Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA306078 Marsha Revel, Judge.
California Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director; and Debbie M. Page, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
The jury convicted defendant Tredis Earl Ferguson of unlawfully taking or driving the vehicle of another without consent in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Regarding the recidivist allegations, defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court found defendant suffered one serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5). The trial court imposed an eight-year prison term consisting of the three-year middle term doubled under the three strikes law, plus two one-year prior prison term enhancements (the third having been stayed as it was based on the prior “strike” conviction).
Unless indicated otherwise, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In his timely appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court violated his federal constitutional right to due process by failing to order a mental competency hearing in accordance with section 1368; (2) trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to declare a doubt as to defendant’s competency and request a competency hearing; (3) the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion for discovery under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) without conducting an in camera hearing; and (4) the trial court erroneously imposed crime prevention fines under section 1202.5, subdivision (a).
We agree with defendant on the second two contentions and therefore conditionally reverse and remand for a Pitchess hearing, and reverse the imposition of the crime prevention fines. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Eusebio Saldana owned a 1995 green Ford Mustang. As of the evening of June 19, 2006, it was in good condition when he parked it in the garage of his Los Angeles home. When Saldana went to the garage the following morning, his Mustang was gone. Saldana had not given anyone permission to drive it. He had never met defendant. Saldana reported to the police that his car had been stolen. On June 29, 2006, he was informed that his Mustang had been recovered. Upon inspection, Saldana found his car had been damaged in that the ignition was broken, the backseat upholstery was torn, and his battery had been taken. It cost Saldana approximately $4,500 to have the damage repaired.
On June 29, 2006, Officer Jeffrey Dohlen and his partner Officer Pudelwitts were on patrol. At approximately 6:30 p.m., they were parked at a swap meet just west of Vermont Avenue near 43rd Street in their patrol car. They had an unobstructed view of the residence at 980 West 43rd Place. That location was subject to a “trespass letter,” which entitled the officers to arrest persons not belonging there. Officer Dohlen saw a man and woman on the porch outside that residence. A green Ford Mustang drove up to the residence and stopped in front. The driver—defendant—exited the Mustang and walked to the porch.
The officers drove to the residence and approached the trio. As Officer Dohlen passed the Mustang, he noticed its engine was running and there was no passenger inside. Typical of stolen cars, the steering column had been removed and the ignition punched. No key was in the ignition. The officer verified that the Mustang had been reported stolen. Officer Pudelwitts found a screwdriver on defendant’s person. There were two screwdrivers inside the Mustang, on the floor underneath the steering wheel, along with a large set of keys. Screwdrivers are often used to start stolen cars when no ignition key is available. The officers arrested defendant.
Defendant presented no evidence.
DISCUSSION
Failure to Hold a Competency Hearing
Defendant argues the trial court’s failure to suspend proceedings to conduct a competency hearing violated his state statutory rights under sections 1367 and 1368, and his right to due process under the federal Constitution. As we explain, because there was no substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence, there was neither a statutory violation nor a due process deprivation.
Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated the longstanding governing standards: “‘Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent. (§ 1367; Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 181; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 384-386; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507.) A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks a “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” (Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402; see also Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399-400; § 1367; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 513.)’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 524.)
Similarly, “‘federal due process and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial. Citations. . . .’” (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 524.) While evidence concerning competency can come from a variety of sources, such as the defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and a history of serious mental illness, “‘a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre . . . behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel. Citations.’ Citation.” (Ibid.) We apply a deferential standard in evaluating a trial court’s decision regarding whether to hold a competency hearing “‘because the court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial. [Citations.] The failure to declare a doubt and conduct a hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence, however, requires reversal of the judgment of conviction. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 525.)
In a hearing outside the jury’s presence on November 27, 2006, following voir dire, but prior to the taking of any testimony, defense counsel explained that before the lunch break, she had “expressed some concerns” about a four-page letter entitled “Manifesto” that defendant had written to the trial court. The trial court read excerpts of the letter into the record. Defendant, referring to himself by his legal name and by the “AKA, Kuame Chemist,” wrote that he was “not attacking the process” of the trial, but requesting leniency. In the letter’s body, defendant said he had received divine revelation as to the causes of various social maladies, including gang violence and had been “anointed” to communicate his prophetical vision to the public.
We have granted defendant’s unopposed motion to augment the appellate record to include a copy of the letter itself.
