Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC816490
RUSHING, P.J.
Defendant Duy Dennis Do appeals following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code, section 1538.5. On appeal, defendant asserts he was denied his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, because the sheriff’s deputy lacked probable cause to stop him, and his detention was unduly prolonged.
Statement of the Facts and Case
On August 25, 2007, at approximately 1:20 a.m., Santa Clara County Sherriff Deputy Tyler Fleckner stopped defendant’s car because it had a cracked windshield. When Deputy Fleckner contacted defendant, defendant gave him a passport for identification, because he did not have a driver’s license with him, and told Deputy Fleckner that he was on probation. Deputy Fleckner also learned that defendant’s passenger in the car was also on probation. Deputy Fleckner confirmed through police dispatch that defendant and his passenger were on probation with a search clause. Deputy Fleckner estimated that this confirmation took a few minutes. At this point, Deputy Fleckner called for backup, which took seven to 10 minutes to arrive.
Another sheriff’s deputy, Nathan Corrick searched defendant and found $1,648 in cash. Deputy Fleckner contacted defendant’s passenger, and noticed symptoms consistent with narcotics intoxication. These observations were confirmed in a blood analysis, which revealed that defendant’s passenger was under the influence of methamphetamine. The deputies than manually searched the car, finding two cell phones.
About 40 minutes after the initial traffic stop, the deputies called for a narcotic canine unit, which arrived shortly thereafter. The search dog found drugs under the car. When the deputies looked under the car, they found a container with several baggies of cocaine, and balls of cocaine wrapped in foil.
Following the discovery of the drugs under the car, the deputies went to defendant’s house, where they found two large bags of methamphetamine, several foil balls with cocaine base inside, and several hundred plastic baggies in defendant’s room. The deputies also found four surveillance cameras, two cell phones, two scales, and a total of $3,300 in cash. The search of defendant’s home was completed by 4:00 a.m. The total amount of drugs recovered from the search was 306 grams of cocaine, 64 grams of cocaine base, and 37 grams of methamphetamine.
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; counts 1 and 3), transportation of cocaine (§ 11352, subd. (a); count 2), possession of cocaine base for sale (§ 11351.5; count 4), and possession of methamphetamine for sale (§ 11378; count 5).
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
Following a denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code, section 1538.5, defendant pleaded no contest to all the counts charged. Defendant was sentenced to six years in state prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the officer did not have probable cause to stop his car, and, the detention was unduly prolonged.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.)
The Traffic Stop for Violation of Vehicle Code, Section 26710
Deputy Fleckner stopped defendant’s car, because he saw a flash of light coming from a crack in the car’s windshield. The crack stretched from the passenger side to the driver’s side of the windshield, and appeared to obstruct the driver’s view. Deputy Fleckner testified, “With the way the crack came across the windshield in the driving position, it you had to look across the windshield in the driving position, if you had to look across, it could obstruct your view from a pedestrian or a hazard, or something you needed to see while driving the vehicle.” Consequently, he stopped defendant for a violation of Vehicle Code section 26710, which proscribes driving with a defective windshield that impairs the driver’s vision.
In support of the motion to suppress, defendant introduced four photographs that contained images of the crack in the windshield. Defendant also offered the testimony of James Shea, a retired police officer from the Los Gatos and Campbell Police Departments. Mr. Shea testified that in his opinion, the crack in defendant’s windshield did not cause a distraction from either the driver or passenger side of the car. Additionally, Mr. Shea testified he would not have stopped defendant’s car and issued a citation for the crack he observed in defendant’s windshield.
An ordinary traffic stop is treated as an investigatory detention (People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 760-761) and is justified at its inception if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810.) The reasonableness of a detention is determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.)
Here, Deputy Fleckner’s testimony supports a reasonable suspicion that defendant’s windshield violated Vehicle Code section 27710. Deputy Fleckner testified that when he first saw defendant’s car, he saw a flash of light coming from a crack that ran diagonally across defendant’s windshield from the passenger side to the driver’s side of the car. Deputy Fleckner believed by the position of the crack, that it would impair defendant’s vision and ability to avoid hazards. Based on his observations, Deputy Fleckner believed defendant was in violation of Vehicle Code section 27710.
On appeal, defendant claims that the photographs conclusively rebutted Deputy Fleckner’s description of the crack, and negated any reasonable suspicion that it might have impaired his vision and thus justified the traffic stop. However, when there is a conflict in the evidence, as there is here between Deputy Fleckner’s testimony and defendant’s exhibits, the trial court implicitly resolved the conflict in favor of the deputy by denying the motion to suppress. We defer to that determination, because the trial court “ ‘sits as a finder of fact with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences....’ ” (People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 265.)
