Opinion
4-20-0250
12-15-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY C. DIXON, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County No. 14CF815 Honorable Scott D. Drazewski, Judge Presiding.
HOLDER WHITE, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOLDER WHITE, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing defendant's postconviction petition at the first stage, where defendant was not denied due process by the court's failure to admonish him regarding mandatory supervised release.
¶ 2 In March 2020, defendant, Anthony C. Dixon, filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging a violation of his due process rights where the circuit court failed to admonish him on the required term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) prior to accepting his guilty plea. The court dismissed defendant's postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing the circuit court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition at the first stage of postconviction proceedings because the petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In July 2014, a grand jury indicted defendant for attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 2014)) (count I), two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a) (2) (West 2014)) (counts II and III), and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e) (1) (West 2014)) (count IV). In November 2015, defendant waived his right to a jury trial.
¶ 6 In January 2016, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm and aggravated battery with a firearm, counts II and IV. In exchange for defendant's plea, the State dismissed counts I and III. Defendant's written plea agreement also stated there was a "Cap of 30 [years]. [Defendant] requests right to ask for a lower sentence (not less than 6)."
¶ 7 The circuit court began defendant's plea hearing by confirming defendant understood the charges he was pleading guilty to. As to count II, aggravated discharge of a firearm, the court confirmed defendant understood the charge was a Class 1 felony, carrying a minimum sentence of 4 years and a maximum sentence of 15 years. The court asked the State if defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence, and the State responded, "We're not aware of anything that would make him extended term eligible at this time, your Honor." The court informed defendant that, "in addition to any time spent in the penitentiary, upon the date of your release, you're still subject to an additional period of monitoring and supervision by the Department of Corrections known as mandatory supervised release, what used to be known as parole, for two years thereafter." Defendant was also eligible for probation or conditional discharge. As to count IV, aggravated battery with a firearm was a Class X felony, carrying a minimum sentence of 6 years in prison and a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison. Again, the court asked the State if defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence, and the State responded it was "not aware of anything at this time that would make him extended term eligible." The court did not reference MSR as to count IV.
¶ 8 After discussing the charges and possible penalties, the circuit court asked defendant, "Now, there is no agreement between you, the State or myself as to any sentence which may be imposed for these charges other than it would be for a term not less than six nor more than 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Is that your understanding?" Defendant responded, "Yes, your Honor." The court stated, "it's my understanding that these are not mandatory consecutive sentences. Said a different way, that any sentence *** would allow you to serve those sentences concurrently with one another." Both defense counsel and the State agreed. The court confirmed defendant understood his right to a trial and that his entry of a plea of guilty would waive that right. Defendant confirmed he understood. The court presented defendant with his written plea agreement and confirmed no one had "forced [him] or threatened [him] into entering into that agreement." The court asked defendant, "Have any promises been made to you in order to obtain your pleas of guilty other than the promises that are shown on the written plea agreements?" Defendant responded, "No, your Honor."
¶ 9 The State presented the factual basis for the plea. On July 18, 2014, defendant and Tedd Mitchell were in a "verbal altercation." Later that day, an SUV returned to the scene of the verbal altercation, and an occupant of the vehicle fired five shots. Two shots struck Shawndell Wright, "both being through and throughs, entering his back and leaving his back from a perpendicular angle to his body." The other three shots hit an apartment and a vehicle. Wright was standing next to Mitchell at the time of the shooting. Police stopped a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. In the vehicle, police located a .40-caliber handgun and ammunition, with one round of ammunition in defendant's pocket. The State would present evidence the handgun was the same weapon used in the shooting of Wright. The State additionally stated, "Your Honor, there would be-we're not presenting evidence into the factual basis, nor do we believe, after a thorough preparation for trial, that there would be evidence of severe bodily injury to Shawndell Wright in this case, given the nature of his injuries." The State added defendant admitted in police interviews he had "exchanged words" with Mitchell and that Mitchell had earlier threatened to kill him.
¶ 10 After the State presented the factual basis, the circuit court admonished defendant he would be required to serve 85% of his sentences for counts II and IV. The court then found defendant understood the nature of the charges, possible penalties, and legal rights and accepted his pleas as knowing and voluntary.
¶ 11 In April 2016, defendant's sentencing hearing commenced. As an initial matter, defense counsel stated:
"I do believe your Honor would have the discretion in this instance to impose a maximum sentence of up to 45 years if your Honor were to find that based on the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and the character of the defendant that for the protection of the community a consecutive sentence were to be imposed, but that would be entirely discretionary with the Court. My apologies, your Honor, I didn't realize that the State had actually de facto capped it at 30."
The court responded, "There is part of the agreement that it was a maximum sentence that would be sought by the State of up to 30 years. And also *** as it would be ordinarily a discretionary consecutive sentence as opposed to a mandatory consecutive sentence under the statute." The State confirmed the sentences would be served at 85%. Finally, the court confirmed, "Three years MSR on Count 4. Two years MSR on Count 2," to which the State replied, "Yes, your Honor."
¶ 12 The State asked that defendant be sentenced to 20 years of incarceration on count IV and 10 years of incarceration on count II. Defense counsel requested an aggregate sentence of seven years of concurrent imprisonment. The circuit court, after considering the factors in aggravation and mitigation, sentenced defendant to 14 years of imprisonment on count IV and a concurrent term of 8 years of imprisonment on count II. The court admonished defendant regarding his appeal rights.
¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the circuit court denied. Defendant appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on defendant's motion.
¶ 14 On March 17, 2020, defendant filed a postconviction petition. In his petition, defendant alleged his due process rights under the United States and Illinois Constitutions were denied where the circuit court failed to admonish him of the MSR period that would attach to his sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm, thereby denying him the benefit of his plea bargain. Defendant attached to his petition an affidavit stating he was not admonished of the 3-year MSR period that would attach to his 14-year sentence.
