Opinion
H049360
11-18-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN CIPRES, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C2106670)
Wilson, J.
Juan Cipres, Jr., appeals from the sentence imposed following his no contest plea to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)). He argues that under Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950), his three-year term of probation must be reduced to two years. We conclude that Cipres's offense of conviction falls under the exception, found in section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1), permitting three-year probation terms. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The facts are taken from the affidavit prepared in connection to Cipres's arrest warrant.
On April 15, 2021, Cipres and another unidentified individual approached the victim, Jesus Garcia, in a park. Cipres asked Garcia where he was from and whether he was affiliated with a gang. He then took Garcia's wallet, backpack, and various electronic devices, including a smartphone, tablet, and a smartwatch. During the robbery, Cipres pointed a semiautomatic handgun at Garcia. Garcia tried to resist but was struck by the handgun several times before Cipres fled. Garcia was transported to Valley Medical Center, where he was told he suffered a skull fracture. The next day, he positively identified Cipres from a photographic lineup.
On May 17, 2021, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Cipres with robbery in the second degree (count 1; § 212.5, subd. (c)), and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2; § 245, subd. (a)(4)). As to count 1, it was alleged that Cipres inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
On May 27, 2021, Cipres pleaded no contest to second degree robbery. On the advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form, Cipres agreed to a stipulated sentence of nine months in county jail and up to five years of formal probation. At the change of plea hearing, the prosecution stated that the "agreed upon disposition is that Mr. Cipres will be placed on two years of formal probation and, among other things, be ordered to serve a nine-month county jail sentence."
On July 20, 2021, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, ordered Cipres to serve a nine-month county jail sentence, and granted him three years of formal probation. Defense counsel interrupted the pronouncement of sentence, stating "[i]t should be two years of formal probation." The court replied, "It's a strike. It's an exception to the-" Defense counsel again interrupted, noting that the probation department had recommended two years of probation. The court responded, "Right," but then stated that probation sent an "email saying[,] is it two [years] or three [years][,] because" robbery is "an exception, because it's one of the serious or violent felonies. So it is formal probation for a period of three years." After imposing and staying various fines and fees based on an inability to pay, the court dismissed the assault count and the great bodily injury enhancement. Cipres filed a timely notice of appeal.
At a separate hearing, Cipres was ordered to pay victim restitution in the amount of $9,972.42.
II. Discussion
Cipres argues that under Assembly Bill 1950, his term of probation is limited to two years. The Attorney General contends that Cipres's conviction falls under an exception to the two-year limitation, and therefore the three-year probation term is not precluded.
A. Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 amended section 1203.1 to limit the maximum probation term that may be imposed for most felony offenses. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) Prior to the effective date of the legislation, a court could impose felony probation for a period "not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence," except "where the maximum possible term of the sentence [was] five years or less," in which case probation could "continue for not over five years." (Former § 1203.1, subd. (a).) As amended, section 1203.1 now states that felony probation "may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years." (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).)
Relevant to this appeal, there are exceptions to this two-year limitation. Section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1) provides that the two-year felony probation limitation set forth in section 1203.1, subdivision (a) "shall not apply to: [¶] An offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 and an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." (§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1)).
At the time of sentencing, these limitations were set forth in former section 1203.1, subdivision (m). Effective January 1, 2022, and with no substantive changes, these exceptions were renumbered to subdivision (l) of section 1203.1. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 177 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 22, pp. 32-35.)
B. Standard of Review
We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61.) When interpreting a statute, "[w]e look first to' "the language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context." '" (Ibid.)" '[I]f the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature ....'" (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357.) "To that end, we generally must 'accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose,' and have warned that '[a] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.'" (Ibid.) The words of a statute must be viewed in context and" 'statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.'" (Ibid.) If there is uncertainty," 'consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.'" (Id. at p. 358.) And "[w]hen a statute is ambiguous, we may consider its legislative history and the statute's purpose." (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 182.)
C. Cipres's Offense of Conviction Falls Within an Exception to the Two-Year Felony Probation Limitation Under Assembly Bill 1950
Cipres argues that the exception to the two-year probation limitation under section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1) does not apply here based on the plain statutory language. He asserts that the exception is for "an offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 and an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions" (§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1), italics added), and that the use of the conjunctive "and" means "both requirements must be met before a term of probation" can exceed two years.
