Opinion
E081843
01-16-2024
In re E.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. E.L., Defendant and Respondent. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Jesse Male, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. DLIN2200005 . Emily A. Benjamini, Judge. Reversed.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Jesse Male, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and respondent, E.L. allegedly raped Jane Doe in June 2019 when he was 17 years old. Doe did not report the alleged rape until May 2020, after E.L. had turned 18. In April 2021, the Riverside County Probation Department requested the Riverside County District Attorney to file a juvenile petition against E.L. for the alleged rape. The District Attorney did not do so until June 2022, about two months before E.L. turned 22 years of age.
In May 2023, E.L. moved to dismiss the petition because the video recording of Jane Doe's interview from when she reported the alleged rape in May 2020 had been erased pursuant to the police department's policy of erasing videos after two years. The juvenile court granted the motion, finding that E.L. was prejudiced by the loss of the video and the loss of juvenile court services due to his age. The District Attorney appeals, and we reverse.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2020, Jane Doe went to the Desert Hot Springs Police Department and reported that E.L. raped her in June 2019, when she went to his house. E.L.'s parents were home, so she and E.L. went to his room and they closed the door. E.L. told Jane Doe to lie down on his bed with him, but she lay down on the couch instead. Jane Doe eventually agreed to lie down on the bed after E.L. asked her several times to do so. Once she did, E.L. forcefully kissed her and asked her to get on top of him, but she refused. E.L. then got on top of Jane Doe, pulled up her shirt, exposing her bra, and kissed her chest area. Jane Doe pushed E.L. several times and told him to stop, but he refused. E.L. then forcefully unbuttoned Jane Doe's pants and pull them down, removed his pants and underwear, and put on a condom. At this point, Jane Doe began crying and yelling at him to stop, but E.L. told her not to cry. When E.L. finished, he walked Jane Doe to her car and she left.
The Desert Hot Springs Police Department conducted an initial investigation before referring the case to the District Attorney in November 2020. In April 2021, the probation department submitted a request to the District Attorney to file a juvenile petition alleging E.L. raped Jane Doe.
The District Attorney filed the requested petition over a year later, in June 2022. The petition, filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleged E.L. forcibly raped Jane Doe in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2), when E.L. was under the age of 18. After E.L. twice failed to appear and repeatedly waived time, trial was set for June 2023.
E.L. moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the District Attorney's three-year delay in filing the petition after Jane Doe reported the alleged rape violated his due process rights. In his motion, E.L. argued that the delay led to the deletion of the video recording of Jane Doe's interview with the police when she first reported the alleged rape in May 2020, which prejudiced his ability to present a defense. He further argued that the three-page report summarizing the interview was inadequate and, regardless, the delay was unreasonable and unjustified.
E.L. made other arguments in the motion to dismiss and another motion under California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, but they are not relevant to this appeal.
At the hearing on the motion, E.L. reiterated his position that he was prejudiced by the destruction of the video recording of Jane Doe's initial interview and the three-year delay between the alleged rape and the filing of the petition. Because of that prejudice, E.L. argued the burden shifted to the District Attorney to show that the delay was justified.
The juvenile court then asked a probation officer attending the hearing whether E.L. was "no longer eligible for certain types of juvenile programming" because he was almost 22 years old. In particular, the court wanted to know whether E.L. would be eligible for the Riverside County Youth Treatment and Education Center (YTEC). The probation officer said he thought E.L. was "too old for the program," but he was not sure and would have to check.
The juvenile court asked E.L.'s counsel whether she was arguing that E.L. was prejudiced by the delay because it made him ineligible for juvenile services. Counsel stated that she did not "believe [E.L. was] eligible for YTEC" but did not "know what he's eligible for due to the passage of time." Then, to make sure that "the [c]ourt is clear," the court asked counsel to confirm that her prejudice argument was, in part, that E.L. was prejudiced by the delay because "he may not be eligible for certain programming based upon his current age." Counsel confirmed that was accurate.
As to this argument, the prosecutor responded that whether juvenile services would be available to E.L. was a "post-sentencing matter," which was not relevant to "this due process motion, which is presentencing, pre-guilt phase."
