Opinion
A156841
08-07-2020
In re CURTIS A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CURTIS A., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J17-00527)
Following various juvenile offenses and failed placements, appellant was committed to the Contra Costa County Youthful Offender Treatment Program (YOTP) with a maximum term of confinement of 3 years 120 days, or until age 21, whichever is to first occur. Appellant asserts the commitment order unconstitutionally delegated the juvenile court's authority to determine the length of commitment to the probation department. Appellant further asserts the guidelines regulating his conduct and progress through YOTP violate due process. We disagree and affirm.
In footnote 5 of appellant's opening brief, he requests this court take judicial notice of the " 'Contra Costa County Probation Overview, County Probation Officer Philip Kader,' " located on Contra Costa County's website. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1), "To obtain judicial notice by a reviewing court . . . , a party must serve and file a separate motion with a proposed order." California Rules of Court rule 8.252(a)(2) sets forth various requirements for the motion, including an explanation of why the matter to be noticed is relevant and subject to judicial notice. Appellant has failed to comply with these requirements. Accordingly, his request for judicial notice is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging appellant committed unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count one) and vandalized school property (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1); count two).
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
The probation officer's report indicates the allegations in the petition arose from a dispute regarding a stolen wallet. During the course of that dispute, appellant entered the victim's car and began driving the vehicle away from the victim. Another individual used his vehicle to prevent appellant from driving away. Appellant left with other juveniles, but left his backpack at the scene. Police recognized the backpack from prior contacts with appellant. Appellant was arrested, and he admitted to driving the vehicle although denied any intent to steal it.
The juvenile court sustained the petition as to the first count and dismissed the second count. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court declared appellant a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
Following multiple probation violations and failed placements with his parents and at the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility, appellant was detained in juvenile hall pending a contested disposition hearing. Following the contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed appellant to a county institution and ordered appellant to participate in YOTP, including completing all phases of YOTP, following all treatment requirements, and obeying all rules and regulations. YOTP describes its goal as to "provide participants with the skill, education and training necessary to successfully return to their families . . . and have the skills necessary to make appropriate life decisions." YOTP is divided into an orientation period and four phases. After completing the requirements for each phase, a minor in the program may submit a petition to the "Assessment Review Team" or "ART Board" (ART board) to move onto the next phase of the program. The ART board is comprised of the minor's counselors, teachers, mental health specialist, and deputy probation officer. If a minor engages in problematic behavior during YOTP, the ART board has a variety of tools available address the behavior, including counseling or admonishing the minor, taking away privileges, or moving the minor to an earlier phase of the program (phase back). The trial court committed appellant to YOTP for a maximum period of 3 years 120 days, or until age 21, whichever occurs first.
The court scheduled a follow-up hearing within a month, and another hearing approximately nine months thereafter to check on appellant's progress. At the follow-up hearing, the court indicated it would set review hearings approximately every 90 days and expected an oral or written report from the probation department to update the court on "how things are progressing." Appellant timely appealed the disposition order.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant asserts YOTP violates his due process by providing unconstitutionally vague guidelines that govern his progress through YOTP. Appellant further contends the juvenile court improperly delegated supervision of his commitment to the probation department. We disagree. A. The Phase Back Decisions and Due Process
Appellant first argues the ART board's phase back decisions violate due process because the "YOTP Handbook" (hereafter YOTP handbook or handbook) provides vague, subjective standards for such decisions, including (1) ability to "model or display the behavior expected," (2) use of " 'appropriate language,' " (3) " 'a groomed appearance,' " and (4) ability to " 'comport yourself with dignity' " and have " 'good habits.' " Appellant argues "[t]here is no articulable standard to ensure fair application of these criteria."
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, "which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of 'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' " (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) While we are unaware of any authority applying this doctrine to the YOTP handbook, it has been extensively discussed in the context of probation conditions. In that context, the California Supreme Court has explained: "To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition. [Citations.] In determining whether the condition is sufficiently definite, however, a court is not limited to the condition's text. [Citation.] We must also consider other sources of applicable law [citation], including judicial construction of similar provisions. [Citations.] Thus, a probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague ' " 'if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.' " ' " (Id. at pp. 500-501; People v. Superior Court (J.C. Penney Corp., Inc.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 376, 387 [" 'Facial challenges . . . are disfavored' " because they often " 'rest on speculation' "].) " '[I]n evaluating challenges based on claims of vagueness, . . . "[t]he particular context is all important." ' " (In re Oswaldo R. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 409, 417.)
The juvenile court ordered appellant to "participate in the County Institution Program, YOTP" and "complete all phases of the program, follow all treatment requirements, and obey all rules and regulations" as part of its disposition order. Accordingly, the juvenile court incorporated the YOTP handbook into its disposition order, and we will evaluate whether it is unconstitutionally vague.
