Opinion
August 3, 1959
Appeal (1) from a judgment of conviction rendered by the County Court, Queens County, August 30, 1955, and (2) from intermediate orders therein made denying appellant's motions (a) for a severance and for a separate trial, (b) to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. On June 9, 1955 appellant was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to defraud the City of New York (count 1), of presenting fraudulent claims to public officers for payment in violation of section 1872 of the Penal Law (counts 2 through 7), of obtaining the proceeds of such claims in violation of section 1864 of the Penal Law (counts 8 through 12), of attempting to obtain such proceeds (count 13), and of giving a bribe in violation of section 1822 of the Penal Law (count 23). The indictment contained 31 counts against appellant and others, and appellant was found guilty of all counts in which he was named. On August 30, 1955 appellant was sentenced to serve, in the New York City Penitentiary, 1 year on count 1, and to serve, in a State prison, 3 1/2 to 7 years on each of counts 2 through 7; 3 to 5 years on each of counts 8 through 12; 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years on count 13, and 5 to 10 years on count 23. The sentences were to be served concurrently, except the sentence of 5 to 10 years which was to be served consecutively. Judgment insofar as it convicts appellant of giving a bribe (count 23) reversed upon the law and the facts, and said count of the indictment dismissed. Judgment insofar as it convicts appellant on counts 1 through 13 affirmed. In our opinion, except for the crime of giving a bribe (count 23), the verdict of the jury is amply supported by the credible evidence. With respect to count 23, it is our opinion that the evidence is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt appellant's guilt of said crime. We have examined the numerous errors claimed to have been made throughout the trial and during the court's charge, and we conclude that none of them presents reversible error. Appellant contends that the sentences imposed were excessive. By reason of the dismissal of the bribery count the sentence of 5 to 10 years imposed for said count has been annulled. We do not deem excessive the sentences imposed for the other crimes. No separate appeal lies from the intermediate orders, which have been reviewed on the appeal form the judgment of conviction. Nolan, P.J., Murphy, Ughetta and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur; Beldock, J., concurs in the affirmance of the judgment insofar as it convicts appellant on counts 1 through 13, but dissents from the reversal of the judgment insofar as it convicts appellant on count 23 and from the dismissal of that count of the indictment, and votes to affirm the judgment insofar as it convicts appellant of that count, with the following memorandum: In my opinion the evidence is sufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to all the counts upon which the jury found him guilty.