Opinion
February 13, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The record demonstrates that, in response to inquiries from the court and the prosecutor, the defendant repeatedly and unequivocally agreed to waive his statutory right to seek appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion as a condition of his plea bargain. Inasmuch as such a waiver has long been recognized as an acceptable condition of a plea bargain (see, People v Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1; People v Williams, 36 N.Y.2d 829, cert denied 423 U.S. 873; People v Bray, 154 A.D.2d 692), and the record overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the waiver in the waiver in this case was knowingly and voluntarily made (see, e.g., People v Seaberg, supra; People v Roberts, 152 A.D.2d 678; People v Cerce, 137 A.D.2d 542), we find that the defendant may properly be held to his waiver. Accordingly, we do not address the merits of the denial of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. Mollen, P.J., Eiber, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.