Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Superior Court County of Los Angeles, Super. Ct. No. VA097258, Patrick T. Meyers, Judge
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Efrain Valdez Ceja appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) and possession of burglar's tools (§ 466). The trial court sentenced him to a two-year term in state prison. Ceja asks us to independently review the record of the in camera hearing on his Pitchess motion. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction under section 466. While we reject his sufficiency of the evidence claim, we conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for a new Pitchess hearing in which the proper procedure is followed.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Around 2:50 a.m., on September 13, 2006, Los Angeles police officers Nicholas Vasquez and Adam Wallicke responded to a call regarding a burglary in progress at the State Auto Sales car lot. When they arrived at the scene, Officer Wallicke saw Ceja's codefendant, Gregorio Garcia, come out of the lot and stop at a bus bench that had tires and rims hidden behind it. As Officer Wallicke detained Garcia, Officer Vasquez walked through the car lot and saw Ceja squatting next to a Lincoln Navigator with what appeared to be a screwdriver in his hands. The rear end of the Navigator was propped up on egg crates and was missing its tires. Officer Vasquez detained Ceja and took him to the bus bench where Garcia was detained. The officer did not collect the object Ceja was holding at that time. A lug nut wrench, carjack and lug nuts were subsequently found underneath or next to the Navigator, although no screwdriver was ever found. The assistant manager of the car lot verified that the tires and hubcaps found behind the bus bench had been taken from the Navigator and two other vehicles, and that none of the tools found near the Navigator or the egg crates belonged to the lot.
Garcia is not a party to this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
Pitchess
Prior to trial, Ceja filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of complaints regarding Officers Vasquez and Wallicke. The court held an in camera hearing and concluded that no such complaints existed. Ceja asks us to independently review the sealed transcript and records produced in response to his discovery motion. (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 110 [standard of review].)
Having reviewed the sealed transcript, we conclude that the matter must be conditionally reversed for a new Pitchess hearing in which all three of the custodians of records, who have information regarding the officers' personnel files, testify under oath and either provide the court with the entire files or summarize their contents for the court's review. "Although the custodian of records was required to submit for review only those documents that were potentially responsive to the discovery request, our Supreme Court has directed that '[t]he custodian should be prepared to state in chambers and for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not presented to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those were deemed irrelevant or otherwise non-responsive to the defendant's Pitchess motion.' [Citation.] Moreover, 'if the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court.' [Citation.] [¶] Accordingly, in cases such as this where the custodian of records does not produce the entire personnel file for the court's review, he or she must establish on the record what documents or category of documents were included in the complete personnel file. In addition, if it is not readily apparent from the nature of the documents that they are non-responsive or irrelevant to the discovery request, the custodian must explain his or her decision to withhold them. Absent this information, the court cannot adequately assess the completeness of the custodian's review of the personnel files, nor can it establish the legitimacy of the custodian's decision to withhold documents contained therein. Such a procedure is necessary to satisfy the Supreme Court's pronouncement that 'the locus of decisionmaking' at a Pitchess hearing 'is to be the trial court, not the prosecution or the custodian of records.' [Citation.] It is for the court to make not only the final evaluation but to make a record that can be reviewed on appeal." (People v. Guevara (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 62, 68-69.) The custodian must also be placed under oath before responding to the court's questions during the in camera proceeding. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1230, fn. 4.)
The proceedings at issue here were deficient in several respects. Only one of the three custodians of record, who had information regarding the officers' personnel files, actually testified at the in camera hearing, and that testimony was not given under oath. According to that witness, who testified on behalf of the South Gate Police Department, he had no records pertaining to Officer Wallicke because he was "a new officer" who had previously worked for the Torrance Police Department. The witness also testified that a sergeant from the Torrance Police Department had informed him that "there was [sic] no investigations and no internal affairs" regarding Officer Wallicke. No representative from the Torrance Police Department actually appeared at the hearing, and neither Officer Wallicke's personnel files nor a summary of their contents were presented for the court's review. Regarding Officer Vasquez, who was apparently working for the Huntington Park Police Department at the time of the hearing, the custodian of records for that department appeared at the hearing but did not testify. Rather, he merely informed counsel for Ceja's codefendant that he did not have any discoverable records. In light of these errors, we must conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new Pitchess hearing in which the proper procedure is followed. (People v. Guevara, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 69.)
II.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ceja contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for possession of burglar's tools. He argues that there was no evidence from which the jury could have inferred that he possessed any of the tools recovered from the car lot with the intent to break into the interior of any of the vehicles on the lot. According to Ceja, "at best, the jury was presented with circumstantial evidence from which they could infer that [he] used the tools to remove items from the outside of the car. [Italics added.]" We disagree.
In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the judgment and all reasonable inferences are drawn in its favor. (People v. Kelso (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 538, 542.) The judgment will be upheld unless there is no substantial evidence to support the conviction under any hypothesis. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Section 466 provides in pertinent part that "[e]very person having upon him or her or in his or her possession a . . . crowbar, screwdriver, . . . or other instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or enter into any . . . vehicle . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor." While a conviction requires proof of an intent to break into a vehicle, "'. . . an intent to break into a particular [vehicle] is not necessary; a general intent is sufficient. The offense is complete when tools or other implements are procured with intent to use them for a burglarious purpose. [Citation.]'" (People v. Southard (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088.) Such intent is usually proven by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 47.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Ceja possessed the tools recovered from the car lot with the intent to break into at least one of the vehicles on the lot, and not merely to steal tires, hubcaps, or other exterior items. Ceja does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding that he actually or constructively possessed all of the tools recovered from the lot, and the jury could infer from all of the evidence that he intended to use those tools to obtain whatever he might want from the vehicles, be it on the interior or exterior. A crowbar is expressly referenced in section 466 as one of the tools commonly used by vehicle burglars, and Ceja was found to have possessed a crowbar while in the process of stealing items from a vehicle after gaining illegal entry into a car lot in the middle of the night. The fact that his crime was interrupted while he was still in the process of removing items from the outside of the vehicle, does not foreclose the finding that he also intended to proceed to steal items from the interior.
Ceja's citation to In re Young K. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 861, is unavailing. There, the court held that the entry into the headlamp housings of a vehicle to steal its headlamps does not constitute an entry into the vehicle, and therefore does not qualify as vehicular burglary as contemplated by section 459. (Id. at p. 864.) Here, it is undisputed that Ceja did not enter into the Navigator or any other vehicles by stealing their tires and hubcaps. Moreover, the prosecution did not have to prove that Ceja was in the process of breaking into any vehicle in order for the jury to find him guilty of violating section 466. (People v. Southard, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1087-1088.) The facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence support the inference that Ceja possessed the tools with the intent to break into one or more of the vehicles, if necessary, to achieve his criminal objectives. His claim of insufficient evidence accordingly fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a new hearing on Ceja's Pitchess motion in conformance with the procedures described herein. If the trial court finds there are discoverable records, they shall be produced and the court shall conduct such further proceedings as are necessary and appropriate. If the court finds there are no discoverable records, or that there is discoverable information but Ceja cannot establish he was prejudiced by the denial of discovery, the judgment shall be reinstated as of that date.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.