Defense counsel explained that some of the letter’s more esoteric references appeared “grandiose and irrational,” which gave her concern as to defendant’s mental competency. When counsel had asked her client about those references, defendant endorsed them as being “true expressions of his purpose in the community.” Counsel had also questioned defendant as to his understanding of the nature of the trial proceedings and his ability to assist in his defense—the legal standards for competency. Those inquiries satisfied counsel that defendant was legally competent. Nevertheless, while she was not declaring a doubt as to defendant’s competency under section 1368, subdivision (b), counsel told the trial court she “would feel more comfortable” if a psychiatric examination of defendant confirmed her opinion.
Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: “A person cannot be tried . . . while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.”
Under that provision, “If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendant's mental competence is to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a hearing. Any hearing shall be held in the superior court.”
The trial court agreed, but explained that it too had no doubt as to defendant’s competency, based on its observations of defendant. By that time, the trial court had conducted a Marsden hearing, engaged defendant in an extensive colloquy in connection with his Romero motion, and inquired whether defendant would accept the prosecution’s plea offer and whether defendant wanted to wear civilian clothes during trial. It found nothing in defendant’s statements or actions to doubt his competency. Defendant asked to comment and informed the trial court he found it “bizarre” that he might be considered incompetent. The trial court replied that “nobody is calling you crazy, and nobody is saying you are insane,” but some of the contents of his letter were so unconventional that counsel wanted to be “very, very sure everything is fine.” Defendant replied that he intended the letter to show the trial court “another side” of his character which would militate in favor of drug treatment and against a long prison term, because it was his drug abuse that prevented him from being a successful “political activist.”
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Towards the end of the day, in a sidebar discussion, the trial court informed defense counsel and the prosecutor that a psychiatrist had been contacted and the court hoped he would be able to perform a mental health evaluation the following day. The trial court added that defendant’s demeanor remained cooperative, but the evaluation’s purpose was to put defense counsel’s “mind at ease.” Defendant did not want the letter to be dismissed as the product of insanity; he was serious about his belief that he had special knowledge that could help ameliorate “the things that are plaguing our community.” The trial court responded that it was not discounting the seriousness of his concerns or calling him “crazy,” but some of the terms used in the letter seemed strange, which caused defense counsel concern. For that reason, a doctor would examine him the following day.
There were no formal trial proceedings until just before lunch the following day, when the trial court apologized to the jury for the delay and informed the jurors they would hear argument, receive instructions, and listen to counsel’s argument in the afternoon. Outside the jury’s presence, the trial court told defense counsel and the prosecutor that Dr. Kaushal Sharma had examined defendant. Defense counsel declined the opportunity to speak to Dr. Sharma privately concerning his findings. Nor did counsel deem it necessary for defendant to be present at that time to hear the psychiatrist state his conclusions. For the record, the trial court explained: “There was some concern because of the letter [defendant] wrote. Counsel didn’t actually declare a doubt under [section] 1368, but everyone would feel more comfortable knowing.” Dr. Sharma, who was not sworn as a witness, explained that defendant “has absolutely no mental illness that should be a concern.” Although the Manifesto’s contents appeared “peculiar” and “bizarre,” the doctor found “no impairment” in defendant’s thinking. He characterized the letter as “a so-called thinking out loud about the ills of the human race.” However, despite the questionable nature of the letter, Dr. Sharma had “no concerns about [defendant’s] competency because he is not mentally ill.” Without objection, defendant was brought into the courtroom and the parties discussed jury instructions.
As our summary shows, the only evidence potentially indicative of incompetence was defendant’s letter, which was hardly dispositive on the salient factors of legal competency. Dubious or even irrational opinions on political or spiritual matters do not necessarily translate to an inability to consult meaningfully with counsel or to understand the proceedings against him. Thus, the mere fact that defense counsel considered aspects of defendant’s letter to be “grandiose and irrational,” did not mean that she implicitly found his mental competence dubious. As counsel understood, there must be a nexus between the questionable behavior and the criteria for legal competency. Again, “a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel.” (People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 508.)
It is telling that counsel questioned defendant concerning the relevant legal factors and concluded those responses gave no reason to doubt his competency. Indeed, during voir dire, defense counsel relayed defendant’s concerns as to the racial composition of the venire—another objective indication that defendant understood the proceedings and was capable of assisting counsel in his defense. The trial court had also engaged in extensive colloquies with defendant and observed him in court for a number of days, finding nothing indicative of incompetence. Our review of defendant’s statements in the record shows him as consistently responding rationally and coherently. While some of his written assertions can be considered strange, defendant offered a rational explanation for his Manifesto. Finally, Dr. Sharma’s opinion corroborates the trial court’s findings.