In People v. Schulz (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 887 (Schulz), the Court of Appeal considered the scope of the exception to the two-year probation limitation now found in section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1). In Schulz, the defendant argued he was entitled to a reduction of his probationary term from three years to two years under Assembly Bill 1950. (Schulz, supra, at p. 891.) The defendant conceded that his offense of conviction " 'mandates a period of probation of "not less than three" years.'" (Ibid.) "However, he claim[ed] that the exclusion under section 1203.1, subdivision [(l)(1)], applies only to those offenses that are both a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c), and include a 'specific probation length[] within its provision.'" (Ibid.)
The Schulz court disagreed with the defendant's claim that he was entitled to a reduction of his probationary term. (Schulz, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) Rather, the court concluded that the exception to the two-year probation limitation now found in section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1) applies both to "felony offenses that fall under section 667.5, subdivision (c), and, separately, those felony offenses that include specific probation lengths within their provisions." (Schulz, supra, at p. 898.) The court first observed that the relevant language excludes" '[a]n offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 and an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.'" (Id. at p. 897.) The court reasoned that if it were "to adopt [the] defendant's interpretation, it would render the second usage of the term 'an offense' superfluous, or a surplusage." (Ibid.)
The court also found support for its interpretation in the legislative history. The court noted that Assembly Bill 1950 was amended three times, with the third and final amendment adding the qualifying language now found in section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1). (Schulz, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 897-898.) As relevant here, the court quoted from the committee report on the third and final amended version, which stated," 'This bill provides that the two-year probation limit does not apply to offenses defined by law as violent felonies, or to an offense that includes a specific probation term within its provisions.'" (Id. at p. 898.) The court also quoted from the committee report's summary of "the author's comments on the matter: The legislative amendment under Assembly Bill No. 1950 'does not include offenses falling under section 667.5 of the State Penal Code, crimes committed against monetary property (i.e., "white collar crimes") valued at over $25,000 nor any specific crimes with probation term lengths identified by statute.'" (Ibid.) Thus, the court determined that the addition of the limiting language and the intent expressed with respect to those limitations supported its conclusion that exclusion to the two-year limitation for felony probation applies both to offenses specified under section 667.5, subdivision (c) and to felony offenses that include specific probation lengths. (Schulz, supra, at p. 898.)
Finally, the Schulz court found that the defendant's interpretation of the law would lead to absurd consequences, noting that "serious crimes categorized as violent offenses under section 667.5, subdivision (c), such as murder, mayhem, rape, and sodomy, do not include specific probation terms, and, therefore, would not be excluded under [the] defendant's interpretation of section 1203.1, subdivision [(l)(1)]." (Schulz, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) The defendant did "not address this argument," nor did he identify any felony offense "that would qualify for exclusion under his interpretation of section 1203.1, subdivision [(l)(1)], which would render the subdivision meaningless." (Id. at pp. 898-899.)
Here, as in Schulz, we conclude that under the plain language of section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1), the exception to the two-year probation limitation for felony offenses applies to both "[a]n offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5" and "an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." (§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1), italics added.) And in that respect, because Cipres's offense of conviction, robbery, is "an offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5" (§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1)), it is excluded from Assembly Bill 1950's two-year felony probation limitation. (See § 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) This construction is supported by the relevant legislative history, which makes clear that the two-year limitation" 'does not apply to offenses defined by law as violent felonies, or to an offense that includes a specific probation term within its provisions.'" (Schulz, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) Finally, Cipres's interpretation of section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1) would lead to absurd results. As in Schulz, Cipres "identifies no felony offense that would qualify for exclusion under his interpretation of section 1203.1, subdivision [(l)(1)]." (Schulz, supra, at p. 898.) This would render subdivision (l)(1) "meaningless." As a result, "[n]either the plain language of the provision nor the legislative history supports such an untenable result." (Schulz, supra, at p. 899)
Because Cipres was convicted of an offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c), Assembly Bill 1950's two-year felony probation limitation does not apply to him. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing a three-year term of probation.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Danner, J.