Opinion
A164604
03-29-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN VERNON DOYLE, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Mendocino County Super. Ct. Nos. SCUKCRCR-2019-33602-001, SCUKCRCR-2020-35837-001)
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
In January 2022, the trial court sentenced John Vernon Doyle to four years and eight months in prison, which included a two-year on-bail enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.1 (undesignated statutory references are to this code). Doyle appeals. He contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to urge the court to strike the enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Senate Bill 81); the bill amended section 1385 before the sentencing hearing to require trial courts to "consider and afford great weight" to enumerated mitigating circumstances proven by the defendant - including whether the "current offense is connected to a mental illness" - when deciding whether to strike an enhancement in the interest of justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; § 1385, subd. (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(2)(D).) We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In two separate cases, the prosecution charged Doyle with identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). The first case alleged he committed identity theft in December 2019 (count one); the second case alleged he committed identity theft in July 2020 (count two).
In January 2020, Doyle pled guilty to count one; the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation with various conditions, including that he complete a residential drug treatment program. In September, Doyle pled no contest to count two, and he admitted committing the offense while on release from custody in the first case. The court revoked and reinstated his probation in the first case; it granted probation in the second case. Thereafter, Doyle admitted violating probation on numerous grounds - including by possessing methamphetamine. In November 2021, the court concluded Doyle violated probation, and it scheduled a sentencing hearing.
The probation department recommended sentencing Doyle - then 32 years old - to four years and eight months in prison, comprised of two years on count one, two years for the on-bail enhancement, and eight months on count two. The department summarized Doyle's history of substance abuse: he began using methamphetamine at age 14 and smoked it daily as a young adult. Despite attending substance abuse treatment programs in 2016, he resumed using methamphetamine intermittently. By December 2019, he was "abusing methamphetamine on a daily basis," which the department suggested "may have contributed" to count one. Doyle reported being "in recovery" since December 2019, when his children were placed into foster care, and he denied a history of mental illness. He told the department he used the victim's "bank card to purchase Christmas gifts for his children" in count one and that he unknowingly cashed a stolen check in count two.
At the January 13, 2022 combined sentencing hearing in both cases, the trial court terminated Doyle's probation as unsuccessful and imposed the recommended sentence.
DISCUSSION
Subject to an exception not relevant here, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 effective January 1, 2022 to require a trial court to" 'dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.'" (People v. Ortiz (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1094 (Ortiz); § 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Senate Bill 81 also amended section 1385 to specify mitigating circumstances the court must consider - and" 'afford great weight to'" - when deciding whether to strike an enhancement in the interest of justice. (Ortiz, at p. 1094; § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Proof of the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances" 'weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.'" (Ortiz, at p. 1094.) Among the qualifying mitigating circumstances in section 1385 is whether the" 'current offense is connected to mental illness.'" (Ortiz, at p. 1094; § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D).) Under the statute, a mental illness is "a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders," here the DSM-5. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(5).)
A trial court may conclude a defendant's mental illness is" 'connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, . . . statements by the defendant's mental health treatment provider, . . . or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense, . . . the court concludes that the defendant's mental illness substantially contributed to the defendant's involvement in the commission of the offense.'" (Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094; § 1385, subd. (c)(5).) We review for abuse of discretion a lower court's decision not to strike a sentencing enhancement under section 1385. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)
Doyle argues trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to urge the trial court to dismiss the on-bail enhancement under Senate Bill 81. According to Doyle, the record contains evidence that he has a substance use disorder - a mental disorder listed in the DSM-5 - and that his crimes are connected to that disorder. We assume without deciding the DSM-5 recognizes substance use disorder as a mental disorder. (See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218 & fn. 6.) But as we explain, Doyle has not established counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" or that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694.)
First, Doyle has failed to demonstrate trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. On appeal, we defer "to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions," and we presume "counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) "Rarely is ineffective assistance of counsel established on appeal since the record usually sheds no light on counsel's reasons for action or inaction." (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736.) On this record, we cannot conclude there is no reasonable explanation for trial counsel's failure to request dismissal of the on-bail enhancement under Senate Bill 81. Doyle denied a history of mental illness, and the record is devoid of information from mental health treatment providers or qualified medical experts that he has a substance use disorder. To be sure, there is evidence Doyle struggled with methamphetamine addiction, but there is no evidence he displayed symptoms of a substance use disorder at or near the commission of count two - the crime for which the on-bail enhancement was imposed - nor is there evidence linking the symptoms of that disorder to the commission of count two. (See Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095.) To the contrary, Doyle claimed he was "in recovery" when he committed count two, and he told the probation department he unknowingly cashed a stolen check. Thus, it is plausible trial counsel believed there was insufficient evidence count two was "connected to mental illness" as required by the statute. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D), (c)(5); Ortiz, at pp. 1094-1095; see also People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 238-239.)
Second, Doyle has not shown prejudice - that the trial court would have dismissed the on-bail enhancement had trial counsel requested dismissal in light of Senate Bill 81. "Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law, and followed it." (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) When, as here," 'the record is silent' on the court's awareness of its discretionary authority in sentencing, we must presume the court understood the scope of its discretion and affirm." (People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 868-869.) Here, the amendment to section 1385 took effect shortly before the court sentenced Doyle. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(7).) Therefore, we must presume the court made the decision to impose the on-bail enhancement with full knowledge of the newly amended section 1385, subdivision (c). Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, the court could have reasonably concluded there was no relevant and credible evidence any assumed mental disorder "substantially contributed to [Doyle's] involvement in the commission" of count two. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(5); see Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [no error in concluding offense was not connected to mental illness under section § 1385, subd. (c)(2)].)
In sum, we conclude Doyle has not demonstrated trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the trial court to dismiss the on-bail enhancement attached to count two pursuant to Senate Bill 81.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Fujisaki, Acting P. J. Petrou, J.