We apply long settled Supreme Court precedent and defer to the trial court’s supported findings, based on personal observation, as corroborated by the representations of defense counsel and the mental health expert. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 525.) As those findings were entirely supported by the record and afforded the trial court a reliable basis for assessing defendant’s competency, we accept them. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s improper invitation to substitute our own credibility findings for those of the trial court. No more availing are defendant’s attempts to discredit Dr. Sharma’s findings as failing to comply with the requirements for expert testimony under section 1368. As no doubt was declared, those requirements never came into play. (People v. Garcia (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 163, 170.) Defendant can only speculate as to whether the doctor’s examination might have failed to comport with applicable medical or legal standards. Such speculation is particularly inappropriate here because it ignores the longstanding presumption in favor competency, imposing the burden on defendant to prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 507.)
Throughout the appellate briefing (the opening brief and reply brief were written by different attorneys), defendant repeatedly insinuates that trial counsel, Dr. Sharma, and the trial court misunderstood the relevant law and concealed their actual doubts as to defendant’s competency in the interest of bringing the trial to a speedy conclusion. We reject those insinuations as wholly unsupported by the record. To the contrary, it appears that counsel and the court made every effort to treat defendant with respect and insure that he received a fair trial.
Similarly misguided is defendant’s assertion that the decision to permit such a nonstatutory mental health examination in order to insure a better informed determination amounted to an implicit admission that there was substantial evidence of incompetence. From the record, it is clear that defense counsel and the trial court found no objective indicia of incompetence, but they remained open to reevaluating that conclusion if a medical expert gave them reason to do so. It would be hard to imagine an approach better suited to protecting defendant’s right to be tried while mentally competent. (See People v. Garcia, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.) Contrary to defendant’s unsupported assertions on appeal, this was not an instance of a trial court’s trying to short circuit the statutory requirements.
Ineffective Assistance
In a closely related contention, defendant argues trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to declare a doubt as to defendant’s competency and request a competency hearing. As the record contains no substantial evidence of incompetency and nothing to suggest a hearing would have been favorable, his claim fails.
“To secure reversal of a conviction upon the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal Constitution, a defendant must establish (1) that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-694; see Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 391-394; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068.) “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1175.)” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1003.) Mere speculation does not meet the Sixth Amendment standard for demonstrating prejudice. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.)
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees competent representation by counsel for criminal defendants[, and reviewing courts] presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making significant trial decisions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703, citing Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 513.) “A defendant who raises the issue on appeal must establish deficient performance based upon the four corners of the record. ‘If the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1003, citing People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1068-1069; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
Defendant cannot show deficient performance because there was insufficient evidence of incompetency to trigger counsel’s obligation to declare a doubt. Indeed, “If an attorney has doubts about his client’s competence but those doubts are not supported by medical reports or substantial evidence, he does not render ineffective assistance by forgoing an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Garcia, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 172, citing People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105.) “Competent counsel is not required to make all conceivable motions or to leave an exhaustive paper trail for the sake of the record. Rather, competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem appropriate under the circumstances. (See generally People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002-1003.)” (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509; see also People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 931; People v. Frye (1998)18 Cal.4th 894, 985.) There is nothing to suggest defendant’s trial counsel did otherwise.
Moreover, given that the trial court would not have been bound to order a competency hearing “based solely on counsel’s opinion that defendant might be incompetent” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1112; see also People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 433), and Dr. Sharma’s examination revealed an absence of significant mental illness, defendant’s showing on the prejudice criterion is doubly speculative.
Pitchess Hearing
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his Pitchess motion without conducting an in camera review of arresting police officers’ personnel records. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b); Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1018-1019 (Warrick).) We agree.
Our Supreme Court has held that Pitchess information is discoverable based on a defendant’s written motion, describing the type of information sought and including an affidavit showing good cause for the discovery. “This good cause showing is a ‘relatively low threshold for discovery.’ [Citation.]” (Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 70 (Garcia).) Assertions in the affidavits “‘may be on information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge [citation], but the information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendant’s simply casting about for any helpful information.’ [Citation.] If the defendant establishes good cause, the court must review the records in camera to determine what, if any, information should be disclosed.” (Id. at pp. 70-71.)
“To show the requested information is material, a defendant is required to ‘establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.’” (Garcia, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 71, citing Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) “Counsel’s affidavit must also describe a factual scenario that would support a defense claim of officer misconduct. [Citation.] ‘That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.’ [Citation.]” (Garcia, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 71, citing Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1025.) The trial court will determine whether defendant’s averments, read in light of the police reports, are sufficient to establish a plausible factual foundation for the alleged officer misconduct and to articulate a valid theory as the information’s admissibility. “Corroboration of or motivation for alleged officer misconduct is not required. [Citation.] Rather, ‘a plausible scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred.’ [Ciation.] A scenario is plausible when it asserts specific misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the proposed defense. (Garcia, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 71; Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026.) We review the trial court’s ruling denying a disclosure request for an abuse of discretion. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535; see also Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 684.)
