Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. VCF196439. James W. Hollman, Judge.
Michael Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Julie A. Hokans, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gomes, J.
Investigating a double-fatality single-car crash, a California Highway Patrol officer spoke with eyewitnesses who reported that a driver in a sport utility vehicle raced the car at speeds nearing or exceeding 100 miles per hour and took off after the accident. David Christiansen, the sport utility vehicle driver, admitted racing before the day of the crash and admitted speeding on the day of the crash but denied racing on the day of the crash and denied causing the crash. He admitted not stopping after the crash, but claimed he tried to overtake a speeding vehicle that, moments before the crash, cut off the car that crashed. A jury found him guilty of, inter alia, leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, he argues an instructional issue and a sentencing issue. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2008, an eight-count information charged Christiansen with two counts of vehicular manslaughter (counts 1 & 2; Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)), one count of leaving the scene of an accident (count 3; Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)), two counts of felony reckless driving with great bodily injury (counts 4 & 5; § 23104, subd. (b)), one count of exhibition of speed (count 6; § 23109, subd. (c)), one count of misdemeanor reckless driving (count 7; § 23103, subd. (a)), and one count of false evidence of registration (count 8; § 4462.5). On March 10, 2009, the court bifurcated an allegation of a prior Vehicle Code conviction in counts 4 and 5 and granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss count 8.
Later statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise noted.
On March 16, 2009, a jury found Christiansen not guilty in counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 and guilty as charged in counts 3, 6, and 7. On April 15, 2009, the court denied his motion to reduce the crime in count 3 to a misdemeanor, ordered a three-year term of felony probation, and imposed, inter alia, a 180-day county jail term.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Christiansen argues that (1) CALCRIM No. 2140 prejudiced him by not requiring a finding of a causal relationship to the accident and (2) the court committed an abuse of discretion by not treating his leaving the scene of an accident as a misdemeanor.
DISCUSSION
1. CALCRIM No. 2140
Christiansen argues that CALCRIM No. 2140 prejudiced him by not requiring a finding of a causal relationship to the accident. The Attorney General argues that the instruction adequately states the elements of leaving the scene of an accident.
To instruct the jury on the law governing a driver’s failure to perform a duty after a fatal accident, the court gave CALCRIM No. 2140 as follows:
“The defendant is charged in Count 3 with failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused death to another person.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:
“One, while driving, the defendant was involved in a vehicle accident;
“Two, the accident caused the death to [sic] someone else;
“Three, the defendant knew that he had been involved in an accident that injured another person or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that another person had been injured; and
“Four, the defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties:
“A, to immediately stop at the scene of the accident; “B, to provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident; “C, to give to any peace officer at the scene of the accident all of the following information:
“The defendant’s name and current residence address; “The registration number of the vehicle he was driving;
“The…name and the current residence address of the owner of the vehicle if the defendant is not the owner.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.
“The duty to stop immediately means that the driver must stop his or her vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.
“To provide reasonable assistance means the driver must determine what assistance, if any, the injured person needs and make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, either by the driver or someone else. Reasonable assistance includes transporting anyone who has been injured for medical treatment, or arranging the transportation for such treatment, if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if an injured person requests transportation. The driver is not required to provide assistance that is unnecessary or that is already being provided by someone else. However, the requirement that the driver provide assistance…is not excused merely because bystanders are on the scene or could provide assistance.
“The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of who was injured and regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was unavoidable.
“You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant failed to perform at least one of the required duties. You must all agree on which duty the defendant failed to perform.
“To be involved in a vehicle accident means to be connected with the accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the driver’s vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.
“When providing his or her name and address, the driver is required to identify himself or herself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.”
Christiansen professes to have “discovered no case law holding that a driver was ‘involved’ in an accident where no causal relationship was established.” He criticizes CALCRIM No. 2140 for defining “involved” as “connected” in a “natural or logical manner” since a “‘logical’ or ‘natural’ nexus does [not] require any causation. A driver might be naturally connected by mere proximity, or logically connected by a sequence of events that the driver did not ‘cause.’” CALCRIM No. 2140, he argues, “eliminates a necessary element of the crime from the jury’s consideration because it does not require the prosecution to prove a causal nexus between a driver’s actions and the subsequent accident.”