¶ 15 On March 30, 2020, the circuit court entered a written order summarily dismissing defendant's postconviction petition. Citing People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d 177, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005), the court found defendant was not denied due process where (1) he did not enter his guilty plea in exchange for a specific sentence and (2) his sentence plus the MSR period was less than the maximum sentence he could have received. The court dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous and patently without merit.
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides a collateral means for a defendant to challenge a conviction or sentence for a violation of a federal or state constitutional right. People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 143, 809 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (2004). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the circuit court must determine, without input from the State, whether the defendant's petition is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). A postconviction petition may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit "only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact." People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 12, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (2009). "To survive dismissal at this initial stage, the postconviction petition 'need only present the gist of a constitutional claim,' which is 'a low threshold' that requires the petition to contain only a limited amount of detail." People v. Harris, 366 Ill.App.3d 1161, 1166-67, 853 N.E.2d 912, 917 (2006) (quoting People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996)). We review de novo the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition. Id. at 1167.
¶ 19 On appeal, defendant argues his pro se postconviction petition presented the gist of a constitutional claim. Specifically, defendant asserts a violation of his due process rights where the circuit court did not admonish him a term of MSR would attach to his sentence for aggravated battery. The State concedes the circuit court erred by not admonishing defendant a term of MSR would attach to his sentence for aggravated battery but argues the error did not violate due process.
¶ 20 Due process requires that defendants understand the terms of their plea agreements before their agreements are accepted by the court. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill.2d 494, 506, 588 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (1992). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012) was adopted to safeguard the rights of the accused by assuring a guilty plea is entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. People v. Daubman, 190 Ill.App.3d 684, 693, 546 N.E.2d 1079, 1085 (1989). Rule 402(a) requires that the circuit court give certain admonishments before accepting a guilty plea, including admonishing the defendant as to "the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences." Ill. S.Ct. R. 402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2012). Rule 402 admonishments are designed to ensure that a defendant understands his plea, the rights he waives by pleading guilty, and the consequences of a guilty plea. People v. Dougherty, 394 Ill.App.3d 134, 138, 915 N.E.2d 442, 446 (2009). There is no substantial compliance with Rule 402, and due process has been violated where a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence and does not receive the "benefit of the bargain." Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d at 186.
¶ 21 In Whitfield, the prosecutor and circuit court promised the defendant that if he pleaded guilty to first degree murder and armed robbery, he would receive 25 years of imprisonment for the former offense and a concurrent term of 6 years of imprisonment for the latter offense. Id. at 179. The defendant pleaded guilty in reliance on that promise, and the court imposed the agreed-upon prison terms. Id. At the plea hearing, no one informed the defendant of MSR. Id. at 180. After he began serving his sentence, the defendant learned that section 5-8-1(d)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (d)(1) (West 1998)) automatically added 3 years of MSR to his 25-year term of imprisonment. Id. He filed a postconviction petition alleging that the addition of MSR deprived him of the benefit of his bargain and violated due process. Id. at 182. The supreme court held:
" [T]here is no substantial compliance with Rule 402 and due process is violated when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence and the trial court fails to advise the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a mandatory supervised release term will be added to that sentence. In these circumstances, addition of the MSR term to the agreed-upon sentence violates due process because the sentence imposed is more onerous than the one [the] defendant agreed to at the time of the plea hearing. Under these circumstances, the addition of the MSR constitutes an unfair breach of the plea agreement." Id. at 195.
The remedy was to modify the defendant's sentence to a term of 22 years of imprisonment followed by 3 years of MSR. Id. at 205. His sentence was therefore not more onerous than the agreed-upon sentence of 25 years of imprisonment. Id.
¶ 22 "Although the best practice is to give the admonitions at the time the circuit court accepts the waiver or the plea, the failure to do so is not necessarily fatal; each case must be determined on its own peculiar circumstances." Dougherty, 394 Ill.App.3d at 139. In other words, failure to properly admonish a defendant does not automatically establish grounds for reversing a judgment. People v. Davis, 145 Ill.2d 240, 250, 582 N.E.2d 714, 719 (1991). "Whether reversal is required depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether [the] defendant has been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment." Id.
¶ 23 Defendant alleges he did not receive the benefit of his bargain with the State where he bargained for a sentence between 6 and 30 years, avoided an extended-term sentence, and received a sentence of 14 years. Therefore, defendant contends the 14-year sentence was the benefit of his bargain and the addition of the 3-year MSR period was more than his bargained-for 14-year sentence. The State contends defendant was not eligible for extended-term sentencing and entered an open guilty plea where the maximum sentence allowed by law was 30 years. Therefore, defendant did not bargain for his sentence, and the sentence with the MSR term was less than the maximum possible sentence. Regardless of whether defendant's guilty plea was a negotiated or open plea, defendant was not denied due process by the omission of admonishment on the required MSR term.
¶ 24 Defendant incorrectly urges us to consider the actual sentence imposed as the benefit for which he bargained. Here, there was never an agreement for a 14-year sentence. To the contrary, defendant negotiated the agreement to receive a sentence between 6 and 30 years in prison. The imposed sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, with the addition of the 3 years of MSR, is well below the maximum sentence of 30 years. Thus, we conclude defendant received the benefit of the bargain-a sentence between 6 and 30 years.
¶ 25 As defendant cannot show he was denied due process by the omission of the MSR admonishment as to aggravated battery, his postconviction petition has no arguable merit in law or fact. See Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 12. The circuit court properly dismissed defendant's postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 28 Affirmed.