Opinion
F041695.
7-1-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHIP ROBERT DILLON, Defendant and Appellant.
Deborah Prucha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, and Carlos A. Martinez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On November 2, 1999, appellant Chip Robert Dillon pled nolo contendere to assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273, subd. (a)). Dillon also admitted an enhancement for causing great bodily injury during domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (d)). On December 7, 1999, the trial court imposed a sentence of four years for the abuse of a spouse or a cohabitant conviction plus five years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court suspended Dillons sentence and placed him on probation for three years.
On July 30, 2002, Dillon admitted an allegation that he failed to complete the terms of probation by completing a domestic violence program and failing to pay court ordered fines. On September 18, 2002, the trial court ordered the termination of Dillons probation and lifted the stay on his prison term. The court granted Dillon applicable custody credits and ordered Dillon to pay a restitution fine.
At the original sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a $ 200 restitution fine. The court imposed a $ 1,200 restitution fine after lifting the stay on the execution of Dillons sentence. Appellate counsel successfully motioned the trial court to impose the original restitution fine of $ 200.
Dillons appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court independently to review the record. (People v . Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal. Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071.) The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that Dillon was advised he could file his own brief with this court. By letter of December 17, 2002, we invited Dillon to submit additional briefing.
Dillon replied with a short letter contending his attorney in 1999 failed to inform him of his rights and incorrectly told him he would receive life in prison unless he accepted the plea bargain. Dillon also contends there was no evidence that he committed the alleged offenses.
Dillon contends his trial counsel was not competent. For such a claim to succeed, Dillon must establish counsels performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation under prevailing professional norms and that he was prejudiced. Dillon has failed to demonstrate a factual basis for either of these requirements in his letter brief. The record provides no factual basis for Dillons contentions that he was not advised by, or, that he was incorrectly advised by his trial counsel.
To establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must demonstrate (1) counsels performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsels deficient representation subjected the petitioner to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels deficiencies, the result of the proceedings would have been more favorable to the defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052; In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 908-909, 864 P.2d 474.) A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
Dillons challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction is foreclosed by his nolo contendere plea. A guilty plea is, for most purposes, the legal equivalent of a jurys guilty verdict. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601, 918 P.2d 999.) A guilty plea serves as a stipulation that the People need not introduce proof to support the accusation. The plea ipso facto supplies both evidence and verdict. The plea is deemed to constitute an admission of every element of the offense charged. (People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 636, 230 Cal. Rptr. 129, 724 P.2d 1154 [overruled on another ground in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150]; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837;People v . Suite (1980) 101 Cal. App. 3d 680, 689, 161 Cal. Rptr. 825.) A nolo contendere plea is the same as a guilty plea for all purposes. (Pen. Code, § 1016; People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 794; People v. Mendez (1997) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095, 969 P.2d 146.)
After independent review of the record, we have concluded no other reasonably arguable legal or factual argument exists.
The judgment is affirmed.