Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWF022980, Dennis A. McConaghy, Judge.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Makayla Crawford-Halsell was charged with four counts of felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a), counts 1-4). She initially pled not guilty. Subsequently, the prosecution amended the complaint to add three additional victims to count 1. Then, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 1. The other counts were dismissed. The trial court suspended the proceedings and granted defendant four years of probation. Defendant subsequently violated her probation numerous times before the court imposed the low term of two years in state prison and ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea,” and appealing the validity of the plea. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant admitted to the factual basis when she pled guilty. The following facts are taken from the probation report: On September 12, 2007, a sheriff and a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker responded to defendant’s residence. Defendant had four children, ages 3, 6, 7, and 11 (the children), and she had a history of CPS referrals regarding child endangerment. The sheriff arrived and found the children unsupervised. The kitchen was filthy; there was a steak knife on the table; the hallway was filled with clothes; there was an open bottle of bleach on top of the clothes, and the bathtub was found three-quarters full of water. The knife and the bathtub were easily accessible to the children.
On September 20, 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to felony child endangerment (count 1). Prior to accepting the plea, the court thoroughly questioned defendant. It found that she understood the nature of the charges against her, the consequences of her plea, and that her plea was made knowingly, freely, and intelligently. The court then suspended the proceedings and placed defendant on probation for four years under certain conditions, and ordered her to serve 90 days in the county jail work release program. Defendant confirmed that she understood and accepted the probation terms, which included the requirements that she perform 20 hours of community service and complete a child batterers class by November 20, 2008.
At a probation violation hearing on December 21, 2007, defendant waived a formal hearing and admitted violating probation as alleged, particularly that she had failed to appear for the work release program or to complete her community service hours. The court found her in violation and reinstated probation on the original terms and conditions, including 90 days in the county work release program with 18 days of credit, to be completed on weekends. The court instructed her to report to the work release program on February 1, 2008, and to complete her community service hours by April 24, 2008. The court also warned her that she would mostly likely be sent to prison after another probation violation.
On February 6, 2008, the work release program reported to the court that defendant had failed to appear on the required commencement date. On March 31, the Alternative Sentencing Program reported that defendant failed to register with it, failed to perform the required community service, and failed to enroll in a child batterers program. At a probation violation hearing on May 9, defendant admitted violating her probation as alleged. The court ordered defendant to serve an additional 30 days in the work release program on weekends, beginning on June 30, and to enroll in the child batterers class by June 9.
Subsequently, defendant missed weekends in the work release program and failed to enroll in or complete the child batterers program. Defendant asked for reinstatement, which the court granted on August 4, 2008.
On September 12, 2008, the work release program reported that defendant had been given a total of four extensions to commence the program but failed to do so. On September 29, defendant admitted that she had violated probation by failing to complete the work release program. The court sentenced defendant to the low term of two years in state prison but suspended the imposition of the sentence on the condition that she accept the original terms of probation plus an additional 90 days in the work release program. Defendant accepted the modification.
On October 7, 2008, the probation department alleged that defendant had violated numerous conditions, including obeying all laws and reporting any law contacts to the probation officer. It was alleged that defendant had failed to notify the probation department of her arrest and subsequent conviction in January 2008 of disorderly conduct/prostitution (§ 647, subd. (b)). In addition, on October 8, the Alternative Sentencing Program alleged that defendant failed to enroll in or complete the child batterers program. On October 20, defendant admitted the violation of probation. The court continued defendant on probation.
On December 9, 2008, the probation department alleged that defendant had still failed to enroll in the child batterers program. On January 16, 2009, defendant failed to appear in court. The court revoked probation and issued a bench warrant. Defendant appeared in court on January 30, 2009, and admitted the violation of probation.
On March 5, 2009, the prosecution requested the court to impose the low term. Defense counsel pointed out there was a mistake on the alternative sentencing program referral form. He claimed that it showed an enrollment date of November 21, 2006, which predated defendant’s original offense. The court replied that it believed the form was from an earlier referral. Defense counsel argued that defendant relied on the date on that form. He then asked that defendant be allowed to withdraw the admission of violation and be reinstated on probation. The court denied reinstatement and ordered execution of the previously imposed two-year prison term. The court imposed a $200 parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45, a $200 restitution fine, a $200 security fee, and a $110 booking fee, pursuant to Government Code section 29550.
DISCUSSION
Dependant appealed, and upon her request, this court appointed counsel to represent her. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case and three potential arguable issues, including: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing unreasonable probation conditions; 2) whether the court erred on March 5, 2009, by declining to reinstate defendant’s probation and ordering the execution of the previously imposed prison term; and 3) whether the court ordered unauthorized fines, penalties, or assessments. Counsel has also requested this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which she has done. She submitted a handwritten letter arguing that her two-year prison term was unfair due to a mistake of the court. She states that she was given a reinstatement of her probation on October 22, 2008, and was given one month to register for a child batterers program. She then claims that her paperwork was “mis dated” for November 2006. She asserts: “There was no way I’d be allowed to register for that program because it seemed like I was supposed to register almost 3 years ago!” Defendant alleges that, when she brought the mistake to the court’s attention, she was told that she had “forged the paper work forcing me to take a plea of not guilty against my will on false pretense[s] presented by the Riverside County District Attorney.” Defendant states that she wants her case refiled.
We reject defendant’s argument. “‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Here, defendant fails to make any legal argument or cite to any authority in support of her claims. Moreover, she fails to cite to any page of the record to support her contentions. Thus, her claims are waived. We note there is a copy of a referral form attached to defendant’s probation report. The report has a line that says “Enroll by 11/21/06” and “Complete by 12/21/09.” However, nothing else is filled in on the referral form (i.e., the name of a defendant, a case number, the program required, etc.) It is unclear what this referral form was for. The probation report has another referral form attached to it that was filed with the court on November 25, 2008. This referral form states defendant’s name and case number, and specifies that she was to enroll in a “52 wk. C.B.” program by November 21, 2008, and complete it by December 21, 2009. This form reflects that the court date was put on defendant’s referral form. In any event, none of defendant’s contentions changes the fact that she violated her probation numerous times. She has been afforded more than enough second chances and has wasted them by consistently failing to comply with the terms of her probation.
We have now concluded our independent review of the record and found no arguable issues. We do note, however, that on March 5, 2009, the court orally pronounced there was “a restitution fine of $200 and a court-security fee in the amount of $200.” The abstract of judgment and the court minutes specify that the restitution fine was imposed pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and that the amount of the court security fee was $20, under section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). To the extent there was any confusion as to the amount of the court security fee, section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), does limit the fee to $20.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., MCKINSTER J.