Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment (order of dismissal) of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VA101214, Yvonne T. Sanchez, Judge.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran and Jennifer C. McDonald, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Lizandro Salas and Graciela Martinez, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Respondent.
WILLHITE, J.
INTRODUCTION
By information, the People charged defendant Adrian Contreras with one count of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) and dismissed the case (§ 1385). The People appeal, contending the search was lawful because defendant was on parole, a fact that law enforcement knew before conducting the search. We agree and therefore reverse.
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on June 10, 2007, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Marc Boisvert was on uniformed patrol with his partner Deputy Velos. They saw defendant walking down the street at the corner of 59th Place and Hoover. Deputy Boisvert observed defendant make “eye contact” with them and then drop a baggie containing marijuana to the ground. The officers detained defendant pending a narcotics investigation. In response to questions from the deputies, defendant told them he had recently been released from prison and was on parole. Deputy Boisvert used his mobile digital terminal to confirm defendant’s parole status.
Defendant pointed his house out to the deputies. It is in the 1200 block of 59th Place, approximately two to three houses from where the deputies detained him. The deputies went to the residence to conduct a parole compliance search. Defendant’s mother opened the door. Deputy Velos spoke to her in Spanish following which she signed a Spanish language document. The deputies entered the residence. She pointed out a room to them. They entered the room. Defendant’s mother then pointed out a dresser. Deputy Velos searched the dresser. In it, he found men’s clothing, identification from the Department of Corrections in defendant’s name, and a “large Baggie containing 53 Baggies” of marijuana. The deputies arrested defendant for possession of marijuana with intent to sell.
Deputy Velos did not testify at the suppression motion.
The prosecutor urged that the warrantless search at defendant’s home was lawful because of defendant’s parole status known to the deputies prior to the search. The trial court disagreed. It explained: “I think that [initial] stop [of defendant] is fine. . . . [¶] I think that part is reasonable and fine. I don’t know how you get in his house. . . . [¶] I have heard nothing to suggest – that would give rise to reasonable suspicion to suggest that criminal activity is afoot at the defendant’s house, and without reasonable suspicion, going to the house is arbitrary and capricious and I grant the motion to suppress all items that were confiscated at the house.” After the prosecutor stated she was unable to proceed, the defense moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion. This People’s appeal follows. (§ 1238, subd. (a)(7).)
DISCUSSION
Section 3067, subdivision (a) provides that all parolees from state prison are subject to “search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” This statutory provision is constitutional. (Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843.) It gives law enforcement the authority to search the parolee, his residence and any property under his control. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2511, subd. (b)(4) [setting forth the contents of the notice of parole given to each parolee].) As long as the officer knows that the defendant is on parole and subject to a search condition, the search is reasonable and does not violate any expectation of privacy, even in the absence of a particularized suspicion of criminal activity. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 333.) “A suspicionless parole search is constitutionally permissible because the parolee lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy and the state has a substantial interest in supervising parolees and reducing recidivism.” (People v. Hunter (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1152.) However, “‘a parole search could become constitutionally “unreasonable” if made too often, or at an unreasonable hour, of if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer.’” (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753-754.) “[A] search is arbitrary and capricious when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee.” (Id. at p. 754.)
Here, the deputies stopped defendant after seeing him discard a baggie of marijuana. They determined that he was on parole and subject to a search condition. Defendant directed them to his house. Defendant’s mother permitted them to enter the residence. She directed them first to a room and then to a dresser. In the dresser (the only area searched by the deputies), they found identification in defendant’s name and drugs. The search was conducted shortly after 7:00 p.m. and there is no evidence it was prolonged or unduly invasive. This search was proper.
Contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, the deputies did not have to have reasonable suspicion that there would be (additional) drugs in the home. Further, there was no evidence that the search was arbitrary or capricious or carried out to harass. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the record is that the search was carried out for a legitimate law enforcement purpose: to determine if defendant, who discarded marijuana upon seeing the deputies, was in further possession of controlled substances. In sum, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant’s brief concedes that the trial court applied an incorrect standard.
Defendant’s contrary arguments are not persuasive. First, he claims that the search became “constitutionally impermissible when it expanded to the search of [his] mother’s home, given the lack of evidence to establish that [he] actually resided there.” The record refutes this claim. Deputy Boisvert testified that defendant “pointed out to us where his house was” (a residence only two or three homes from where defendant was detained) and that was the house he and his partner entered and searched. Next, defendant urges that the search was constitutionally impermissible because the prosecution “failed to introduce any reliable evidence to establish . . . that any criminal activity was afoot at the home of [his mother].” As explained earlier, there is no requirement that the deputies entertain a reasonable suspicion that there would be drugs in the house. Because defendant identified the home as his residence, the deputies could rely on the parole search condition. (See People v. Middleton (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732 [warrantless search of motel room proper because the police first determined that the room was occupied by an individual on the active parolee list].) Further, to the extent that defendant suggests that the deputies’ actions were improper because they invaded his mother’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it is well-settled that a defendant cannot invoke the privacy rights of a third party in urging a search was unreasonable as to him. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order of dismissal pursuant to § 1385) is reversed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., MANELLA, J.