Opinion
March 14, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Leahy, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by providing that the term of imprisonment imposed for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree shall be served concurrently with each of the terms of imprisonment imposed for the intentional murder convictions; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, we do not find that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in ruling, with respect to the defendant's Sandoval application (see, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371), that the defendant could be cross-examined concerning three prior robbery convictions and a weapons possession conviction (see, People v. Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142, 146-148; see also, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292; People v. Barbosa, 176 A.D.2d 139, 140).
Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the defendant was afforded meaningful representation of counsel (see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147).
With respect to the defendant's claim, with which the People concur, that his sentence should be modified to the extent that the term of imprisonment imposed upon his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree be made to run concurrently with the intentional murder sentences, we find that modification is appropriate under the facts of this case because these offenses arose out of the same transaction (see, People v Ellis, 139 A.D.2d 662, 662-663).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J.P., Joy, Hart and Friedmann, JJ., concur.