Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. EE705751
Premo, Acting P.J.
In the court below, defendant Quincy Crandle unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence. Thereafter, he pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana while driving. On appeal, defendant asks this court to examine the sealed reporter’s transcript of a Pitchess hearing and the documents reviewed by the trial court and determine whether the court properly exercised its discretion. The People do not object to such appellate review. We affirm the judgment.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (in camera review of peace officer personnel records for relevance).
BACKGROUND
Defendant drove his vehicle through a parking lot at 25 miles per hour and then on a street at 50 miles per hour where the speed limit was 30 miles per hour. Sunnyvale Police Officer Jose Marines stopped him for speeding. He smelled marijuana coming from inside defendant’s vehicle. He asked defendant to exit the vehicle. Police Officer Jesse Curiel responded to assist Officer Marines. Defendant exited the vehicle and consented to a search of the vehicle. When Officer Marines began to search the trunk, defendant ran away. Officer Curiel and then Officer Marines pursued him. At some later point, Officer Whitaker searched the trunk and found the incriminating evidence.
DISCUSSION
“[O]n a showing of good cause, a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the confidential personnel records of a peace officer accused of misconduct against the defendant. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).) Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both ‘ “materiality” to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84.) A showing of good cause is measured by ‘relatively relaxed standards’ that serve to ‘insure the production’ for trial court review of ‘all potentially relevant documents.’ (Ibid.) If the defendant establishes good cause, the court must review the requested records in camera to determine what information, if any, should be disclosed. (Chambers v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 673, 679.) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations (see Evid. Code, § 1045, subds. (b)-(e)), ‘the trial court should then disclose to the defendant “such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” ’ (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226, quoting Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (a); see also Warrick v. Superior Court [(2005)]35 Cal.4th [1011, ] 1019.)” (People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179.)
Before filing his motion to suppress, defendant filed a Pitchess motion. In support of the motion, defendant’s counsel stated that he believed that “the officers made material misstatements with respect to their observations, including fabricating defendant’s alleged acts of driving faster then [sic] the posted speed limit and giving consent to search his vehicle. Defendant asserts that he was not driving in a manner that was a vehicle code violation. Rather, Defendant was stopped because he is African-American and he was driving his vehicle after midnight in Sunnyvale. Moreover, defendant asserts Officers Marines [and] Curiel made material misstatements with respect to [defendant] consenting to a search of his trunk.” Defendant sought the personnel records of Officers Marines, Curiel, and Whitaker.
The trial court determined in camera that a showing of good cause for discovery had been made regarding Officers Marines and Curiel pertaining to racial profiling, racial prejudice, planting of evidence or false or misleading reports. The City of Sunnyvale produced the officers’ records at the in camera hearing. The trial court examined the records and declined to release them to defendant. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74.)
The trial court noted that defendant had shown no justification to examine the records of Officer Whitaker. We find no abuse of discretion in the ruling. (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311.) “[T]his court in City of San Jose [v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135] found that the defendant had failed to make the requisite good cause showing. The defendant merely made conclusory statements asserting officer misconduct (‘ “voluntary consent to enter was not in fact obtained by the officers” ’) without providing a specific factual scenario for the alleged misconduct (‘the specifics of the allegedly improper police conduct’). [Citation.] We concluded that absent a specific factual scenario, ‘the trial court could not determine whether “the discovery or disclosure sought” was material to “the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” ’ ” (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020-1021.) Here, defendant made no statements asserting misconduct by Officer Whitaker. The factual scenario involved fabricating a traffic stop and lying about a consent to search. Officer Whitaker was not involved in the traffic stop or consent inquiry.
In People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1216, the court described the proper procedures to be followed by the trial court when, as in this case, the trial court concludes that good cause exists for the trial court to review an officer’s personnel file in response to a Pitchess motion: “When a trial court concludes a defendant’s Pitchess motion shows good cause for discovery of relevant evidence contained in a law enforcement officer’s personnel files, the custodian of the records is obligated to bring to the trial court all ‘potentially relevant’ documents to permit the trial court to examine them for itself. [Citation.] A law enforcement officer’s personnel record will commonly contain many documents that would, in the normal case, be irrelevant to a Pitchess motion, including those describing marital status and identifying family members, employment applications, letters of recommendation, promotion records, and health records. (See Pen. Code, § 832.8.) Documents clearly irrelevant to a defendant’s Pitchess request need not be presented to the trial court for in camera review. But if the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court. Such practice is consistent with the premise of Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 that the locus of decisionmaking is to be the trial court, not the prosecution or the custodian of records. The custodian should be prepared to state in chambers and for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not presented to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those were deemed irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant’s Pitchess motion. A court reporter should be present to document the custodian’s statements, as well as any questions the trial court may wish to ask the custodian regarding the completeness of the record.” (Id. at pp. 1228-1229.) The sealed reporter’s transcript shows that these procedures were followed in the instant case.
A reviewing court “routinely independently examines the sealed records of such in camera hearings to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s motion for disclosure of police personnel records.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 [“A trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.”].)
Defendant requests that we conduct an independent review of the personnel records of the officers to determine if the trial court’s discovery order was proper, and the People have no objection. Because we could not initially determine the specific documents reviewed during the in camera hearing, we ordered augmentation of the record for the purpose of creating a record from which this court could determine whether the documents reviewed by the trial court are discoverable. (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1231.)
We independently reviewed the sealed specific documents reviewed during the in camera hearing, sealed reporter’s transcript of the in camera hearing, and a sealed reporter’s transcript of an in camera hearing held pursuant to our order to augment the record. As reflected in the sealed transcript, the trial court’s findings are sufficient to permit appellate review. Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to make any disclosures.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Elia, J., Lucas, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.