A defendant's act of deliberately colliding his vehicle with a vehicle occupied by the victim constitutes simple battery where there is evidence that the vehicle collision resulted in increased force on the body of the victim. (People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1152 (Dealba).) Licina contends that Dealba was wrongly decided.
And finally, citing both Clark and Townsend , a California court of appeals recently affirmed a defendant’s battery conviction for intentionally "smashing" his vehicle into the vehicle that his wife was driving. People v. Dealba , 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 848, 850-51 (2015). Dealba argued that there was no evidence to support the offense’s touching element.
Pulling down someone's pants could qualify as a battery, and, thus, an "unlawful touching," for purposes of the self-defense instruction. (See § 242 [defining a "battery" as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another"]; see also People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149, 1150 [only a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement for a criminal battery; force need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark].) Given defendant's testimony, we conclude substantial evidence supported giving a self-defense instruction as to the corporal injury to a child offense.
In other words, force against the person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark." ' " (People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149, citing People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404-405.) Further, an element of section 243, subdivision (e)(1) not present in the aggravated assault statute is the requirement of a specific relationship with the victim.
"Therefore, '[o]nly a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery.'" (People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149.) The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object or someone else to touch the person.
And it was equally reasonable to infer that Yennifer, with her back to Renteria and extremely limited cognitive abilities, did not consent to that offensive touching, however slight it may have been. (Cf. People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149 ["'[o]nly a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery'"].) In any event, a finding of misdemeanor battery does not require proof that the touching was sexually motivated.
J.E.’s conduct upon being approached by Deputies Slater and Spangler, which included a profanity-laced refusal to cooperate and an attempt to spit at them, was nasty, rude, and disrespectful, but was it criminal? Because " ‘[o]nly a slight unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a criminal battery’ " ( People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 ), J.E.’s "kick" to Deputy Slater would unquestionably be sufficient to uphold a Penal Code section 243, subdivision (b) conviction if J.E. were an adult. The same would be true for the Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1) charge, since J.E.’s conduct in walking away from and then resisting these two deputies impeded them from carrying out their duties.
(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(7).) Nalbandian testified that Kosoyan, without provocation, assaulted and battered her at the gas station by punching her, pulling her hair, and attempting to run her over with her car. (See People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149 [battery includes "'punching, kicking, or tripping the victim'"]; People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 109 [driving a car toward someone can be an assault]; see also Lips v. City of Hollywood (11th Cir. 2009) 350 Fed.Appx. 328, 333, fn. 9 ["hair-pulling is considered a battery"].) Nalbandian's testimony was substantial evidence of unlawful violence by Kosoyan.
(People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227.) Battery requires a touching of the victim, however slight the touching may be. (People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149-1150.) Simple assault is a lesser included offense of battery because an assault is "nothing more than an attempted battery."
Huber directs our attention to cases in which defendants were found to have committed the touching required for battery indirectly, by causing force to be applied to the person of another. (See, e.g., People v. Dealba (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1152-1153 [evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for spousal battery where, to counteract force on her hands and arms generated when the defendant repeatedly slammed his car into hers, victim had to grip steering wheel tighter and struggle to keep from crashing into parked cars]; In re B.L. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1493, 1497 [upholding wardship adjudication based on misdemeanor battery where student slapped walkie-talkie out of teacher's hand]; and see People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 210, fn. 17 [stating in dicta that force required for battery may be applied indirectly].) We have no quarrel with the principle that an unlawful touching can be accomplished indirectly by intentionally causing force to be applied to another object or person.