After the parties submitted, the court asked the probation officer whether he had determined if E.L. would be eligible for YTEC. The probation officer said the cutoff for YTEC is "[t]ypically" 18 and so E.L. likely would not be eligible for it, but he would have to "refer it to YTEC" to get a definite answer. Shortly afterward, the prosecutor told the court that the probation officer confirmed that E.L. would be eligible for certain juvenile services, including "Pathways," sex offender counseling, and "wardship and services." The prosecutor also reiterated the probation officer's comment that it was unknown whether E.L. was eligible for YTEC.
This program for juveniles is "'a secured treatment environment with a fourtiered school campus model resembling' the YTEC." (In re T.O. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 252, 258.)
After receiving further argument from the parties, the juvenile court granted E.L.'s motion to dismiss. The juvenile court found two things prejudiced E.L.: (1) the loss of the video recording of Jane Doe's initial statement and (2) "the loss of juvenile court services" to E.L. The court then found the prosecution's reasons for the delay were "insubstantial and not adequately explained." The court thus found "there has been prejudice and there has been no justification presented for the delay," which required the petition to be dismissed.
The District Attorney timely appealed. We reverse.
III. DISCUSSION
The District Attorney argues the juvenile court erroneously dismissed the petition because E.L. was not prejudiced by the delay and the prejudice, if any, did not outweigh the prosecution's justifications for the delay. We conclude no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that E.L. was prejudiced by the delay, so we must reverse.
We recently outlined the applicable principles in People v. Manzo (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 538, 541-542 (Manzo).) "Under article I, section 15 of the California constitution, an unreasonable postcomplaint delay constitutes a denial of the right to a speedy trial. [Citation.] To warrant dismissal on such grounds, the defendant must first show actual prejudice resulting from the delay. [Citation.] The showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence and 'must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.' [Citation.] Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice. [Citations.] Instead, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate having suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay, not just the possibility of prejudice. [Citation.] [¶] If-and only if-the defendant shows actual prejudice from a delayed prosecution, 'the prosecution must show justification for the delay. If the prosecution does that, the trial court must balance the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay against the prosecution's justification for the delay. [Citation.]' [Citation.] '[T]he more reasonable the delay, the more prejudice the defense would have to show to require dismissal.' [Citation.] But if the defendant fails to satisfy the initial burden of showing actual prejudice, 'there is no need to determine whether the delay was justified.' [Citation.] [¶] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial delay for an abuse of discretion and defer to any underlying factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Whether a delay is prejudicial is a factual question that we review for substantial evidence." (Manzo, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 541-542.)
We agree with the District Attorney that Manzo is applicable here. There, the juvenile court found that the loss of dashcam footage from his arrest prejudiced the defendant. (Manzo, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 542.) We reversed because there was no evidence that "the footage had exculpatory value." (Id. at p. 542.) We reasoned that, although the footage "might help [the] defendant's case," it was "entirely possible that it could help the prosecution's case" because it could have confirmed the arresting officer's version of events that defendant wanted to challenge. (Id. at p. 543.) "Defendant's claim of prejudice is therefore based wholly 'on speculation, not proof of actual prejudice.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
In reaching this conclusion, we relied on People v. Lewis (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 203, and People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846. In Lewis, "the defendant argued 'that he was prejudiced by the loss of the child welfare agency, police, prosecution, and court records.' He claimed that 'the lost records might have contained information he could have used to impeach' the victim. [Citation.] The Lewis court rejected the defendant's argument that the loss of the records prejudiced him because it was 'wholly speculative.' Like the [Manzo] defendant, the defendant in Lewis failed to make any showing that the lost records had exculpatory value, so it was 'entirely speculative' that he was prejudiced by their disappearance." (Manzo, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 542.)
In Alexander, "the defendant claimed that he was prejudiced by the loss of witness interview audio tapes. He argued that the tapes 'may have included statements not contained in, or that contradicted, the investigators' reports or witnesses' testimony.' [Citation.] Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the loss of the tapes prejudiced him because it was 'based on speculation, not proof of actual prejudice.' [Citation.]" (Manzo, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 543.)