The “foremost rule of statutory construction” is that the courts “‘follow the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law.’” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 75.) As the dictionary definition of “involved” is “affected” or “implicated, ” so the definition of the word in the instruction is “connected” in a “natural or logical manner.” (Webster’s Third New Internat. Dict. (1986) p. 1191; CALCRIM No. 2140.) Congruently, the instruction notes, “It is not necessary for the driver’s vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.” (Ibid.)
The definition in the instruction comes from the statutory requirement that the “driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident.” (§ 20001, subd. (a).) As authority for the definition, CALCRIM No. 2140 relies on two cases the parties discuss at length, People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 (Bammes), and People v. Sell (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 (Sell). (Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Insts. (2009-2010) Com. to CALCRIM No. 2140, vol. 2, p. 175.) Both casesanalyze the word in the statute identically: “‘It seems clear that the word “involved” is there used in the sense of being connected with (an accident) in a natural or logical manner. The statute relates to a driver thus involved in such accident and is in no way made dependent upon whether or not control of a vehicle is retained or lost, or upon who may ultimately be found to be most at fault.’” (Bammes, supra, at p. 631, quoting Sell, supra, at p. 523.) “One can be involved under section 20001 in an accident, ” Bammes notes, “without being its legal cause.” (Ibid.)
Disapproved on another ground by Byers v. Justice Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1039, 1045-1046; cf. People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1547-1548.
Christiansen’s attempt to conflate the word “involved” with causation finds no support in the plain meaning of the word or the statutory construction of the word. His argument that the other verdicts, like his acquittal of vehicular manslaughter, cast doubt on “a causal nexus between [his] actions and the subsequent accident” misconstrues the statute. The gravamen of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident “is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid.” (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1509.) The statute imposes “a standard of conduct for drivers who are involved in accidents causing injury to other persons, whether or not the drivers are responsible for the accident.” (People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425, 432.) “Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated ‘hit-and-run, ’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’” (People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148 (Corners).) CALCRIM No. 2140 correctly instructs that a driver “involved” in a fatal accident has a duty to stop, provide reasonable assistance, and give information to any peace officer at the scene. Christiansen’s argument to the contrary is meritless.
2. Sentencing Discretion
Christiansen argues that the court committed an abuse of discretion by not treating his leaving the scene of an accident as a misdemeanor. The Attorney General argues the contrary.
Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3) grants a court the discretion to designate a crime alternatively punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor as one or the other at the time of sentencing. (People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 433, fn. 4.) On appeal, an “extremely deferential and restrained” abuse of discretion standard governs review of “the court’s broad latitude” of sentencing discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 981 (Alvarez).)
Christiansen’s record showed four Vehicle Code priors for excessive speed – three for violating the basic speed law (§ 22350) and one for driving over 55 miles per hour on a two-lane undivided highway not posted for a higher speed (§ 22349, subd. (b)). As the probation officer noted, he had “an admitted history of street racing.” At the probation and sentencing hearing, Christiansen argued the jury “found not true that [he] caused the accident” and instead found true just “that he was basically there.” Characterizing his post-accident conduct as a “split-second choice” between stopping and going after the person he felt caused the accident, he argued that if he had not called the California Highway Patrol after the accident he probably never would have been found. “Well, I don’t think the jury bought the fact that he was going after somebody that apparently caused the accident, ” the court noted, opining he “left the scene” due to “some guilt for what he had done” and declining his request for misdemeanor sentencing.
Like his instructional argument, Christiansen’s sentencing argument betrays a basic misunderstanding of section 20001, which criminalizes “not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’” (Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 148; ante, part 1.) He did not hit, but he did run. The court, as did the jury, rejected his argument to the contrary. The burden is on the party attacking the sentence “to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977.) Since he fails to make the requisite showing, we presume the court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. (Id. at pp. 977-978.) The court’s discretionary sentence choice stands.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Wiseman, Acting P.J., Hill, J.