Opinion
October 24, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bourgeois, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial when the arresting officer testified about an uncharged crime. The court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the testimony and, then, in response to counsel's request, gave an additional extensive curative instruction (see, People v Santiago, 52 N.Y.2d 865; People v Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995; cf., People v Woodhull, 105 A.D.2d 815).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Although the defendant contends that the People failed to prove her identity as the person who robbed the complainant, the unwavering identification testimony of the eyewitness was sufficient to support the conviction (see, People v Solomon, 141 A.D.2d 579). The eyewitness testified that he saw the defendant's face as she took the complainant's tote bag, pursued the defendant as she fled, and pointed her out to police, who promptly arrested her. Although the testimony of the complainant and the eyewitness differed as to exactly where the theft took place, the eyewitness's identification testimony was not incredible as a matter of law and the eyewitness's ability to see the theft created an issue of fact which the jury resolved against the defendant. We see no reason to disturb the jury's determination (People v Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 272; People v Bigelow, 106 A.D.2d 448).
The sentence imposed was not unduly harsh or excessive (People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.