Here, defendant’s Pitchess motion sought to compel production of the two arresting police officers’ personnel files to the extent the files contained complaints as to a variety of improper acts, including the fabrication of evidence and writing false police reports. The police report was attached to the motion. It was authored by Officer Pudelwitts and listed Officer Dohlen as the other reporting officer. The report described the events leading up to the arrest in a manner generally consistent with Officer Pudelwitts’s trial testimony; however, it also described two other persons who had been on the porch area before defendant’s arrival. According to the arrest report, those two were also detained in the officers’ trespass investigation and they told the officers that defendant had driven up to the location, and parked the stolen car with the engine running.
Defense counsel, in her supporting declaration, stated she was informed and believed—contrary to the statements in the police report—that defendant had neither driven nor been inside the green Mustang. Rather, he had walked to the residence on West 43rd Place an hour before the officers arrived. Further, the two witnesses did not give statements to the officers inculpating defendant, but were present when defendant told the officers “a male Hispanic had driven the car to the location.” Defendant admitted possessing the screwdriver, but claimed it was used as a “pusher for cocaine pipes,” not for punching car ignitions. Defense counsel declared the police officers’ contrary statements in the report were lies. Counsel therefore sought evidence of complaints that the officers had previously engaged in similar misconduct, which she planned to use at trial for impeachment purposes. The trial court denied the motion, apparently finding that admission concerning possession of the screwdriver rendered his version of events implausible.
While the trial court cannot be faulted for finding defendant’s proffered scenario less than credible, our Supreme Court’s “plausible scenario” doctrine depends not on credibility, but merely on whether it is “one that might or could have occurred,” as long as it “asserts specific misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the proposed defense.” (Garcia, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 71; Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026.) “To require a criminal defendant to present a credible or believable factual account of, or a motive for, police misconduct suggests that the trial court’s task in assessing a Pitchess motion is to weigh or assess the evidence. It is not.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) A central fact for the prosecution’s case was Officer Puddelwitt’s eyewitness testimony that minutes before the arrest, defendant drove to the location and exited the green Mustang, leaving the engine running. Defense counsel’s supporting declaration presented a scenario that directly contradicted that testimony and, therefore, permitted an inference that the officer had falsified the police report. Defendant’s admitted possession of the screwdriver certainly undercut his scenario’s credibility, but did not render it internally inconsistent or implausible under our Supreme Court’s Pitchess precedent.
It follows that “[i]n denying defendant’s Pitchess motion without an in camera hearing under section 1045, subdivision (b), the trial court erred. Defendant was ‘entitled to an in camera hearing and a determination of relevance under the provisions of section 1045.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 292, 304.) This kind of error is subject to harmless error analysis. (See People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 684; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We, however, cannot determine whether there is a reasonable probability the discovery sought by defendant would have led to admissible evidence helpful to defendant in his defense—for instance, there may have been no relevant complaints against the officers, eliminating any likelihood of prejudice. We agree with the reasoning and disposition of People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410 and reverse and remand the matter to the trial court with directions specified below: If the trial court concludes defendant should have received information by virtue of his Pitchess motion, the proper standard for the trial court to use to determine prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had the information been disclosed. (People v. Hustead, supra, at pp. 421-423, citing People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799.)
Imposition of Fine
In the case on appeal (No. BA306078), defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 10851. The trial court ordered defendant to pay a $10 fine pursuant to section 1202.5. However, Vehicle Code section 10851 is not a listed offense under section 1202.5 and the $10 was unauthorized and must be stricken. The Attorney General properly concedes the issue.
Defendant also had a probation violation before the trial court as a result of his earlier conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 in case No. BA282022. A section 1202.5 fine was imposed on the probation violation. Again, this was unauthorized. Although it appears defendant did not file a notice of appeal in case No. BA282022, an unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time. Accordingly upon issuance of the remittitur, the trial shall strike the $10 fine.
DISPOSITION
The $10 fines pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.5 in case Nos. BA306078 and BA282022 are ordered stricken. The judgment is reversed conditionally and remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct an in camera hearing on defendant’s Pitchess motion. If the hearing reveals no discoverable information in the officers’ personnel files, the trial court is ordered to reinstate the original judgment, and the judgment is ordered affirmed. If discoverable material exits and defendant can demonstrate prejudice, the trial court should order a new trial. If defendant is unable to demonstrate
prejudice, the trial court is ordered to reinstate the original judgment and sentence as corrected, and the judgment is otherwise ordered affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., MOSK, J.