Like the defendants in Manzo, Lewis, and Alexander, E.L. made no showing that the lost evidence actually prejudiced him in any way. E.L. observes that he cannot evaluate various aspects of the interview without the recording, such as what Jane Doe said, the mannerisms of the interviewers and Jane Doe, and whether she came across as credible. E.L., however, fails to show that the recording would have helped his case. There is no evidence in the record that the recording had any exculpatory value or anything that could have helped E.L.'s case. For all we know, Jane Doe could have come across as highly credible in the video recording, which presumably could harm E.L.'s defense. Jane Doe's recorded statement could be consistent with other evidence and any testimony she would give in further proceedings, which again could harm E.L.'s case. As in Manzo, Lewis, and Alexander, E.L.'s claim that the loss of the recording prejudiced him is "based on speculation, not proof of actual prejudice." (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 875.)
The juvenile court's finding that the loss of juvenile services prejudiced E.L. likewise finds no support in the record. We assume without deciding that the loss of those services is a proper basis to find prejudice in this context. But there is no substantial evidence in the record that the prosecution's delay in filing the petition against E.L. means he will be ineligible for various juvenile services, should he be found to have raped Jane Doe.
In the opening brief, the District Attorney argues that the loss of juvenile services cannot establish prejudice here because that is a sentencing consideration. (See People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 945-946 [delay causing loss of ability to serve a concurrent sentence does not establish prejudice warranting dismissal without a showing of initial prejudice that delay prejudiced the defendant's ability to present a defense].) In his reply brief, however, the District Attorney argues that we need not decide the issue because there is no substantial evidence that E.L. is ineligible for juvenile services due to the delay. We agree on both points.
We first note that the lack of any evidence confirming which services E.L. may be because the juvenile court brought up the issue sua sponte at the hearing on E.L.'s motion. When the juvenile court raised the issue for the first time, E.L.'s counsel stated, "I don't believe that [E.L.] is eligible for the YTEC program .... [¶] I don't know if he's eligible for the WRAP Around program .... I don't know what he's eligible for due to the passage of time." The prosecutor was unsure what services E.L. would be eligible for until asking the probation officer during the hearing. We assume counsel for both parties were unprepared to discuss the issue because E.L. did not argue in his motion that he was prejudiced because of the loss of juvenile services, and the District Attorney (understandably) did not mention the issue in his opposition to the motion. Nor did E.L. make the argument when restating his position at the beginning of the hearing. Instead, it appears from our record that the juvenile court seemingly made the argument for E.L. later at the hearing, which E.L. then adopted and advanced. This may explain why neither E.L.'s counsel nor the prosecutor appeared prepared to discuss what, if any, juvenile services would definitively be available for E.L.
The only juvenile service the parties and court discussed that E.L. might not be eligible for is the YTEC program. Although the probation officer thought it was unlikely E.L. would be eligible for YTEC, he could not confirm E.L.'s eligibility for the program with certainty without referring the matter to YTEC. More importantly, however, the probation officer confirmed that if E.L. were ineligible for YTEC, it was because he turned 18 in August 2019, eight months before Jane Doe reported the alleged rape. The prosecution's delay thus did not cause E.L.'s potential ineligibility for YTEC.
E.L. identifies no other juvenile services that he may be ineligible for because of the prosecution's delay. E.L. notes that the probation officer "confirmed some juvenile services would still be available" to him, but then notes that the juvenile court found that "'there are services that [he] is no longer eligible for at this time, due to his age.'" Nowhere in his respondent's brief, however, does E.L. state what those services are or why he is ineligible for them because of the prosecution's delay. In short, there is no evidence in the record that E.L. is ineligible for any juvenile services due to the prosecution's delay in filing the petition.
As a result, there is no substantial evidence that E.L. was prejudiced by the delay. We therefore need not address the prosecution's justifications for the delay and must reverse the juvenile court's order dismissing the petition. (Manzo, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 543.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order dismissing the petition is reversed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. MILLER J.