Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Marin County Super. Ct. No. SC136018A.
SIMONS, J.
Michael Ray Coffman appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea. Counsel has advised us that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues, and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant has filed a supplemental statement asserting: (1) he was coerced into entering a guilty plea; and (2) he should be “deported in lieu of serving time in prison” because he is an Israeli citizen. We find no arguable issues and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts in this section are derived from the probation report and the transcript from the preliminary hearing.
Appellant and the victim, Johnathan Leonsky, were acquaintances. Appellant had been romantically involved with Joanie Chase in the past, but that relationship had ended, and Chase was engaged to Leonsky. Witnesses testified at the preliminary hearing that appellant was hurt and upset that Chase was dating Leonsky. According to one witness, appellant said Leonsky was “no good” for Chase, and he was not going to allow Chase to “mess up her life” by marrying Leonsky. Another witness testified that appellant was angry when he found out that Leonsky had given Chase an engagement ring and repeatedly said, “I’ll kill him,” as he slammed his fist into his other hand.
On the day of the incident, appellant received a telephone call from Leonsky and invited Leonsky to his apartment. According to witnesses, appellant was upset after ending his telephone conversation with Leonsky and broke the telephone by hitting it with his fist. Appellant then placed a knife on the table and said, “I’m ready.” Leonsky arrived at appellant’s apartment with Chase and urged her to show appellant the ring he had given to her. Appellant told Leonsky he did not approve of Leonsky and Chase’s relationship, and a heated argument ensued. Both men armed themselves with knives, and appellant stabbed Leonsky approximately 10 times in the chest and side.
When the police arrived at the scene, they found Leonsky bleeding and holding a knife. Leonsky told the police he was stabbed by appellant, who was upset that Leonsky had asked Chase to marry him. Leonsky later died from coronary vascular disease and high blood pressure, and the stab wounds were a contributing factor in his death. According to appellant, Leonsky grabbed a knife and tried to kill him, and he had no choice but to retaliate in self defense.
Procedural Background
On June 29, 2005, the Marin County District Attorney filed an information charging appellant with one count of murder, a related personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement, and five serious felony priors alleged as both serious felony and strike priors. On June 23, 2006, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, a first amended information was filed, amending the murder charge to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. The amended information also charged appellant with a personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement, five serious felony priors, and one strike prior. Both the information and the amended information contained probation ineligibility allegations.
Appellant filed a written guilty plea and waiver of rights form and a written waiver of his right to trial on aggravating factors. Prior to accepting appellant’s plea, the court explained to appellant the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. The court also explained to appellant the consequences of his plea. Appellant entered a guilty plea to the voluntary manslaughter charge of the amended information, and admitted the personal use of a weapon, serious felony and strike enhancements, as well as three of the probation ineligibility allegations. Judgment of conviction was entered based upon the guilty plea, and the trial court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 18 years.
DISCUSSION
Appellant asserts his attorneys coerced him into entering a guilty plea by telling him he was guilty, and that the deputy district attorney told him he would send appellant’s friend to jail or prison unless appellant pled guilty to murder or voluntary manslaughter. Penal Code section 1237.5 provides that “[n]o appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty . . . except where both of the following are met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” Appellant did not file a written statement with the trial court, and has received no certificate of probable cause. Therefore, he may not raise this issue on appeal. In addition, the allegation would require information outside the record, including discussions he may have had with his attorneys or the deputy district attorney, and is thus beyond the scope of this appeal.
In any event, a defendant who wishes to withdraw a guilty plea must make a motion to do so under Penal Code section 1018 and then establish good cause to withdraw the plea by clear and convincing evidence. (See People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1617.) No such motion was made here. We note that during the change of plea hearing, appellant stated, “I’ve been forced a little bit by Deputy Swafford, coerced by Deputy Swafford . . . to plead out . . . .” The court stated it cannot accept a guilty plea from him if he is being pressured to do so, and appellant responded, “I’m agreeing to, not because of a deputy or anybody else, I’m doing this because I want to, because I have no choice in the matter, not because of the deputy.” Appellant later reiterated, “I’m doing this freely because it’s the right thing to do.” The court asked, “All right. And you’re not doing it because . . . anybody, including deputies in the jail, have pressured you into doing this; is that right?” Appellant responded, “Correct.” The record shows that during the discussion regarding whether he was coerced to plead guilty, appellant never mentioned any coercion on the part of his attorney or the district attorney.
Further, the record reflects appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. At the beginning of the plea hearing, the court set out its understanding of the plea agreement. Appellant stated he had initialed and signed the written waiver forms. He stated he understood what he was about to do, and that he understood the elements of the voluntary manslaughter charge. The court advised appellant that his maximum exposure, including the addition of the terms on the enhancements, was 28 years. Appellant stated he understood the maximum term and understood that he would be sentenced to prison in light of the strike allegation. The court informed appellant of the constitutional rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and appellant indicated he waived each of those rights.
Appellant also asserts he should immediately be “deported in lieu of serving time in prison” because he is an Israeli citizen. It is, however, within the exclusive power of the federal immigration authorities to determine whether, and when, appellant should be deported. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. [Immigration and Nationality Act]; De Canas v. BICA (1976) 424 U.S. 351, 354 [“[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power”].)
Appellant was adequately represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings and appeared at every hearing. There was a factual basis for the guilty plea. There was no sentencing error. There are no arguable issues requiring further briefing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P.J., NEEDHAM, J.