Opinion
2015-04-01
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Marcus COTTON, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (De Nice Powell of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Rhea A. Grob, Arieh Schulman, and Solomon Neubort of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (De Nice Powell of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Rhea A. Grob, Arieh Schulman, and Solomon Neubort of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SHERI S. ROMAN, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Firetog, J.), rendered April 18, 2011, convicting him of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
CPL 310.30 requires that trial courts give notice to the People and the defense before responding to a note from a deliberating jury ( see People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d 294, 298, 998 N.Y.S.2d 154, 22 N.E.3d 1022; People v. Walston, 23 N.Y.3d 986, 988–989, 991 N.Y.S.2d 24, 14 N.E.3d 377; People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 276, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189). A court's “ ‘core responsibility under the statute is both to give meaningful notice to counsel of the specific content of the jurors' request—in order to ensure counsel's opportunity to frame intelligent suggestions for the fairest and least prejudicial response—and to provide a meaningful response to the jury’ ” ( People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d at 298–299, 998 N.Y.S.2d 154, 22 N.E.3d 1022, quoting People v. Kisoon, 8 N.Y.3d 129, 134, 831 N.Y.S.2d 738, 863 N.E.2d 990). Meaningful notice means notice of the “actual specific content of the jurors' request” (People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d at 277, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189; see People v. Walston, 23 N.Y.3d at 989, 991 N.Y.S.2d 24, 14 N.E.3d 377), and “a court must read a jury note ‘verbatim’ so that the parties have ‘the opportunity to accurately analyze the jury's deliberations and frame intelligent suggestions for the court's response’ ” (People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d at 299, 998 N.Y.S.2d 154, 22 N.E.3d 1022, quoting People v. Kisoon, 8 N.Y.3d at 135, 831 N.Y.S.2d 738, 863 N.E.2d 990).
“Although not every violation of CPL 310.30 is immune from normal preservation principles, a failure to apprise counsel about the specific contents of a substantive note from a deliberating jury violates the fundamental tenants of CPL 310.30 and qualifies as a mode of proceedings error,” which does not require preservation(People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d at 299–300, 998 N.Y.S.2d 154, 22 N.E.3d 1022 [citation omitted] ).
Here, the trial court's failure to share the entire contents of a substantive note from the jury constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal ( see People v. Walston, 23 N.Y.3d at 990, 991 N.Y.S.2d 24, 14 N.E.3d 377; see also People v. Morris, 120 A.D.3d 835, 991 N.Y.S.2d 454; People v. Sydoriak, 120 A.D.3d 840, 991 N.Y.S.2d 478).
While defense counsel's failure to review a surveillance video in its entirety is troublesome, in light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief.