Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo Super. Ct. No. F438582 San Luis Obispo County Michael L. Duffy, Judge
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Lee K. Clarke appeals a judgment recommitting him to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962.) We conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Clarke poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS
On October 6, 2009, Clarke filed a superior court petition to challenge a Board of Prison Terms (BPT) determination that he met the criteria for treatment as an MDO. (§ 2962.) The court appointed counsel for him. Clarke, through his attorney, waived a jury trial.
On October 15, 2009, Clarke appeared in court and requested permission to represent himself. During the hearing, he told the court, "I'm making known about treason." He began speaking quickly and the court told him to slow down so the court reporter could hear his words. Clarke told the trial judge, "Well, I can talk even slower if you would read the brief instead of doing additional treason." Clarke began to act irrationally. The court found that he had to be removed because he was causing "a commotion in the courtroom." Clarke told the judge, "I smell treason." The court found that he was unable to represent himself.
At trial, Clarke had to be removed from the courtroom after he became disruptive and flung "a large envelope" at the trial judge.
John F. Eibl, a psychologist, testified that Clarke suffers from a "post-traumatic stress disorder" and a "delusional disorder, persecutory type." He has "auditory hallucinations" and "mood disorders." He becomes "hypomanic" when he "talks about the Government conspiracy and of the legal system." He "believes that anyone who's part of law enforcement is part of a conspiracy." Eibl noted that Clarke was arrested after a traffic accident and he "kicked out the back window" of the patrol car. Clarke was convicted of resisting an officer with force or violence. (§ 69.) Eibl felt that commitment offense was related to "part of his delusional disorder."
Eibl said Clarke refers to himself as "Mr. Overt, United States private attorney general and special prosecutor." Clarke believes that "all the branches of government are impinging upon him." He refers to his treating doctors as "treasonous." Eibl said, "[W]hen I pass him he calls me 'treasonous.'" Clarke has not participated in treatment regarding his delusions.
The prosecutor asked whether "Clarke represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his delusional disorder." Eibl responded, "He does now. He has difficulty coping with people challenging him."
Clarke did not testify and he called no witnesses.
The trial court found "beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Clarke meets the criteria" to be recommitted as an MDO. Clarke was currently dangerous to police and people in authority because of his delusions about conspiracy and persecution. The court said that if confronted by "police or other authorities, " he "is going to react violently."
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence
Clarke contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We disagree.
In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences from the record to support the judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We do not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of the witnesses. (Ibid.)
An MDO commitment is authorized for a prisoner where "'by reason of his or her severe mental disorder the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others....'" (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 23; § 2962, subd. (d).) Whether the defendant meets that standard necessarily involves "a prediction of future dangerousness by mental health professionals." (Qawi, at p. 24.)
Here Clarke has not shown that there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding on dangerousness. Eibl testified that Clarke represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. As a qualified expert, his opinion on this issue constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24; People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 917.) Eibl also testified that Clarke has "a history of assaultiveness and violence" which is linked to his delusional disorder. Clarke's disorder is not in remission and he lacks insight or understanding about his delusions. He "has difficulty coping with people challenging him." Eibl said that because of his delusional thinking, Clarke would "feel justified in reacting violently to those in authority" if he felt they were part of a "conspiracy" against him. Clarke's commitment offense involved a crime against a police officer with the use force or violence. (§ 69; People v. Clarke (Apr. 27, 2010, B217233) [nonpub. opn.].) Eibl said the offense was directly related to his delusional disorder regarding authority figures.
Clarke argues that some of Eibl's testimony supports favorable inferences for his position. He notes that on cross-examination Eibl referred to Clarke as "a legal litigious assaulter." Clarke claims that threatening litigation is not evidence that he constitutes a danger of physical harm. True, but the issue is not whether some evidence, taken in isolation, supports Clarke. Our task is to determine whether substantial evidence, when reviewing the whole record, supports the judgment. Clarke suggests that there are some inconsistencies between Eibl's direct and cross-examination testimony that impeach his credibility. But the weight, credibility, and the inferences from any conflicts in Eibl's testimony were matters for the trial court to resolve. (People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) After resolving conflicts in a witness's testimony, the trial court may rely on the portions of the testimony it believes to be true to support its findings and its fact finding will be upheld on appeal. (People v. Woolwine (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 385, 389; People v. White (1954) 43 Cal.2d 740, 747-748.)
Clarke notes that Eibl said the psychiatric treatment team was of the opinion that Clarke had "maintained psychiatric stability in the last six months" and he was not violent to team members. But that involves his conduct within a rigidly confined and controlled environment. That is substantially different from the type of environment he would face in a more open setting in the community. Eibl, the expert witness at trial, noted that, although Clarke had attended treatment sessions, Clarke failed to seek treatment for his delusions. Eibl concluded that Clarke's failure to have a "relapse prevention plan" relating to his delusions prevented him from resolving his disorder. He said Clarke "has to discuss his delusions for him to go back to the community and not become as aggressive and violent as he has in the past."
Clarke argues that the claim that he would be violent to authority figures in the community is refuted by the fact that he "remained non-violent in the presence of authority figures" for a long period and while in court. But during one pretrial session, Clarke had to be removed from the courtroom after he became irrational and accused the judge of "treason." At trial, Clarke again became disruptive and had to be removed after he flung "a large envelope" at the trial judge.
From his evaluation of Clarke, Eibl was entitled to make "a prediction of" Clarke's "future dangerousness" if he were to be released into the community. (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24.) He was not limited solely to a review of Clarke's behavior toward staff during the last six months of treatment, and the concept of "'substantial danger of physical harm' does not require proof of a recent overt act." (§ 2962, subd. (f); People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1161.) Eibl's testimony demonstrates that Clarke's mental condition makes him dangerous to others. He testified that "[t]he problem has been when [Clarke] believes that his rights are being violated he gets very much excited..., hypomanic about it, and it feels as though he may attack." Clarke's delusions about being the victim of a government conspiracy lead him to "feel justified in reacting violently." Eibl said Clarke's overt symptoms, auditory hallucinations and mood disorders were out of control at the time of the BPT hearing, and at trial. Clarke's disruptive courtroom conduct bolstered this testimony.
Based on Eibl's testimony, the trial court could reasonably infer that Clarke is dangerous to others. The evidence is sufficient. We have reviewed Clarke's remaining contentions and conclude he has not shown error.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.