Opinion
2002-08370, 2002-08373.
Decided February 17, 2004.
Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Firetog, J.), both rendered June 4, 2002, convicting him of robbery in the third degree (two counts; one each under Indictment Numbers 2854/01 and 6001/01), upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Linda Breen of counsel; Renee Anderson on the brief), for respondent.
Before: A. GAIL PRUDENTI, P.J., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO and BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.
We do not agree with the People that the defendant waived his right to appellate review, either with regard to his claim that his sentences were excessive, or with regard to his claim as to the Supreme Court's failure to consider, or to grant, youthful offender treatment ( see People v. Boustani, 300 A.D.2d 313; cf. People v. Kemp, 94 N.Y.2d 831).
The ambiguous remarks made by defense counsel shortly after the Supreme Court pronounced sentence did not constitute a request for youthful offender treatment ( see CPL 720.10), much less a timely one. The defendant's failure to make such a request in the Supreme Court precludes him from arguing on appeal that it was error as a matter of law for that court to have failed to consider whether youthful offender treatment would have been appropriate under all the circumstances ( see People v. McGowen, 42 N.Y.2d 905; People v. Howard, 1 A.D.3d 718; People v. Walrath, 285 A.D.2d 674; People v. Pagano, 253 A.D.2d 500; People v. Cunningham, 238 A.D.2d 350; People v. Wimbush, 234 A.D.2d 574). In any event, youthful offender treatment was not warranted under all the circumstances presented in this case ( cf. People v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, affd 67 N.Y.2d 625).
The sentences imposed were not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
PRUDENTI, P.J., GOLDSTEIN, LUCIANO and COZIER, JJ., concur.