Opinion
G063251
06-27-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH FRANKLIN DAVILA, Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. FWV22003033 Katrina West, Judge.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, J.
Appellant Joseph Franklin Davila appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him on one count of inflicting corporal injury upon E.G.-a person with whom he has or had a dating relationship-that resulted in a traumatic condition in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) (all undesignated statutory references are to this code). Davila argues insufficient evidence supports the conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Davila and E.G. had an on-and-off dating relationship since 2018. They lived together for the majority of their relationship and have remained "very good friends."
At trial, E.G. testified as follows:
One day in August 2022, at a time when they were not living together, Davila visited E.G. at her residence. E.G. could not recall when Davila arrived or what time she awoke that day. But after having her recollection refreshed by her statement to police, she testified she woke up at 5:00 a.m. At that time, she saw Davila come "out of the shower."
Later in her testimony, she clarified Davila was taking an oatmeal bath that she had drawn for him to alleviate his itching. While Davila was taking a bath, E.G. took his keys and cell phone, scrolled through messages on his phone, and found messages between Davila and another woman. These messages angered E.G. She tried to relax after seeing these messages, and eventually fell asleep in her bed. Davila apparently had fallen asleep in the bath or elsewhere and, at 5:00 a.m., he walked out of the bathroom, waking up E.G. She saw Davila standing in the doorway. As he walked into the bedroom, she "popped up" from her bed realizing she forgot to return his keys and cell phone to where she found them.
To create an opportunity to put these items back, she tried to hug him around his neck, and beseeched him to "'come to bed with'" her. Davila "pulled away," and E.G. started crying. Davila relented and climbed into bed with her. After a brief moment in bed, he said she "was acting weird," left the bed, and walked to the bathroom to dress. While dressing, Davila realized E.G. had his keys and cell phone and asked for them. E.G., still on the bed, replied she did not have them. He repeatedly asked for his keys and cell phone, but she told him no and started crying.
E.G., lying on the bed, reached for Davila again and pulled him toward her. She wanted him to lie down on the bed. But he pushed her. He continued to ask for his keys and cell phone, but she refused to return them. She tugged at him, he pulled away, and they struggled "back and forth."
Davila eventually extricated himself from E.G.'s grip and went to the bathroom. E.G. heard rustling. When he came out of the bathroom, he continued to ask for his belongings. She denied having them and said, "'I know that you want to move in with her.'" Davila replied, "'What are you talking about?'" E.G. could not recall when this back and forth ended. She could not recall any other physical acts between the two occurring that day.
At some point, she left her bedroom and headed outside to the driveway. On her way out, she encountered her landlord. The landlord stated he intended to call the police. E.G. replied, "'Okay. Do it.'" The police promptly arrived at the house. E.G. spoke with Officer Victor Reyes. She could not recall what she told Reyes.
Reyes testified as follows:
At approximately 5:10 a.m., he was dispatched to a residence in regards to a domestic violence call. At the residence, E.G. informed him she was "involved in a domestic violence incident" and the perpetrator was still inside the house. Reyes and other officers entered the house. At the bottom of the stairs, the police announced their presence and asked Davila multiple times "to come outside." Hearing no response, they proceeded upstairs to E.G.'s bedroom. They announced their presence and asked Davila repeatedly to "come out of the bedroom." Hearing nothing, Reyes forced open the locked bedroom door with a "ram tool." The police did not see anyone inside the bedroom.
A police dog was used to search the bedroom. Once the dog started barking, Davila revealed he was inside a locked bathroom. Reyes instructed Davila to "come outside with his hands up." Davila replied he would not leave because of the dog. After Reyes assured Davila the dog was leashed and it was safe to come out, Davila opened the bathroom door, and the police took him into custody.
Reyes next spoke with E.G. This interview was recorded via Reyes's body-worn camera, and played to the jury. During her interview E.G. recounted the following:
Davila was visiting and staying on a couch downstairs because his car was towed to her residence. At around 8:00 p.m., she allowed Davila to take a shower in her bathroom. The next morning, at approximately 5:00 a.m., she woke up and saw Davila coming out of the bathroom. She invited him to bed. Davila said "something kinda rude," causing her to cry and hyperventilate. She approached him, asked for a hug, and Davila gave her one.
Her crying intensified, and he began to act "mean" and curse. She urged him to stop. But Davila pushed her. E.G. started accusing him of choosing others over her and leaving her alone. Davila tried to defend himself by naming men whom he thought she had dated and with whom she had continued talking. E.G. cried, "'You picked them,'" and reminded Davila of previous arguments between them. She went to her bed and lay down, hoping she would entice Davila to "chase" her.
Davila became angrier. He approached her, held her head down on the bed, and said, "'I wanna hurt you' or 'kill you' or 'I wish you were dead.'" Davila "smacked" her with his hand. Davila then turned around, but E.G. cried and pleaded, "'Love me more.'" He returned and began to choke her. He held down her neck for approximately 30 to 45 seconds. After letting go, he started punching her in the face. He also hit her teeth with a hard object, using so much force she was concerned her teeth would break. While Davila was hitting her, he repeatedly said, "'I know I'm going to jail.'" E.G. lay on the bed, closed her eyes, and waited for an opportunity to escape.
Near the end of the attack, he tried to "poke" and "scoop out [her] eyes." She started blocking her eyes-that was the only time she tried to defend herself. Davila walked away to the bathroom. She left the bedroom, knocked on her landlord's door, and asked her landlord to call the police because Davila hit her. The entire attack lasted for 20 to 30 minutes.
