Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF126752. Paul E. Zellerbach, Judge.
Jamie L. Popper, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P.J.
Defendant pled guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), during which he discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and unlawfully driving/taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). As part of his plea bargain, he waived his right to appeal. He was sentenced to the agreed-to term of 29 years in prison. There is no certificate of probable cause in the record before this court.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
He appealed, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 493] setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has not done.
After concluding our independent review of the record, we affirm the judgment.
Facts
The trial court accepted as a factual basis for defendant’s plea a police report, which is not part of the record before this court. According to the factual statement in defendant’s brief, he shot at a person he apparently believed had wronged his cousin. A car at the scene which had been driven by defendant had been stolen.
Discussion
The change of plea form states that defendant served 814 days of presentence custody. It then states that that represents 407 days of section 2933 credits, however, the 407 was crossed out and replaced with 122 days and there is one amount written for total credits, which is 1221. At the taking of the plea, the prosecutor noted that the presentence custody days were listed, but she did not know if the conduct credits were enumerated pursuant to section 2933.1. The trial court responded that they were not, then said, “122.” Defense counsel said, “Yes. Thank you.” Counsel then stated there was no legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced and declined the court’s invitation to say anything about sentencing.
122 days represents 15 percent of the 814 days of actual presentence custody to which defendant is entitled under section 2933.1, subdivision (a) because he was convicted of attempted murder. Therefore, defendant was neither denied the benefit of his bargain, nor was his plea unknowing by virtue of the fact that he received only 122 days of custody credits.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI, J., MILLER, J.