1. The YOTP Handbook
As raised by appellant, the YOTP handbook uses the phrases "the behavior expected," "appropriate language," "groomed appearance," "[c]omport yourself with dignity," and "good habits." And in the context of probation conditions, similar phrases have been found problematic. (See, e.g., In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 299 [phrase "to 'be of good behavior and perform well' " was unconstitutionally vague]; In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1102 [noting the term " 'satisfactory' " is inherently subjective].) Here, however, the handbook provides additional guidance and context for these terms. The first page of the handbook lists specific goals set for minors, including "development of pro-social skills, critical thinking, independent life skills, self-control, . . . [¶] . . . [c]ognitive self-change, addressing self-reflection of thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and problem solving[,] . . . [¶] . . . [a]nger [m]anagement/[c]onflict [r]esolution skills, . . . [¶] . . . developing healthy perceptions of masculinity and relationships, . . . [¶] [and] [e]nhanced reading, writing, math, health and science skills . . . ." The handbook then notes the minor's "counselors, teachers, mental health specialist, and Deputy Probation Officer . . . . will work with you and your family to help define your goals and work toward their achievement. The duration of your program will be defined by your ability to meet your personal objectives and successfully work through the phases of the program." The handbook explains the minor will meet with all individuals involved in the minor's treatment at the beginning of the program "to formulate and evaluate your individualized treatment plan that you will begin," and the treatment plan is based on the minor's "individual needs." The minor's success at moving through the program is based on the minor's "progress toward meeting your treatment goals."
Appellant highlights phrases such as "the behavior expected" and "[c]omport yourself with dignity," without acknowledging the broader context in which they are used. For example, a minor's expected behavior is based on the specific terms of the minor's treatment plan. Similarly, the phrase "[c]omport yourself with dignity" is directly clarified in the YOTP handbook as encompassing "[n]o disrespect, swearing, abusive language, pressure, intimidation, or threatening behavior towards anyone in the facility is allowed." To the extent any ambiguities may still exist, the handbook describes the orientation period as a time to "understand the rules" and "learn what behavior is acceptable, what is not, and the positive and negative consequences of the choices you make."
Because the handbook references a minor's specific treatment plan as the guiding document for that minor's success in YOTP, a facial challenge to the YOTP handbook is inappropriate. A party asserting a facial challenge " ' "cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the statute . . . . Rather, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that the act's provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions." ' " (Vergara v. State of California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 619, 643.) As noted above, we must consider the " ' "particular context" ' " of the vagueness challenge. (In re Oswaldo R., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 417; People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117 [provision is not void for vagueness " 'if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources' "].) The handbook cannot be interpreted alone. It must be read in connection with appellant's specific treatment plan and goals. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the YOTP handbook represents a " ' "total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions." ' " (Vergara, at p. 643.)
Appellant's reliance on In re P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 288 does not alter our analysis. In that matter, the juvenile court imposed in relevant part two probation conditions requiring the minor "to 'attend classes or job on time and regularly; be of good behavior and perform well' and 'be of good citizenship and good conduct.' " (Id. at p. 292.) On appeal, the minor argued these conditions were unconstitutionally vague because they were "too 'imprecise' and 'subjective' to provide sufficient notice of the conduct they require," and the Attorney General conceded the conditions were vague. (Id. at p. 299.) This court "agree[d] with the parties that the good-behavior conditions [were] not ' "sufficiently precise" ' " and held "[r]easonable minds can differ about what it means to 'be of good behavior and perform well' at school or work and to 'be of good citizenship and good conduct.' " (Ibid.)
Here, however, appellant is not left to unilaterally discern the meaning of the phrases at issue. The YOTP handbook either provides additional guidance or contemplates additional guidance as part of orientation and the minor's individualized treatment plan. Because we must consider the particular context of the vagueness challenge, we cannot conclude the YOTP handbook is facially unconstitutional due to vagueness.
2. Phase Back Decisions
Appellant also contends the phase back decisions by the ART board violate due process. Specifically, appellant asserts the "subjective and imprecise criteria" in the YOTP handbook cannot create the necessary nexus justifying an ART board decision to phase back a participant.
As discussed above, however, the YOTP handbook does not operate in a vacuum. Participants in the YOTP develop a personalized treatment plan and goals at the beginning of the program. And, specifically as to phase back decisions, the handbook explains a phase back would only occur if the participant is "unable to model or display the behavior expected for your place in your individualized treatment program, and have failed to modify behavior that has been brought to your attention as inappropriate or unacceptable by program staff or the ART Board." Because the validity of a phase back decision is dependent on a participant's individualized treatment plan, we cannot conclude based on appellant's facial challenge that there is no " ' " 'reasonable and practical construction' " ' " that could be given to the handbook requirements regarding phase back decisions. (People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 501.) B. Commitment to YOTP
Moreover, while appellant argues the ART board lacks any "professional training" to inform their decisions, the ART board is led by a deputy probation officer and the participant's treatment plan is developed by the ART board in conjunction with the participant and his or her parents. Accordingly, the ART board does, in fact, have specialized knowledge and insight as to the goals the participant must meet in order to succeed in the program.
