Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF124917A, Lee P. Felice, Judge.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Wiseman, Acting P.J.
A deputy sheriff approached and spoke to defendant Mark David Criswell as Criswell stood beside his pickup truck. After a field evaluation, the officer concluded that Criswell was under the influence of drugs; he handcuffed him and searched the truck, finding methamphetamine in a suitcase in the truck’s bed. After the trial court denied Criswell’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, he pleaded no contest to charges of possessing and being under the influence of a controlled substance; he now argues that the suppression motion should have been granted. We affirm the conviction. We agree with the trial court that the search was supported by probable cause and could therefore be carried out without a warrant under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. In light of this conclusion, we do not address the parties’ dispute over whether it was valid as a search incident to arrest under the new doctrine of Arizona v. Gant (2009) 129 S.Ct. 1710 or the older doctrine of New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 and Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
Criswell was charged by information with simple possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)); and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). He filed a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search.
At the hearing, Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy Ryan Sorrow described his encounter with Criswell. At about 1:00 a.m. on September 3, 2008, he saw Criswell’s truck parked at the side of Snow Road near Coffee Road. As Sorrow parked his patrol car behind the truck, Criswell got out. Sorrow met Criswell near the front of the patrol car. In response to a question from Sorrow, Criswell explained that he parked because he needed to talk on his cell phone and did not want to do so while driving. He told Sorrow he had just driven into town from Fresno and was going to his brother’s house.
Sorrow noticed signs of intoxication. Criswell was speaking quickly and his eyes appeared very wide and alert. His pupils were dilated and reacted little when Sorrow shined his flashlight near Criswell’s face. His mouth appeared dry and pasty, there was a thick white coating on his tongue, and he seemed to have trouble standing still. He kept placing his fingers in his pockets even though Sorrow repeatedly asked him not to do so; Sorrow finally handcuffed him. He told Criswell he was not then under arrest.
Sorrow then carried out a drug evaluation. First, he had Criswell do a “Rhomberg challenge.” Criswell had to close his eyes, tilt his head backward, and estimate 30 seconds. While Criswell was doing this, he displayed eyelid, finger, and leg tremors. After 21 seconds he guessed 30 seconds had passed. Next, Sorrow checked Criswell’s pulse. It was elevated, at 108 beats per minute. Sorrow concluded Criswell was under the influence of a controlled substance. He also conducted a records check and found an active misdemeanor warrant. No evidence of what offense this warrant was for was presented at the suppression hearing. Sorrow placed Criswell under arrest for the warrant and for being under the influence of a controlled substance.
Sorrow then conducted what he described as an inventory search of Criswell’s truck. In the bed of the truck, he found a black suitcase. He unzipped the suitcase; there were some men’s clothes and, under those, a cardboard box. Sorrow opened the cardboard box and found a clear blue plastic box. Inside that box were two clear plastic baggies containing a substance Sorrow believed was methamphetamine. The box also contained a metal tube, inside which was a glass smoking pipe with some kind of residue inside it. Sorrow took custody of this evidence and the truck was towed and stored. At the time of the search, Criswell had been in handcuffs for about five to 10 minutes.
The People’s written opposition to the motion argued that the search was a valid inventory search. They did not, however, present any evidence on this point at the hearing other than Sorrow’s testimony that he considered it to be an inventory search. They did not, for instance, attempt to show that the search was “pursuant to standard police procedures” (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 372), or that the opening of the suitcase was done “‘according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity’” and was not “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence” (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4).
Defense counsel argued that the search was not a proper inventory search. The court did not disagree with defense counsel’s view on that issue, but said the search was valid in spite of this because it was supported by probable cause. The court apparently believed that any time an occupant of a vehicle is arrested for being under the influence, probable cause exists to search the vehicle:
“Is that-I think it’s clearly a state of the law, at least as I understand it, if a person is in a vehicle and under the influence, that the officer would have probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband.”
The court also stated that it had to determine for itself whether the search was valid and on what basis, regardless of the basis relied on by the People or the officer. It denied the motion.
The court then accepted Criswell’s change of plea from not guilty to no contest on the charges of being under the influence and in possession of a controlled substance. The charge of possessing drug paraphernalia was dismissed. The court suspended imposition of sentence and admitted Criswell to probation pursuant to Proposition 36.
