Opinion
December 23, 1994
Appeal from the Monroe County Court, Connell, J.
Present — Green, J.P., Pine, Wesley, Callahan and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously reversed on the law, motion to dismiss indictment denied, indictment reinstated and matter remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings on indictment. Memorandum: On appeal from an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that defendant was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the People contend that County Court erred in charging two periods, totalling 103 days, of postreadiness delay to the People (see, CPL 30.30). We agree.
The People concede that the 154-day period of time between the commencement of the criminal action and defendant's arraignment on the indictment, when the People declared their readiness for trial, is chargeable to them. The court erred, however, in charging to the People the 32 days between the filing of defendant's CPL 210.30 motion and the production of the Grand Jury minutes by the People; that was a reasonable period of time to respond to that motion (see, CPL 30.30 [a]; People v Harris, 82 N.Y.2d 409, affg 187 A.D.2d 1015 [36 days]); see also, People v Inswood, 180 A.D.2d 649, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1002 [64 days]; People v Rodriguez, 132 Misc.2d 1044 [39 days]). The court also erred in charging to the People the 71-day period during which defendant's CPL 30.30 motion was pending; the pendency of that motion did not affect the People's readiness for trial (see, People v Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529; People v Shannon, 143 A.D.2d 572, 572-573, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 860; People v Allen, 152 Misc.2d 257, 263, affd 203 A.D.2d 97, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 963).
Thus, because only 154 days were chargeable to the People, they were ready for trial within six months from the commencement of this action and defendant's motion to dismiss should have been denied.