part, that a defendant may file a second or subsequent motion for relief from judgment if the motion is based on either "a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment was filed" or "a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion was filed[.]" Defendant has not established either basis for overcoming the procedural threshold in MCR 6.502(G)(2). The scientific research detailing the cognitive differences between juveniles and adults, along with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v Alabama and Montgomery v Louisiana that discuss how those cognitive differences affect juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to life without parole, predate defendant's first motion for relief from judgment, which he filed in 2017. Further, those decisions do not apply to this defendant, who was sentenced to term-of-years sentences for nonhomicide offenses he committed when he was a juvenile. Also, as Justice VIVIANO explains, none of this Court's recent juvenile sentencing decisions applies to this defendant. Because defendant fails to cite new evidence or a qualifying retroactive change in the law since his last motion for relief from judgment in 2017, I would deny leave under MCR 6.502(G).
Miller v Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
Montgomery v Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (holding that Miller applies retroactively).
Defendant also cites Cruz v United States , unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, issued March 29, 2018 (Case No. 11-CV-787), vacated 826 F Appx 49 (2020), which merely extended the scientific research identified in Miller and Montgomery to 18-year-old homicide offenders sentenced to mandatory life without parole. Accordingly, the scientific evidence discussed in the Cruz opinion cannot be considered "new" for purposes of filing a successive motion for relief from judgment, nor does the now-vacated unpublished federal district court decision have any force of law to constitute a retroactive change in the law.
See People v Parks , 510 Mich. 225, 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022) (holding that Const. 1963, art. 1, § 16 prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 18-year-old homicide offenders); People v Stovall , 510 Mich. 301, 987 N.W.2d 85 (2022) (holding that Const. 1963, art. 1, § 16 prohibits parolable life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders); People v Boykin , 510 Mich. 171, 987 N.W.2d 58 (2022) (requiring a sentencing court to consider a juvenile homicide offender's youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing the offender to a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, but not requiring the court to articulate on the record how the offender's youth affected the sentencing decision).
Viviano, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from this Court's order remanding to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. As discussed below, this Court's recent decisions involving issues related to sentencing for juveniles and young adults appear to be readily distinguishable. Therefore, I would deny leave to appeal.
In People v Stovall , 510 Mich. 301, 987 N.W.2d 85 (2022), the Court held that a sentence to life with the possibility of parole for a defendant who committed second-degree murder as a juvenile is unconstitutional. But defendant in the present case received term-of-years sentences for his convictions, none of which was for murder. Stovall also held that a claim purportedly based on a retroactive change in law need not "fall squarely within" that retroactive change in order for a defendant to satisfy the procedural hurdle in MCR 6.502(G)(2) to file a successive motion for relief from judgment. Id. at 310, 987 N.W.2d 85. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Stovall , 510 Mich. at 362, 987 N.W.2d 85, I do not believe the defendant in this case has overcome the procedural bar to file a successive motion for relief from judgment and would deny leave for this reason.
In any event, I agree with Justice Zahra that defendant cannot overcome the procedural hurdle of MCR 6.502(G)(2) because the purported retroactive change in law and new evidence that defendant relied on in his current motion for relief from judgment predated his first motion for relief from judgment.
In People v Parks , 510 Mich. 225, 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022), the Court held that a mandatory sentence to life without parole for a defendant who committed first-degree murder when he was 18 years old is unconstitutional. Again, the defendant here received term-of-years sentences, and none of his convictions was for murder.
In People v Poole , 510 Mich 851 (2022), the Court applied the holding from Stovall regarding MCR 6.502(G) and the holding from Parks to determine that the defendant there was entitled to a remand to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of his motion for relief from judgment. Because defendant in the present case is not entitled to relief under Parks , he is likewise not entitled to relief under Poole.
In the consolidated cases of People v Boykin and People v Tate , 510 Mich. 171, 987 N.W.2d 58 (2022), the Court held that "trial courts must consider a juvenile defendant's youth to be a mitigating factor when sentencing [him or her] to term-of-years sentences under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a" but that a court is not required to "articulate on the record how a defendant's youth affected the decision." Id. at 178, 987 N.W.2d 58. However, the defendant in the present case was not sentenced under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, and Boykin /Tate did not broadly hold that trial courts must consider youth to be a mitigating factor in all sentencing proceedings. Additionally, in its opinion and order denying defendant's motion for relief from judgment, the trial court in this case recognized that defense counsel emphasized defendant's youth at sentencing. Given that the court need not "articulate on the record how a defendant's youth affected the decision," id. , there is no indication the trial court failed to do anything it would have been required to do even if Boykin /Tate applied.
For these reasons, I see no reason to remand the case to the Court of Appeals and instead would deny leave to appeal under MCR 6.502(G).