( People v. Pugh (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 226, 234 [ 289 P.2d 826], app. dism. 352 U.S. 885 [1 L.Ed.2d 83, 77 S.Ct. 141].) Indeed, since a corporation acts only through agents, a theft by false pretenses from a corporation could only be committed as described by the rule just quoted (e.g., People v. Coggan (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 42, 44 [ 317 P.2d 67]). The false pretense may be made through an agent who is clearly authorized by the principal to make it ( People v. Green (1913) 22 Cal.App. 45, 50 [ 133 P. 334], criticized on other grounds in Ashley, supra, 42 Cal.2d 246, 262; People v. Moore (1927) 82 Cal.App. 739, 747-748 [ 256 P. 266]; People v. Robinson (1930) 107 Cal.App. 211, 227-228 [ 290 P. 470]).(34) Here, there is a false written token.

These contentions, which are certainly worthy of consideration, need to be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. (People v. Coggan (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 42, 44 [it is not the function of reviewing court to weigh the evidence].) That the Legislature has "prescribe[d] a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level" (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 813) is reason enough to require the trial court in the first instance to adjudicate the motion under the correct standard.