Opinion
2013-05-3
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Roosevelt COLLINS, Defendant–Appellant.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27[1][a] [vii]; [b] ), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress statements he made at a police station. Specifically, defendant contends that the statements should have been suppressed because he was de facto arrested without probable cause and because the statements were coerced based, inter alia, on the length of the interrogation. We reject those contentions.
We agree with defendant that the actions of the officers at the time they took him into custody amounted to an arrest ( see People v. Leon, 23 A.D.3d 1110, 1111–1112, 804 N.Y.S.2d 220,lv. denied6 N.Y.3d 755, 810 N.Y.S.2d 423, 843 N.E.2d 1163;see generally People v. Brnja, 50 N.Y.2d 366, 372, 429 N.Y.S.2d 173, 406 N.E.2d 1066). Contrary to defendant's further contention, however, the police had “ ‘information to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been ... committed’ by” defendant ( People v. Shulman, 6 N.Y.3d 1, 25, 809 N.Y.S.2d 485, 843 N.E.2d 125,cert. denied547 U.S. 1043, 126 S.Ct. 1623, 164 L.Ed.2d 339, quoting People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451), and thus had probable cause to arrest him.
With respect to defendant's contention that his statements were coerced, we note at the outset that, although this Court recently affirmed a judgment of conviction resulting from a 49–hour police interrogationon the ground that there was a pronounced break in the interrogation that dissipated any taint, we nevertheless wrote that “the length of the interrogation was unparalleled and should in no way be condoned” ( People v. Guilford, 96 A.D.3d 1375, 1376–1377, 945 N.Y.S.2d 825). Here, although the length of the interrogation exceeded 60 hours, the suppression court properly suppressed as involuntary all of the statements defendant made after he had been in custody for 15 hours. Contrary to defendant's contention, however, his statements made during the first 15 hours of interrogation were not involuntary due to police coercion. “To determine voluntariness, courts review all of the surrounding circumstances to see whether the defendant's will has been overborne” ( People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 413, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828), and that 15–hour length of time does not by itself render the statements involuntary ( see People v. McWilliams, 48 A.D.3d 1266, 1267, 852 N.Y.S.2d 523,lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 961, 863 N.Y.S.2d 145, 893 N.E.2d 451;People v. Weeks, 15 A.D.3d 845, 847, 789 N.Y.S.2d 373,lv. denied4 N.Y.3d 892, 798 N.Y.S.2d 737, 831 N.E.2d 982;People v. Whorley, 286 A.D.2d 858, 858–859, 730 N.Y.S.2d 595,lv. denied97 N.Y.2d 689, 738 N.Y.S.2d 305, 764 N.E.2d 409;see generally People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 12–13, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188). In view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements made during the 15–hour period, e.g., that defendant was given short breaks, food, drinks, cigarettes and bathroom breaks during that period of interrogation, we conclude that those statements were not rendered involuntary by reason of any alleged coercion by the police ( see People v. Kirk, 96 A.D.3d 1354, 1357, 945 N.Y.S.2d 818,lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 1012, 960 N.Y.S.2d 355, 984 N.E.2d 330;People v. Ellis, 73 A.D.3d 1433, 1434, 903 N.Y.S.2d 615,lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 851, 909 N.Y.S.2d 28, 935 N.E.2d 820;People v. Sylvester, 15 A.D.3d 934, 935, 788 N.Y.S.2d 786,lv. denied4 N.Y.3d 836, 796 N.Y.S.2d 591, 829 N.E.2d 684).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Defendant's guilt “was established by a compelling chain of circumstantial evidence” establishing all of the elements of the crimes of which he was convicted ( People v. Brown, 92 A.D.3d 1216, 1217, 937 N.Y.S.2d 803,lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 992, 945 N.Y.S.2d 647, 968 N.E.2d 1003).
Defendant further contends that the court abused its discretion in refusing to sanction the People for their untimely disclosure of a videotape. Contrary to the People's contention, the record establishes that this issue is preserved for our review; the court “was aware of, and expressly decided, the [issue] raised on appeal” ( People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 493, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946). Defendant failed to establish, however, that he was surprised or prejudiced by the late disclosure, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that no sanction was warranted ( see generally People v. Jenkins, 98 N.Y.2d 280, 284, 746 N.Y.S.2d 651, 774 N.E.2d 716;People v. Jacobson, 60 A.D.3d 1326, 1328, 876 N.Y.S.2d 259,lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 916, 884 N.Y.S.2d 697, 912 N.E.2d 1078).
We also reject defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion in refusing to impose a sanction for the “consumption,” during DNA testing, of hair found at the crime scene ( see generally People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516, 520–521, 478 N.Y.S.2d 834, 467 N.E.2d 498;People v. Scott, 235 A.D.2d 317, 653 N.Y.S.2d 309,lv. denied90 N.Y.2d 943, 664 N.Y.S.2d 761, 687 N.E.2d 658). In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, the “failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law” ( Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281,reh. denied488 U.S. 1051, 109 S.Ct. 885, 102 L.Ed.2d 1007;see People v. Winchell, 250 A.D.2d 942, 943, 673 N.Y.S.2d 474,lv. denied92 N.Y.2d 931, 680 N.Y.S.2d 473, 703 N.E.2d 285;People v. Callendar, 207 A.D.2d 900, 900–901, 616 N.Y.S.2d 667,lv. denied84 N.Y.2d 1029, 623 N.Y.S.2d 185, 647 N.E.2d 457). Here, the People established that the samples were necessarily destroyed as part of routine testing procedures, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a sanction.
Finally, we conclude that the sentence of life without parole for the murder conviction is not unduly harsh or severe ( see People v. Ojo, 43 A.D.3d 1367, 1368, 842 N.Y.S.2d 648,lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 769, 854 N.Y.S.2d 331, 883 N.E.2d 1266,reconsideration denied11 N.Y.3d 792, 866 N.Y.S.2d 618, 896 N.E.2d 104;cf. People v. Owens, 78 A.D.3d 1509, 911 N.Y.S.2d 525,lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 834, 921 N.Y.S.2d 198, 946 N.E.2d 186).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.