Appellant argues the juvenile court unlawfully delegated to the probation department the duty to determine the length of his commitment. Appellant acknowledges our colleagues in Division Five recently considered a similar claim in In re J.C. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 741 (J.C.). However, he contends J.C. was wrongly decided because (1) filing a petition pursuant to section 778 (section 778 petition) provides an insufficient remedy, (2) the court is unaware of when the phase back decisions are made, and (3) the ART board does not have objective standards to apply or provide any written statement of reasons when assessing the minor's progress through YOTP.
In J.C., as in this matter, the probation department recommended the minor be committed to YOTP. (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 743.) In doing so, the juvenile court "declined to order a fixed term of commitment," observing that it could not " 'predict exactly when he will finish the program. The key is that he finish all the programming at YOTP.' . . . '. . . [O]bviously there [is] the maximum period he could be held and that would be basically until his 21st birthday, and I'm sure he will have completed YOTP before then.' " (Id. at p. 744.) The minor opposed an indefinite commitment to YOTP, arguing doing so was an inappropriate delegation to the probation officer of the authority to determine the length of his commitment. (Id. at pp. 744-745.)
Division Five rejected the minor's position. The court principally relied on In re Robert M. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1178 (Robert M.), a case in which the juvenile court directed a probation officer to seek placement of a minor in a sex offender counseling program at the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). In rejecting the minor's claim that the disposition order "impermissibly intermingle[d] the responsibilities of the probation department and the responsibilities of DJF," Robert M. held the day-to-day supervision of the minor by those operating the program did "not change the ultimate responsibility of the juvenile court for the ward's supervision and control." (Id. at p. 1185.) The J.C. court determined Robert M. provided analogous support for concluding the juvenile court did not make an impermissible delegation in ordering the minor to YOTP because the court retained "ultimate authority" to determine whether and when the minor successfully completed YOTP. (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.) The court further noted the YOTP handbook referenced " 'court review' " and the probation officer's duty to " 'inform the court' " of the minor's progress and whether the minor "should" be released to the next phase of the program. (Id. at p. 746.) These statements "plainly contemplate[d] the probation officer will provide the juvenile court with an opinion about whether the minor has successfully completed the program and will make a recommendation to the court regarding the minor's release. The court will then make the final determination on these issues." (Id. at p. 747.)
Appellant first argues J.C. was incorrectly decided because it unfairly shifts the burden of supervision onto the minor by placing the burden on him to file a section 778 petition. We disagree. Appellant's position relies on his assumption that the probation department is improperly supervising the minor because the court is not involved in all ART board decisions. But, as explained in J.C., the juvenile court is entitled to delegate responsibility for day-to-day supervision of the minor while in the YOTP. "[S]upervision and control over a minor in a court-ordered custodial treatment program" is not an improper delegation because "the juvenile court retains the ultimate authority to determine whether the minor successfully completed the program." (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.) To the extent appellant disagrees with the ART board regarding his progression through YOTP or any phase back decisions, then section 778 provides a mechanism for appellant to seek additional judicial involvement.
Nor is appellant's claim that he is prevented from filing a section 778 petition persuasive. While he claims a minor "is never notified that he can file a 778 petition," appellant is represented by counsel and his argument to this court demonstrates he is aware of his ability to do so. Moreover, nothing in the YOTP handbook prohibits minors from filing section 778 petitions. While the YOTP handbook sets forth internal grievance procedures, the handbook does not state minors may only use those procedures to challenge ART board decisions or otherwise prohibit minors from filing section 778 petitions.
Appellant also argues annual review is "too late" for the juvenile court to remedy a phase back decision. However, as described above, appellant may file a section 778 petition to seek more immediate review. Also, the juvenile court in this instance indicated an intent to set review hearings every two or three months "to see if there's anything going badly or anything that counsel should bring to my attention."
Next, appellant argues the juvenile court cannot provide meaningful review of ART board decisions because the ART board is interpreting subjective standards regarding the "behavior expected" and does not provide a written statement of decision. As discussed in part II.A., ante, we disagree with appellant's representation of the YOTP handbook as creating subjective standards governing his progress. As explained above, a minor's progress is primarily guided by their individualized treatment plan. Accordingly, a facial challenge, as is presented here, to the constitutionality of the ART board's decisionmaking process must fail.
Finally, appellant complains about the lack of a written statement from the ART board following phasing decisions. We are unaware of any authority requiring a probation department to issue written statements of decisions as it manages the progress of minors through a rehabilitation program. And the ART board does not decide whether or when a minor successfully completes YOTP. As already explained, the probation department merely makes recommendations for the juvenile court to consider when making its findings at noticed review hearings as to whether or when a minor completes YOTP. (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 746-747.)
In sum, we agree with the analysis in J.C. and conclude the disposition order here did not impermissibly delegate authority to the probation department or violate appellant's constitutional rights.
III. DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Banke, J. /s/_________
Sanchez, J.