Defendant cites People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636 (White) in support of his argument that the stop was not reasonable in this case. In White, the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop based on a suspected violation of Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(2), which prohibits vehicles with an object displayed that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side windows. There, the officer stopped the defendant because his car had an air freshener hanging from the rear view mirror. The officer in White believed the hanging air freshener violated Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(1), which prohibits the placement, display, installation or affixing of anything on the windshield or rear windows without regard to whether it impairs vision. (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 640-641.)
The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress in White, noting that the statute cited by the officer was inapplicable because the air freshener was not on the windshield. (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 641.) Moreover, the court found no evidence that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view, in violation of Vehicle Code section 26707, subdivision (a)(2). Notably, the officer in White did not testify that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view or that he suspected that it might. Nor did the officer testify to other facts, such as hesitant or erratic driving, that might have suggested an obstruction. In addition, the defense presented an expert, who opined that the air freshener did not obstruct vision because it covered so little of the total area of the windshield. Moreover, the defendant testified that his vision was not obstructed. (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.)
White is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Here, unlike White, Deputy Fleckner testified that he stopped defendant because from his observation, the crack in defendant’s windshield impaired defendant’s vision and posed a safety hazard under the circumstances.
Deputy Fleckner’s testimony regarding the crack in defendant’s windshield demonstrated a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the traffic stop for a violation of Vehicle Code section 26710.
Length of Detention
Defendant asserts that even if the officer had probable cause to stop his car based on the cracked windshield, the detention was unduly prolonged for a routine traffic stop.
In support of his position, defendant relies on People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577 (McGaughran) and Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349 (Willaims). In McGaughran, a police officer stopped a car going the wrong way on a one-way street. The officer obtained and examined the driver’s licenses of the defendant and his passenger. Instead of promptly releasing the men with a citation or warning as was customary, the officer detained them for an additional period while he initiated a warrant check. When the check showed arrest warrants for both men, the officer searched them incident to their arrests and found evidence eventually used to convict the defendant of burglary. The Supreme Court held an officer cannot prolong a detention based on a traffic violation for the purpose of running a warrant check. (McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 586.) Rather, “the officer may temporarily detain the offender at the scene for the period of time necessary to discharge the duties that he incurs by virtue of the traffic stop.” (Id. at p. 584.) Nevertheless, “[i]f a warrant check can be completed within that same period, no reason appears to hold it improper: because it would not add to the delay already lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his violation, it would not represent any further intrusion on his rights.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Similarly, in Williams, a police officer, suspecting that the defendant was involved in recent robberies, stopped the defendant’s car after he committed a traffic violation. The officer promptly obtained all the information needed to prepare a citation, but he never commenced writing it. Instead, he began to investigate extraneous matters. The court held that the officer had unnecessarily extended the traffic detention to investigate the unrelated matters. (Williams, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 359.) The Williams court said that there is no “general outside time limit” at which a detention will be found to be prolonged. (Id. at p. 358.) The circumstances of each traffic detention are unique and the reasonableness of each detention period must be judged on its particular circumstances. (Ibid.) “The clear intent of McGaughran is to preclude officers from imposing a general crime investigation upon the detained traffic offender that is not ‘reasonably necessary’ to completion of the officer’s traffic citation duties unless the officer has an independent reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed unrelated offenses.” (Ibid.)
Defendant asserts that like McGaughran and Williams, “[t]he present case provides a classic example of the minor traffic stop that leads to a prolonged detention for the purpose of an unrelated fishing expedition.” However, here, there are significant differences in the facts that make both McGaughran and Williams inapplicable. In particular, at the beginning of the traffic stop, defendant did not provide Deputy Fleckner with a valid driver’s license, and he told Deputy Fleckner he was on active probation. Therefore, during the initial detention, Deputy Fleckner was confirming defendant’s identity in the absence of a driver’s license, and the fact that defendant was on probation with a search clause. This was not a circumstance like that in McGaughran and Williams, where the officerwas in a position to cite the defendant for a traffic violation and instead, prolonged the detention to investigate unrelated matters. At the time of his initial contact with defendant, Deputy Fleckner learned defendant was on probation. Taking time to confirm that fact, and determine if there was a search condition as a term of defendant’s probation did not amount to an unduly prolonged detention.
Here, Deputy Fleckner learned that defendant was on active probation with a search clause within a period of minutes after the initial traffic stop. At that point, Deputy Fleckner was entitled to further detain defendant for the purpose of performing a probation search (See People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 609-610 [police do not need reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a search of probationer because probationer has waived his right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment]; People v. Suennen (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 192, 200-201 [if additional cause to detain develops after initial stop, additional time to investigate is allowed].)
The court was correct in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The cracked windshield was sufficient to provide the officer with probable cause for the traffic stop, and the detention was not unduly prolonged.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, J.DUFFY, J.