DISCUSSION
A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. (United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 717.) Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of a vehicle is valid if the searching officer has probable cause to believe contraband or other evidence of an offense will be found in it. (Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 149; United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 799 (Ross).) The “scope of the warrantless search authorized by [the automobile] exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search” (Ross, supra, at p. 825), including “all containers” (id. at p. 822).
At the same time, the scope of the search “is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” For instance, “probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase, ” and “[p]robable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” (Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 824.) Probable cause exists if the facts known to the officers would justify issuance of a warrant. (Id. at p. 809.) The facts justify issuance of a warrant if “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.) On appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the court’s express or implied factual findings under the substantial evidence standard; we review de novo the court’s application of the law to the facts. (People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123.)
Criswell argues that the evidence did not support a finding of probable cause. We disagree. Preliminarily, we express no opinion on the trial court’s statement that probable cause to search a vehicle exists whenever there is probable cause to arrest an occupant of the vehicle for being under the influence. What is the degree of likelihood that, for example, a drunk driver arrested as he pulls away from a bar has brought an open container with him and concealed it somewhere out of plain view? Still, we agree with the court’s conclusion that there was a fair probability that Criswell had drugs somewhere in his truck. The symptoms Deputy Sorrow observed were symptoms of methamphetamine intoxication. As Sorrow knew, Criswell had just driven from Fresno to Bakersfield and was on his way to his brother’s house. It was not mere speculation to conclude that a methamphetamine user would take drugs with him on such a trip. The facts constituted probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including closed containers, for contraband. The court’s implied finding of these facts was supported by substantial evidence.
People v. Low (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 89 supports our conclusion. Police observed Low drive up to a telephone booth and saw a person lean into the car and Low’s arm move toward the person. They followed Low when he drove away and stopped him after observing him exceeding the speed limit and failing to keep to his side of the road. When Low got out, he staggered, his speech was slurred, his pupils were “pinpointed” and did not react to sunlight, and he had needle marks on one arm. The Court of Appeal concluded that these facts constituted probable cause both to arrest Low and search his car for contraband. It upheld his conviction, rejecting his argument that the methamphetamine the police found in the car should have been suppressed. (Id. at pp. 90-92.) We believe Low was decided correctly and is analogous to this case.
Wimberly v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 557 is a case that cuts against our position. After stopping Wimberly’s car for speeding and weaving, police saw a pipe and marijuana seeds on the floor and smelled burned marijuana when the door was opened. They searched the car and found several pounds of marijuana in the trunk. (Id. at p. 562.) Our Supreme Court held that, although there was probable cause to search the passenger compartment (id. at pp. 564, 566), the proper scope of the search excluded the trunk (id. at pp. 571-572). This was because the facts known to the officers before they opened the trunk indicated “only that the petitioners were casual users of marijuana” (id. at p. 572), and there were no “specific articulable facts which [gave] reasonable cause to believe that seizable items [were], in fact, concealed in the trunk” (id. at p. 568). We reached a similar conclusion based on similar facts in People v. Gregg (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 137 (Gregg). Wimberly and Gregg, however, predate Ross, supra, 456 U.S. 798. In Ross, the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause to search a vehicle covers the entire vehicle, including containers, unless the specific facts limit the search, as when the object sought is larger than the container searched. Since California’s exclusionary rule is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830), we agree with the conclusion in People v. Dey (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1322, that Wimberly and Gregg lack “continued vitality” and that Ross controls.
Criswell also argues that the trial court should not have upheld the search based on the existence of probable cause because the People did not argue that there was probable cause. In support of this contention, Criswell cites the rule that, after a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the search was conducted without a warrant, the prosecution has the burden of proving a justification for a warrantless search. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136.) The People here did prove the necessary facts. The court did not shift the burden of proof by supplying the legal theory that fit those facts.
There is no authority for the proposition that a court must grant a suppression motion where facts justifying the search have been proven but the People have failed to state a legal theory under which the search is valid. Criswell had an opportunity to address the probable cause theory at the hearing when the trial court expressed the view that probable cause was present; he does not claim the court’s application of that theory after the People failed to brief it denied him due process. In any event, our review on appeal is confined to the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons it gave for its ruling. (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156; People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 27.) Consequently, it makes no difference that the reason the court relied on was different from the reason for which the People argued.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Hill, J., Poochigian, J.