1983). Although challenges to discovery rulings are typically the subject of an appeal, People v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739, 742 (Colo. 1995), it can be appropriate to review discovery orders interlocutorily, by way of original proceeding, where the impact of the ruling would be substantial and incurable at a later time. See People v. District Court, 664 P.2d at 251; see also People v. District Court, 898 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo.
1983). Although challenges to discovery rulings are typically the subject of an appeal, People v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739, 742 (Colo. 1995), it can be appropriate to review discovery orders interlocutorily, by way of original proceeding, where the impact of the ruling would be substantial and incurable at a later time. See People v. District Court, 664 P.2d at 251; see also People v. District Court, 898 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo.
In such actions, the district court is generally represented by the Attorney General's Office. See, e.g. , Pearson v. Dist. Court , 924 P.2d 512, 517 (Colo. 1996) (ordering trial court to vacate its orders for mediation); People v. Dist. Court , 894 P.2d 739, 746 (Colo. 1995) (finding respondent court erred by suppressing evidence obtained through discovery in the prior civil proceeding). In fact, if a court or judge is named in a C.A.R. 21 petition, the implication for conflicts could be more serious than the types of conflicts claimant fears; unlike workers' compensation or unemployment cases that name the Panel generally, a C.A.R. 21 petition that names an individual judge is likely to be returned to that same judge to preside over subsequent proceedings.
When the language of the statute or rule is clear, so that the drafter's intent can be discerned with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction. People v. Dist. Court , 894 P.2d 739, 742 (Colo.1995). B. Section 18–1.3–603(3)
Section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S.2009, and C.A.R. 4.1 authorize the prosecution to file interlocutory appeals in the supreme court from certain types of adverse trial court rulings, including a limited class of evidentiary rulings, namely, those with respect to motions to suppress evidence or to suppress an extrajudicial confession or admission. See alsoPeople v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739, 742 (Colo.1995) (" C.A.R. 4.1 allows the state to file interlocutory appeals from trial court rulings granting motions to suppress for unconstitutional seizures of property, involuntary confessions or admissions, and improper orders for nontestimonial identifications." ); People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Colo.1994) (" C.A.R. 4.1 limits the types of rulings from which interlocutory appeals [in criminal cases] can be taken and cannot be employed to obtain pre-trial review of issues not covered by the rule."
); People v. Buffalo Gravel Corp., 195 N.Y.S. 940, 945-46 (N.Y. Extra. Trial Term 1.922) (scope of New York Housing Commission Resolution granting immunity for testimony sufficiently broad so as to negate necessity for asserting privilege against self-incrimination).See United States v. Abrams, 357 F.2d 539, 549 (2d Cir.1966) (defendant did not secure immunity under former immunity subsection of 15 U.S.C. § 77 (which included "after having claimed privilege" clause) by testifying before an examiner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, where defendant never made contemporaneous claim of privilege when he testified); People v. Skelton, 109 Cal.App.3d 691, 167 Cal. Rptr. 636, 646 (1980) (finding that the plain language of California's Corporations Code Section 25531(e) "clearly requires the privilege be claimed if immunity is to be obtained"); People v. Dist. Court of Arapahoe County, 894 P.2d 739, 743 (Col. 1995) (same). See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West 2006) (federal general immunity statute that supplemented previous federal immunity statutes requires witness to assert privilege before immunity can attach).
When the language of the statute is clear so that the General Assembly's intent can be discerned with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory interpretation. People v. Dist. Court, 894 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1995). The Colorado restitution act, § 18-1.3-601, et seq., C.R.S. 2003, states that it is to be "liberally construed" to accomplish its purposes.
When the language of the statute is clear, so that the legislative intent can be discerned with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction. People v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1995); People v. Moltrer, 983 P.2d 810 (Colo.App. 1999). Because construction of a statute is a question of law, we are not bound by the trial court's interpretation.
When the language of the statute is clear so that the legislative intent can be discerned with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction. People v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1995). Here, the language of 18-1-105(9)(a)(III) is not ambiguous. It requires that if a defendant is on probation for another felony at the time of the commission of this felony, he or she must be sentenced to a term of at least the midpoint of the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range.
When the language of the statute is clear so that the legislative intent can be discerned with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction. People v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1995). The felony sentencing statute, § 18-1-105, C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B), sets forth a presumptive range of penalties for each class of felony.