Following the interview, Reyes photographed E.G.'s injuries. These photographs depicted darkness and bruising on her face, discoloration-"almost purple"-on both eyelids, dried blood on her lips, and a laceration to her chin. Reyes and E.G. testified these photographs were an accurate depiction of her injuries that day. At trial, E.G. could not recall how she sustained these injuries.
Since the incident, Davila called E.G. a few times from jail. In one telephone call, E.G. suggested she could testify at trial that Brittany hit her, not Davila.
The prosecution filed an information, alleging Davila committed one felony count of corporal injury to a cohabitant in violation section 273.5, subdivision (a). It also alleged he had a prior serious or violent felony conviction or juvenile adjudication, which qualified as a "strike" under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) &1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
The jury convicted Davila of "inflicting injury on someone with whom the defendant currently has, or previously had, a dating relationship that resulted in a traumatic condition, in violation of . . . [s]ection 273.5[, subdivision] (a) ...." (Capitalization omitted.) After a bifurcated trial, the jury found true the prior serious felony conviction allegation. Davila timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Davila argues his conviction violates the federal and state due process clause because there was insufficient evidence to show he inflicted corporal injury on E.G. resulting in a traumatic condition. We conclude substantial evidence supports the conviction.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Our review must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence." (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 44 (Zaragoza).) "'[A] reasonable inference . . . "may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] . . . A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence." [Citation.]'" (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.) "'"'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.'"'" (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104.)
We do not reweigh evidence, reevaluate the credibility of a witness, or settle factual conflicts, because "these are functions reserved for the trier of fact." (People v. Xiong (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1268 (Xiong).) We "can only reject evidence accepted by the trier of fact when the evidence is inherently improbable and impossible of belief. [Citation.] Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Ibid.)
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DAVILA'S CONVICTION
"Any person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim . . . is guilty of a felony." (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) The definition of "victim" includes, inter alia, "[t]he offender's cohabitant or former cohabitant" and "someone with whom the offender has, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship . . . ." (§ 273.5, subd. (b)(2)-(3).) "'[T]raumatic condition' means a condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury, including, but not limited to, injury as a result of strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force." (§ 273.5, subd. (d); see People v. Chaffer (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1044 ["the injury may be of any variety"].)
Substantial evidence supports Davila's conviction of inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a former cohabitant or someone with whom he has or had a dating relationship. E.G. testified she and Davila cohabited for most of their dating relationship. In her statement to Reyes, E.G. described Davila's attack against her: Davila smacked her with his hand, choked her, punched her, hit her teeth with a hard object, and tried to scoop out her eyes.
Photographs taken that day substantiated her statement to Reyes and illustrated the injuries she incurred. Reyes' photographs showed bruising on her face, discoloration on both eyelids, dried blood on her lips, and a laceration to her chin. E.G. and Reyes testified these photographs were accurate depictions of what she looked like that day. These photographs, together with E.G.'s statement to police, support the jury's finding that Davila willfully inflicted injury on her resulting in a traumatic condition.
The trial court instructed the jury on CALCRIM No. 840. To prove a violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), the prosecution must show, inter alia, the defendant did not act in self-defense. (CALCRIM No. 840.) The evidence here shows Davila did not act in self defense.
Davila argues E.G.'s testimony was not credible. He invokes E.G.'s felony conviction for identity theft, a misdemeanor conviction for providing false information to a police officer, and a misdemeanor conviction for petty theft. He characterizes her as untruthful, citing a jail call in which E.G. expressed a willingness to testify someone else, not Davila, hit her. Davila also asserts her testimony was contradictory and her statements to Reyes were inconsistent with her testimony. Davila acknowledges appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witness, but his arguments are inviting us to do just that. Such functions are beyond our purview and "reserved for the trier of fact." (Xiong, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268.) These arguments are therefore unavailing.
Davila contends the record does not contain evidence that is credible and of solid value from which a rational trier of fact could find Davila guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But his argument presumes E.G.'s testimony was the only evidence at trial. He ignores the photographs. He also does not recognize the jury could have given more weight to E.G.'s prior statements to Reyes and less to her testimony at trial. That is what the prosecution urged the jury to do in its closing argument. The prosecution asserted E.G. lied in her testimony to save her friend Davila, but when her safety was at stake, she told the truth to the police. The photographs, along with her statement to Reyes, were "reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a" reasonable jury could conclude Davila was guilty. (Zaragoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 44.)
Davila argues the instant matter resembles People v. Williamson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 336 (Williamson). In Williamson, a defendant's convictions depended almost exclusively on the credibility of the complaining witness. (Id. at p. 338.) That witness testified the defendant raped her. (Id. at p. 340.) But the witness's testimony was inconsistent and inherently incredible and other evidence appeared to exculpate the defendant. (Id. at pp. 340-341.) The defendant had an alibi, corroborated by other witnesses. (Id. at p. 340.) A medical examination of the witness, along with an examination of the bed, did not reveal any evidence of rape. (Ibid.) The intruder entered through a window, but the defendant, who was "a sort of father figure to" the witness, had a house key, rendering it improbable he entered through the window. (Id. at pp. 338, 341.) The appellate court found "'the evidence to be such that no rational trier of fact could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (Id. at p. 341.)
The present case is readily distinguishable from Williamson. Indeed, both the complaining witness in Williamson and E.G. had credibility issues. But, unlike in Williamson, where the entire record was insufficient to support the conviction, the record here, particularly the photographs in conjunction with E.G.'s statement to Reyes, supports the conviction. And the jury could have reasonably deduced from the photographs and E.G.'s statement to Reyes that Davila inflicted corporal injury on her.
Therefore, we conclude substantial evidence supports Davila's conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J., SANCHEZ, J.